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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the issue of housing demolition by Housing Market Renewal 
Pathfinders (HMRPs), and the potential of community-led alternatives.  It begins with 
an extensive review of the literature relating to HMRPs, focusing on their demolition 
activity and objections to it.  This leads to the development of three theoretical 
propositions; that such demolition schemes can detrimentally affect the capital wealth 
of existing residents; that they can fail to empower residents; and that addressing 
these two issues may lead to more effective interventions.  The thesis explores the 
potential of Community Land Trusts (CLTs) to address issues of resident 
capitalisation and empowerment, particularly in HMRP settings. Using a case study 
strategy the theoretical propositions are tested, and attempts to create a CLT in one 
HMRP area are scrutinised.  The thesis concludes that the propositions made are 
valid for the case, and likely to be valid for similar cases.  It asserts that whilst there 
are a number of challenges in creating CLTs, the model has the potential to capitalise 
and empower and this should be acknowledged and tested further. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
At the turn of the new millennium the issue of low demand for housing, specifically in 
the UK’s northern cities, was vexing politicians, academics and housing practitioners.  
This study commenced in 2005, two years after the Labour government had initiated 
its Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder (HMRP) programme, which was a response 
to the low demand issue.  The HMRP programme, as shall be discussed, gave rise to 
significant opposition related predominantly to the demolition of housing (Leather, 
2010).  This thesis looks at the issue of HMRP demolition, why opposition was so 
vociferous and explores other models of intervention in HMRP areas. 
 
The following chapter presents a brief overview of the subject of study, leading to full 
discussion of the aims and research questions of the thesis. The chapter concludes 
with a description of the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Research focus 
As the UK’s economic vitality has peaked and troughed over the preceding 50 years, 
it has become clear that periods of economic growth have often provided little respite 
for deprived communities.  What is more, in periods of economic hardship such areas 
have often been the ones to have suffered the most (Kearns and Parkes, 2003; 
Tunstall, 2009).   
 
It is perhaps because of this that the footprint of deprivation has remained relatively 
fixed for several decades (Atkinson & Kintrea, 2002).   This has been particularly 
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evident in the UK’s northern cities.  A significant level of outmigration from inner city 
areas (Champion, 2001) has been the product of a variety of social and economic 
forces, as well as government policies.  For over twenty-five years there have been 
sustained attempts to regenerate some of these areas, and whilst some interventions 
have proved effective (Power, 1995), transformational change has been hard to 
secure (Atkinson & Kintrea, 2002).   
 
In the early 2000s, structural problems in the housing markets of northern cities were 
becoming manifest, specifically the areas peripheral to the city centres; their ‘inner 
cores’.  Social housing providers reported intractable problems letting vacant 
dwellings, as well as high turnover rates for their properties (Ferrari & Leather, 2006).  
This is despite there being significant housing need in their area.  Similar problems 
were also evident in the private sector, and this cross-tenure nature of the problem 
(as well its cross-regional characteristics) made some commentators suggest that 
greater forces were at work: regional and sub-regional changes in migration patterns, 
changes in lifestyles, and neighbourhood factors that were causing unpopularity of 
housing (Bramley and Pawson, 2002).     
 
Strategic action, at a large geographical scale, would be needed to prevent 
displacing the problem to nearby areas.  What was needed was intervention that 
would renew failing housing markets.  The model that emerged from a series of 
studies on low demand (Nevin et al, 2001; Lee and Nevin, 2003) was that of Housing 
Market Renewal Pathfinders (HMRPs), whose purpose was to ‘determine the 
trajectory of neighbourhoods’ (Hastings, 2003) and address ‘the mismatch between 
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demand and supply and improve the quality of housing’ (ODPM, 2005). From an 
early stage, it was acknowledged that housing demolition would be an element of 
HMRP’s activity (Audit Commission, 2005), so powers of compulsory purchase were 
strengthened to enable this intervention.   
 
As detailed in the following sections, the initial scale of planned housing demolition 
stimulated interest not only in the housing sector, but also in the mainstream media.  
The issue received prime-time television coverage through programmes such as 
‘Bulldozer Battles’ on ITV (Anderson & Warren, 2006) and Radio 4’s investigation 
entitled ‘Urban Regeneration’ (Law, 2005).  Few in policy circles were disputing the 
need for action.  However, few would also deny the scale of opposition to demolition.  
A number of communities that were subject to housing demolition, or were going 
through the process of compulsory purchase orders, were expressing dissatisfaction 
(and at times outrage) with the activity (Clifton, 2006).   
 
Such opposition to demolition has been vociferous and multi-faceted.  Some 
opponents have focused on the importance of retaining heritage assets and have 
criticised the incentives for demolition rather than refurbishment (SAVE Britain’s 
Heritage, 2006; HCCPA, 2008). Other opponents have focused on the poor value for 
money achieved by HMRPs.  As discussed later in the thesis, other important 
criticisms have emerged relating to the capitalisation and empowerment of residents 
in such interventions. 
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1.2 The research stages 
The research has adopted an inductive strategy in reviewing the literature relating to 
HMRPs, leading to the development of theoretical propositions to test through case 
study research.  In the following chapter a detailed account of the research strategy 
and methods is given, and the rationale for choosing them.  
 
The decision to focus on the HMRP programme was made as a result of the sheer 
scale of controversy and opposition it had sparked in 2005.  The extent of opposition 
to it, and the relative consensus that low demand housing was a problem, made this 
an interesting subject of study. It was hoped that by exploring the programme, and 
trying to understand the opposition to it, the thesis may arrive at some conclusions 
about how HMRPs may better intervene.  Hence the aim throughout has been a 
practical one; to provide intelligence that will enable HMRPs to develop more 
effective interventions. 
 
Given this aim the research has evolved through the following four stages: 
1. Exploration 
2. Theory development 
3. Primary research 
4. Reconciling theory and primary evidence 
 
Below a summary of the purpose and development of each of the four stages is 
given. 
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Stage 1: Exploration 
The research was initially developed through a wide ranging review of literature on 
the HMRP programme, drawing on secondary evidence from a variety of sources. 
This exploration sought to understand the broad context in which the HMRP 
programme emerged, as well as how the programme was conceived and how 
HMRPs have intervened in their local areas. Such a general literature review helped 
narrow the focus of study. 
 
Stage 2: Theory development 
Having demonstrated in the exploration phase the critical role of demolition in HMRP, 
this became the focus of the theory development. Analysing the different types of 
opposition to demolition led to the development of a number of theoretical 
propositions about such interventions, and an assessment of potential alternatives.  
Specific attention is given to Community Land Trusts (CLTs) as such an alternative.  
 
Stage 3: Gathering primary evidence 
In this stage the aim was to test the theoretical propositions by exploring a real world 
example of HMRP demolition.  An explanatory case study (Yin, 2003a) was deemed 
the most appropriate strategy.  This case study uses a variety of evidence to 
chronologically scrutinise a HMRP demolition scheme, as well as looking at a 
community’s attempt to offer an alternative. 
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Stage 4: Reconciling the theory and primary evidence 
In conclusion the theoretical propositions developed in the thesis are assessed for 
validity.  This entails looking at validity for the cases study area and beyond to other 
similar cases, assessing the extent to which generalisations can be made.  
 
1.3 Research aims and questions 
Each stage of the study had an aim and a set of research questions that guided the 
research activity.  These were as follows: 
 
Stage Aim Research questions 
Stage 1: 
Exploration  
 
To build an understanding of 
the HMRP programme and 
to narrow the focus of study 
a. What was HMRP a response to? 
b. How were HMRPs conceived? 
c. How have HMRPs intervened?  
Stage 2: 
Theory 
Development 
To develop theoretical 
propositions regarding 
HMRP interventions 
d. What has been the opposition to 
demolition by HMRPs? 
e. What interventions would address 
such opposition? 
Stage 3: 
Testing 
theories with 
primary 
evidence 
To undertake case study 
research to test the 
theoretical propositions 
f. How did the HMRP intervene? 
g. How much did the intervention 
capitalise residents?  
h. How much did the intervention 
empower residents? 
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Stage 4: 
Reconciling 
the theory 
and evidence 
To make conclusions about 
the validity of the theoretical 
propositions, within the case 
and in general terms 
i. Does the alternative intervention 
have application beyond this case 
study?  
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
The following chapter (Chapter 2) outlines the research strategy and methods 
employed.  Chapter 3 presents a detailed exploration of the HMRP programme.  
Chapter 4 presents a detailed view of opposition to HMRP demolition, and offers a 
set of theoretical propositions about this.  In addition the chapter explores an 
alternative model of intervention. Chapter 5 presents a case study of HMRP 
demolition, giving a chronological account of the intervention and subjecting it to 
analysis.  Chapter 6 concludes by bringing together the learning from the research, 
reflecting on the findings, and assessing the thesis’ contribution to knowledge and its 
limitations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS 
 
The following section explains the research strategy and methods adopted.  It 
provides a record of the key decisions made relating to the strategy and methods, 
highlighting both the strengths and weaknesses of the research.   The section follows 
the order of the research process, starting with a discussion of how the subject of 
HMRPs was selected and how the literature review and the research questions were 
developed.  The section focuses heavily on how the case study was designed and 
the methods employed in it.  The section draws on the wide methodological reading 
undertaken. 
 
2.1 Selecting a subject of study 
To understand the research strategy and methods, and to appraise the reliability of 
the research, an understanding of the history of the study must be provided 
(Silverman, 2005, p.306).  It began in 2005, at a time when the author was 
conducting several research projects with HMRPs in a professional capacity.  This 
familiarity with the HMRP programme, and the desire to undertake longer term 
academic research, were primary motives for undertaking an MSc by Research on 
this subject.  In addition, the HMRP programme was receiving significant attention in 
2005, and hence was a relevant and contemporary subject to study.  At the outset of 
the research it was decided that the study should be of some practical value beyond 
the academic field.  In focusing on the HMRP programme, the hope was that new 
9 
 
knowledge could be contributed that would enable more effective interventions by 
HMRPs.  
 
Having professional experience with a number of HMRPs, before the study was 
initiated, brought both benefits and challenges.  Familiarity with the subject matter 
helped focus the study and relate the literature on HMRPs to real life experience.  
However, such experience had created a number of preconceptions about HMRPs, 
in particular with regard to their consultation processes.  To address this potential 
bias a substantial review of the practices of HMRPs was undertaken to gain a 
broader range of perspectives. 
 
In focusing on HMRPs the thesis is concerned with the development and 
implementation of the programme through the period 2002-2010.  As such, any 
references to ‘government’ relate to the UK’s 1997-2010 Labour government, unless 
otherwise stated.   The period of study roughly covers this Labour government’s final 
two terms in office, though the conclusion introduces some perspectives on the 
current coalition government’s policies, who were elected in May 2010. 
 
2.2 Literature review and research question development 
As noted in the introduction the research began with a detailed review of the 
literature on the HMRP programme.  The purpose of a literature review, as suggested 
by Robinson and Reed (1998), is primarily to establish what is known:  
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‘a systematic search of published work to find out what is already known about the 
intended research topic’ (Robinson and Reed, 1998, p.58)  
 
In the initial stages of the review a diverse range of subjects related to HMR was 
explored; detailed reading on measuring neighbourhood change, resident 
displacement in HMRPs and patterns of urbanisation in the UK were all subjects that 
were explored.  Reading was suggested by a thesis supervisor, and the literature 
review grew organically. It became clear from an early stage that some parameters 
were needed to decide what literature to review. Hence, three research questions 
were developed to guide the review;  
 
• What were HMRPs a response to?  
• How were HMRPs conceived?  
• How have HMRPs intervened in their local areas?   
 
In the course of answering these questions the focus narrowed onto the issue of 
HMRP demolition and the widespread opposition to it.  A further set of research 
questions were developed at this stage relating to this and how HMRP interventions 
may counter such opposition.  Answering these research questions led to the 
development of a number of theoretical propositions.  The intention was to test the 
theoretical propositions through primary research.  This gave rise to a further set of 
research questions to guide the primary research.  In this way the research questions 
were developed at each stage, guiding the exploration, then the theory development 
and finally the primary research.  The literature review performed a crucial function in 
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determining ‘the questions that are most significant for a topic and gaining some 
precision in formulating these questions’ (Cooper, 1984).  At the start of each 
chapter, we detail the research questions driving that stage of the research. 
 
Beyond reviewing the documents relating to HMR, literature relating to social 
research methods was also reviewed.  Suitable research strategies were explored 
that would be appropriate for the emerging focus on HMRP demolition.  Significant 
reading was conducted on the issue of inductive versus deductive research designs.  
This learning shall not be repeated here, but it has informed the eventual research 
strategy.  The research has sought to balance inductive and deductive research 
practices.  The literature review was conducted in an inductive manner, collecting 
data before generating theoretical propositions (May, 2001, p.31).  Following this a 
more deductive approach was adopted in testing the theoretical propositions through 
further research (Popper, 2003). 
  
2.3 Choosing the research strategy 
Having formed a number of propositions about HMRP demolition (see Chapter 4) 
several options for further research were considered.  Case study research had an 
initial appeal as it would enable a testing of the propositions.  Having reviewed 
various research strategies it became clear that case studies had a number of 
advantages.  Firstly, the case study strategy was deemed appropriate when ‘a how or 
why question is being asked about contemporary events’ (Yin, 2003a, p.9). This fitted 
the requirements of this research. In the formation of the theoretical propositions 
about HMRP demolition a number of ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions were raised, for 
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instance, how do HMRPs implement their demolition programmes?   Secondly, the 
reading undertaken suggested that a case study approach would allow researchers 
to reflect the multi-faceted nature of social phenomena, removing the requirement to 
isolate certain variables.  When big and complex questions need to be asked, such 
as how much do interventions empower residents, case studies allow the researcher 
to look across a multitude of factors, influences and issues:  
 
‘..case studies allow investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events such as individual life cycles, organisational 
and managerial processes and neighbourhood change’ (Yin, 2003a, p.2). 
 
The third reason for selecting a case study research strategy, and related to the 
above, is that case studies are of particular value when looking at decision-making.  
Such an approach enables an unpicking of the reasons why events took the course 
they did, and issues of implementation: 
 
‘the essence of the case study...is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of 
decisions; why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what 
result’ (Schramm, 1971).  
 
Given the focus on HMRP interventions, the case study strategy seemed highly 
appropriate. 
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However, case study research is not without its critics.  Whilst the case study strategy 
has won favour among sections of the social research community, it is still viewed by 
many as a lesser alternative to surveys, experiments and histories.  The case study 
can be justifiably seen as having certain limitations (Yin, 2003a): 
 
• lack of statistical generalisation and the application of ‘sampling logic’ 
• inability to offer predictive mechanisms; and 
• limited capacity to provide explanatory or descriptive insight 
 
The case study for this thesis was designed to counter the first two limitations.  At no 
point does the study attempt to make statistical generalisations or predictions (see 
sub-section 2.5 below for a discussion of generalisability).  The idea that case studies 
struggle to provide explanatory and descriptive insight can be challenged.  In sub-
section 2.4 below an argument is made for the use case studies in explaining and 
describing contemporary events.  In reviewing the methodological literature there are 
strong arguments for adopting a case study strategy in this research, especially given 
the focus on government policy and implementation.  Coffield (1980) succinctly 
articulates this as such: 
 
‘The value of a detailed case study such as this is that it presents a testing 
ground for policy; the central questions are not only about the typical families, 
but also about the way in which a national policy can influence the particular 
cases which this study describes.’ (Coffield et al, 1980, p.15). 
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2.4 Choosing the type of case study 
Before designing the case study a number of well-regarded and popular case studies 
were reviewed (Liebow, 1967; Allison, 1971). Following this a detailed reading of 
Yin’s seminal publication on case study research (2003a) was undertaken.  In this 
publication Yin presents three types of case study research: 
 
• Exploratory – Data is collected prior to any theory development.  Such case 
studies focus on “what” questions, such as what are the ways of intervening in 
low demand areas?  
 
• Descriptive – Such case studies take exploration a step further and try to 
obtain data on particular issues. Research questions here can focus on “what” 
questions, but perhaps lead to deeper enquiry, asking questions such as what 
actions were taken?  
 
• Explanatory – The aim is to explain why or how something happens or 
happened. Such case studies require some theory development to direct the 
data collection. The research questions are likely to be of the “how” or “why” 
type, for instance, why did an intervention take place?   
 
Others commentators have added to the list of case study types (Stake, 1995), but 
for expediency Yin’s basic typology was used.  Yin suggests that the choice of case 
study type is dependent on a number of factors; the type of research questions 
posed, the control of the investigator over events, and the degree of focus on 
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contemporary or historical events.  Having developed an initial theory, leading to the 
positing of ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions, meant that an explanatory case study 
design was appropriate.  Such studies lend themselves to the ‘examination of 
contemporary events but where relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated’ (Yin, 
2003a, p.7).  The proposed case study of a recent HMRP intervention, which had 
been completed and therefore immune from manipulation by the researcher, seemed 
to fit the criteria for an explanatory case study.  
 
As noted above, such explanatory case studies require some propositions or theory 
to guide case selection and data collection: 
   
‘For case studies, theory development as part of the design phase is essential, 
whether the ensuing case study’s purpose is develop or test a theory...it is not 
only an immense aid in defining the appropriate research design and data 
collection, but also becomes the main vehicle for generalising the results of the 
case study’ (Yin, 2003, p.28). 
 
This asserts the importance of the initial stage of research, in reviewing the literature, 
narrowing the focus of the research and formulating theories.  This has enabled a 
‘hypothetical story about why acts, events, structure and thoughts occur’ (Sutton and 
Staw, 1995, p.378) to be developed.  Having such a story aided case study selection 
and help decide which case best met the needs of the research question (see sub-
section 2.5 below).  
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2.5 Ensuring a good case study design  
Designing the case study in line with accepted social science practices has been a 
priority throughout.  It is suggested that: 
 
‘...a good case study design, at a minimum, involves defining your case, 
justifying your choice of single or multiple case study, and deliberately adopting 
or minimising theoretical perspectives’ (Green et al, 2006, p.114). 
 
These three issues have been rigorously addressed.  Taking each in turn, the 
rationale for making certain choices about case study design is explained below. 
 
Defining the case 
In defining the case to be studied Yin (2003a) urges that the ‘unit of analysis’ is 
defined.  In simple terms this might be a person, a geographical area or an institution.  
After developing our theoretical propositions and a set of research questions, it 
became clear that the unit of analysis needed to be more specific than just a 
geographical area or an institution.  The research questions demanded an 
examination of the decisions, actions and interventions of a HMRP within one or 
more geographies.   Reputable studies from the field of case study research have 
shown how this design can be appropriate when studying implementation processes, 
or programmes for sociological or organisational change (Feagin et al,1991).  In such 
case studies, the unit of analysis is a programme, rather than a simple geography or 
organisation.  The case study design has been built on such learning. 
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It is legitimate to ask how the case(s) were to be selected. Methodological reading 
had suggested that cases should be selected on the basis of those which ‘best 
illuminate your research questions’ (Green et al, 2006, p.121). Therefore, the 
theoretical propositions and research questions required the identification of a case 
(or cases) with both of the following criterion: 
 
I. An area that had been the recipient of HMRP demolition 
II. An area that had developed a CLT in response to demolition 
 
The first criterion created a number of challenges.  There are various instances of 
HMRP demolition nationally, but access to primary and secondary evidence is 
challenging because of the high profile and controversial nature of such 
interventions. Few HMRP staff wanted to be interviewed or provide documentary 
evidence (see sub-section 2.7 below).  In addition, because of the stipulation that 
demolition had already taken place, it was likely that residents would have been 
displaced making them hard to find to interview.  The first two years of study were 
spent trying to engage HMRPs in the research, but few were willing to participate.  
Various HMRPs were contacted via letter and email but without response.   
 
The second criterion made identifying a case equally difficult.  There are very few 
instances of CLTs in HMRP demolition areas, though some examples do exist.  In 
the course of trying to find a case that met the two criterions, a number of academics 
and specialists in the HMRP and CLT field were contacted.  This revealed a number 
of cases in the UK and in the United States (US), but none that met the criteria.  
18 
 
Finally, a suggestion was made by an academic at the University of Birmingham that 
Slater Street (in Stoke on Trent) might be an appropriate case.  The area had been 
subject to HMRP demolition, and whilst a CLT had not been formed, attempts had 
been made to develop one.  In addition, it would be possible to speak to a resident 
still living in the area. 
 
These pragmatic considerations drove the selection of Slater Street as the case 
study.  Various attempts were made to engage the HMRP, but these failed (see sub-
section 2.7 below). 
 
Single case versus multiple cases 
There are several good reasons for conducting multiple case studies.  Multiple case 
designs are often regarded as more compelling and robust, and offer the researcher 
the opportunity to make comparisons between cases. Nonetheless there are powerful 
arguments for single case designs: 
 
‘The single case design is eminently justifiable under certain conditions – when 
the case represents (a) a critical test of a theory, (b) a rare or unique 
circumstance’ (Yin, 2003a, p.47). 
 
It became clear having developed the theoretical propositions, and having 
experienced the difficulty of identifying a suitable case, that Slater Street was indeed 
both a critical test and a unique circumstance.  As suggested by Flyvbjerg (2006) 
practical considerations, such as those experienced in this study, rather than logical 
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considerations, often governs case selection.  When researching niche areas, with 
few practical examples to build on, case selection becomes an art and not a science.  
It is with such considerations in mind that a single-case design was adopted.  
Accepting the limitations of this approach, it nonetheless enabled significant time and 
effort to be invested in understanding the case, and identifying multiple perspectives 
within the case. 
 
Critics of the case study method may argue that neither single nor multiple case 
designs enable ‘generalisation’ from the case to a wider population.  Indeed, 
statistical generalisation is not possible from the case study in this thesis.  The 
findings presented here are not representative of all HMRP demolition areas, nor do 
our conclusions on CLTs hold for all such developments.  Yet some commentators 
have argued that such formal generalisation is overvalued: 
 
 ‘One can often generalise on the basis of a single case, and the case study 
may be central to scientific development via generalisation as supplement or 
alternative to other methods. But formal generalisation is overvalued as a 
source of scientific development, whereas ‘the force of example’ is 
underestimated.’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.228) 
 
How then does generalisation from case studies take place, if not formally? In 
conducting the case study, the aim has been to elucidate some of the complexities of 
an individual case, which facilitates a new and more informed understanding of 
similar cases.  This is called analytic generalisation (Yin, 2003a).  The case study 
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provides context-dependent conclusions; where similar cases have comparable 
contexts, the learning can be transferred.  The case allows for the expansion and 
generalisation of a theory, rather than enumerating frequencies (Yin, 2003a, p.10).  
In this sense the thesis’ conclusions are not generalisable to all areas of HMRP 
demolition, but those with specific conditions and contexts. 
   
Theoretical perspectives 
The third factor in good case study design is deciding whether theoretical 
perspectives are to be minimised or actively adopted.  The development and role of 
the theoretical propositions in this study has been discussed above.  It suffices to say 
that a number of theoretical propositions were adopted prior to case study research. 
Such practices are deemed appropriate where researchers are inexperienced in case 
study research.  Greater challenges are posed for those wishing to conduct case 
studies with minimal recourse to theories (Yin, 2003a). 
 
Hence we have addressed the three key issues in case study design.  In addition 
attempts have also been made to meet Yin’s (2003a) quality criteria; that case 
studies construct validity, have internal validity, ensure external validity and are 
reliable; they provide data in a way that has maximised the objectivity and 
independence of the researcher; the research is conducted ethically; the case 
studies enable theory development and ‘analytic’ generalisations.   
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2.6 Case study structure 
In considering how to analyse and report the case study, a great deal of thought was 
given to how the case study should be structured.  Using Yin’s six structural types1
 
 
(2003a, p.152) an assessment of the best structure for the study was made, in light of 
the purpose, the theoretical propositions and the research questions of the study.  
Having an explanatory case study design made a chronological structure the most 
appropriate, enabling an explanation of ‘causal sequences’ occurring linearly over 
time (Yin, 2003a, p.153).  Given the research questions for the case study, which 
relate to how HMRP intervened over a period of time, a chronological structure 
seemed prudent. 
Having opted for a chronological structure, issues of presentation and interpretation 
of evidence were then dealt with.  Cautionary words on the ‘mixing of evidence and 
interpretation’ were noted, and how this ‘may be taken as a sign that you do not 
understand the difference between the two’ (Green et al, 2006, p.117).  The case 
study was therefore structured into sections; the first and second sections present 
evidence on the broad context for the case and the chronology of the intervention. 
This evidence is presented with as little interpretation as possible. The third section 
interprets and analyses this evidence to see whether it supports the theoretical 
propositions made.    
 
                                            
1 The six structural types are; linear-analytic, comparative, chronological, theory building, ‘suspense’, 
unsequenced. 
22 
 
2.7 Methods employed in the case study 
In advance of deciding which research methods to employ, a case study protocol was 
developed to guide data collection and analysis.  The protocol documents such 
things as research questions, whilst also describing the ‘general rules and 
procedures to be followed’ (Yin, 2003a, p.67).  The case study protocol evolved 
throughout the study and is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
It was decided at an early stage, where possible, to triangulate types and sources of 
data.  This meant adopting different data collection methods (e.g. interviewing or 
document reviews), as well as identifying different sources of data (e.g. resident 
interviews or HMRP documents)  By triangulating the data differing perspectives 
were to be teased out.  Triangulation helps achieve a sense of clarity by seeing 
phenomena in different ways and from different perspectives (Flick, 1982).  In 
addition, where different data sets confirmed each other it instilled greater confidence 
in their validity (Niglas, 2004).  The subject of study made such triangulation crucial.  
From an early stage it was clear that the perspectives of the HMRP were significantly 
at odds with that of affected residents.  Triangulation was central to getting to an 
accurate and balanced view of events. 
 
With the requirements of triangulation in mind, the case study was formed from three 
types of data, providing three different perspectives: 
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Figure 1: Data types and sources 
Data set Data type Perspective 
Public inquiry evidence 
and HMRP documentation 
Written documents • The HMRP and local 
authority officers 
• External researchers 
Resident/activist  
testimony 
Face to face interviews • Residents/activists 
affected by demolition 
Local media coverage Newspaper articles • The views of the wider 
community  
 
The methods of data collection for each data set are presented below, along with 
reflections on the value and limitations of these methods.  
 
Public inquiry evidence  
Following case study selection a large amount of documentary evidence was 
amassed.  This evidence had been submitted by the HMRP to a public inquiry 
conducted in 2008.  This public inquiry was sanctioned by the Secretary of State to 
adjudicate on the proposed demolition activity in the case study.  The documentation 
provided a wealth of information not only on the lead up to and implementation of 
demolition, but also on how decisions were made and the evidence supporting them.  
In total over 30 documents were formally reviewed, comprising over 1000 pages of 
data. The documentation contained the following types of evidence: 
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• Proof of evidence – personal testimonies from HMRP and local authority 
officers related to decision-making processes and the evidence supporting 
demolition 
• Formal decision making documentation – such as reports to the Local 
Authority cabinet and minutes of local Overview and Scrutiny Commissions 
• External research  - such as Neighbourhood Renewal Assessments, Stock 
Condition Surveys and community consultations 
• External masterplanning documents 
• Correspondence with residents – such as letters and leaflets 
• Correspondence between the HMRP/local authority and central government 
• Local authority policy documents – such as relocation and compensation 
policies 
 
Such was the wealth of evidence a rigorous system for analysis was required.  The 
bulk of the documentation was in the form of Proofs of Evidence, this evidence was 
reviewed using a coding matrix to segment the data into analytical units.  Choosing 
the ‘labels’ for these analytical units was a key issue for consideration, as they would 
attribute emphasis or focus (Merriam, 1998).  The case study research questions 
helped guide the segmentation, ensuring the capture of data relevant to our 
theoretical propositions.  Whilst such methods provided a rigor to the analysis a 
formal content analysis of these documents was not undertaken (Krippendorff, 2004). 
 
Analysing the Proofs of Evidence in this way gave a detailed picture of the 
chronology of intervention from the perspective of the HMRP and local authority staff.  
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Such testimony however, being personal accounts of events, raised numerous 
questions.  In order to answer these questions, and develop a more rounded view, 
other documentary evidence was reviewed.  For instance, the Proofs of Evidence 
raised numerous questions regarding the two Neighbourhood Renewal Assessments 
(NRAs) carried out in the case study area.  Hence, all the available NRA documents 
were examined and used to either verify or falsify the Proofs of Evidence.  In this 
way, all of the documents for the public inquiry were reviewed.  
 
The documentary evidence from the public inquiry provides the basic narrative of 
intervention by HMRP.  However there was an awareness that such evidence 
presents only one version of events; the view of officers.  Following Lefebvre’s work 
on The Production of Space (1991), it was noted how professionals, such as urban 
planners, have a different conception of space from those who live in that space.  
Resident views based on ‘lived’ space, loaded with ‘shared experiences and 
interpretations at a profound level’ (Liggett, 1995, p.251) may be at odds with 
professionals’ views based on ‘conceived’ space, ‘intellectualised through codified 
languages of planning schemes and design discourse’. (Dovey, 1999, p.46).  Given 
our theoretical propositions about the empowerment of residents, it was imperative 
that a resident’s account of events was secured, to balance the narrative of 
professionals.   
 
Resident/activist testimony  
To achieve this balance in the narrative, semi-structured interviews were undertaken 
with a local resident and a local activist.  At the time of the public inquiry, demolition 
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of dwellings had already started.  When it came to planning the interviews, only 5 
residents remained in the case study area.  The limited number of remaining 
residents, along with the inevitable sensitivities around their situation, made access 
to resident interviewees challenging.  The aspiration was to interview residents that 
represented the views of objectors to demolition.  The fact that the demolition plans 
had been subject to a public inquiry made it obvious that not all residents supported 
this intervention.  It was a significant priority that their perspectives were represented.  
In addition, the hope was to find officers or local politicians that presented an 
alternative perspective on the decision-making process, as well as residents that did 
not object to demolition. 
 
In the course of developing the case study, conversations were held with a number of 
residents, along with consultants active in the case study area.  However, many of 
these conversations were informal and off-the-record and hence could not be 
included in the evidence base.  After many attempts at securing formal interviews, 
arrangements were made to interview one resident objector, as well as one former 
local councillor.  The latter had objected to the local authority’s decision to demolish 
whilst in his role as ward councillor.  The resident interviewee was identified via a 
colleague at the University of Birmingham, who had previously been in contact with 
the resident.  This resident in turn helped identify further potential interviewees, as a 
process of ‘snowballing’ interviewees commenced (Babbie, 2010, p. 193).  As such 
contact with the former local councillor was made.  Despite such interviews, no 
formal interviewing was undertaken with HMRP staff or local authority officers.  
Contact was made with two officers in 2010 to request interviews.  No response was 
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received to either request.  Following this a list of questions was submitted to the 
HMRP via email.  Again, no response was offered.  In light of this, the research has a 
number of limitations (see sub-section 2.8 below).  
 
Semi-structured interviews were used to gather the testimonies of the resident and 
local councillor.  The adaptability of semi-structured interviews was of particular 
benefit, as it allowed for unforeseen evidence to arise.  Given the reliance on 
documentary evidence from the HMRP and local authority, such flexibility was 
imperative in allowing different perspectives to surface. The overall result was a 
richer content than quantitative structured interviews.  Such interviews enable 
interviewees to talk freely and set the pace of the interview (Stone, 1984). It was 
however necessary for the interviews to have some structure so as to collect 
evidence directly related to the theoretical propositions and research questions.  
 
A topic guide was developed for each interview.  The topic guides opened with an 
explanation of the research, covered ethical issues of anonymity, quoting and audio 
recording, as well as the anticipated length of the interview.  It commenced with 
simple, non-emotive questions to make the interviewee feel comfortable. The topic 
guide was developed around the key research questions for the case study.  It 
ensured that views on the intervention and how it was implemented were collected. In 
addition, it asked direct questions about the creation of a CLT in that area. An 
example topic guide is included in Appendix 2.   
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In collecting and analysing such testimonies, the important role of the interviewer has 
to be acknowledged.  The research has followed Silverman (2005) in his assessment 
of the role of the interviewer: 
 
‘The assembly of narratives in interviews (or conversations) is always a two-way 
process. Therefore, we must see the interviewer’s questions not as (possibly 
distorted) gateways to the authentic account but as part of the process through which 
a narrative is collectively assembled’ (Silverman, 2005, p.47). 
 
Significant attempts have been made to honestly reflect how the research questions 
and theoretical propositions guided the interview structure.  This has purposefully led 
to the emphasis of certain evidence, specifically that which enables the research 
questions to be answered, or the theoretical propositions to be verified or falsified. 
 
The interviews were recorded so that transcripts could be prepared.  The transcripts 
were coded to segment the data, and a number of themes emerged.  When coding 
the data, specific attention was given to evidence that validated or falsified the 
documentary evidence from the public inquiry.  In writing up the case study, resident 
testimony has been used where it is at odds with, corroborates or adds depth to the 
documentary evidence.    
 
Local media coverage 
The above two data sets contrasted markedly in reference to certain HMRP activities.  
Differing sources and data collection methods had secured differing perspectives on 
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the HMRP’s intervention.  However, in order to triangulate the data a third source and 
type of data set was required. To meet this need a decision was taken to analyse 
local media and press coverage of the demolition in the case study area.  Such data 
offered two benefits; firstly, it provided a non-professional perspective, and gave an 
indication of the wider community’s views of the intervention; secondly, as the public 
inquiry evidence covered the period 2002-2008 there was a gap in evidence from 
2008 onwards.  Local media coverage offered a recent account of events in the case 
study area, and filled the gaps in the chronology of the intervention. 
 
The main source of such data was the local newspaper, the Stoke Sentinel.  To 
gather all the content on the case study, searches on key phrases were undertaken 
to identify relevant articles; ‘Slater Street’ and ‘demolition’.  Each article was 
reviewed, looking specifically for alternative perspectives on the intervention.  A 
number were found, and have been used in the case study report.  In addition to 
reviewing individual articles attempts were made to trace a ‘conversation’ through the 
articles, to see if a general view was presented (Sacks, 1992).  It emerged that most 
coverage criticised the intervention, and this was factored into the interpretation of 
the evidence. 
  
2.8 Limitations of the research 
The limitations of this research relate primarily to the quantity of interview evidence 
that could be gathered.  The challenging and sensitive nature of housing demolition, 
made setting up interviews difficult.  The lack of interview evidence from HMRP or 
local authority officers means that some of the ‘off-the-record’ views of decision-
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making have been missed. In addition, having conducted only two interviews with 
objectors (one resident and one activist) arguably too much weight has been given to 
the views of a few individuals.  This potentially biases the study toward their 
perspectives, and misses alternative resident views.  It is hoped that in triangulating 
data this potential limitation has been mitigated. 
 
The study does not allow for statistical generalisation.  It is not permissible to suggest 
findings hold for all HMRP demolition areas and that they will have predicative 
accuracy in all such areas. However, such learning can be applied and translated for 
similar contexts, and this is its practical use.  This issue of generalisation is 
addressed in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EXPLORING HOUSING MARKET RENEWAL 
 
As detailed in the previous section, the research was initiated with a broad review of 
the literature relating to the HMRP programme.  This chapter presents some of the 
key learning from this literature review, which is drawn on throughout the rest of the 
thesis.  To set some parameters around this literature review three research 
questions were developed: 
 
• What were HMRPs a response to? 
• How were HMRPs conceived? 
• How have HMRPs intervened? 
 
The sub-sections below correspond to these research questions.  Sub-section 3.1 
presents some of the broad socio-economic, policy and housing market context for 
the HMRP programme.  Sub-section 3.2 describes the rationale and objectives for 
HMRPs and the initial inception of the Pathfinders. Finally, sub-section 3.3 explores 
the interventions made by HMRPs, focusing down on their demolition activity.  
 
3.1 What were HMRPs a response to? 
At the turn of the new millennium, as the first notions of the HMRP programme were 
emerging, the UK was experiencing its longest period of economic growth since the 
end of the Second World War (Cole and Nevin, 2004, p.6). This growth had been 
coupled with stability; analysis of the UK’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
inflation rates shows that since 1992 the UK had experienced stability that has not 
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been seen since 1945 (Benati, 2004, p. 714).  The resilience of the UK economy to 
global affairs and the flexibility of its labour and product markets were cited as 
reasons for such ‘impressive’ performance (OECD, 2005).  But whilst the national 
picture was positive, the benefits of a healthy economy and increasing prosperity had 
not been received uniformly.  Geographically and socially, the windfall from economic 
growth was being unevenly distributed, a common feature across western economies 
(Anderson, 2001).  The national picture hid pockets of intense deprivation and 
economic decline where unemployment and a plethora of other social issues were 
prevalent (Kearns and Parkes, 2003, p.828).  The HMRP programme, in conjunction 
with other New Labour regeneration initiatives, was part of the solution to this 
pocketed deprivation. 
 
Within the context of this economic climate, urban areas throughout the UK had 
experienced dramatic change in the fifty years preceding the development of the 
HMRP programme.  The movement of residents away from urban areas, and the 
decline in traditional industries, meant that cities were now very different places to 
live and work.   In the North of England, out-migration from cities had been a 
prominent feature and this can be traced back to the economic restructuring that they 
have undergone: 
 
‘Between 1930-2000 Liverpool experienced a total population loss of 49%...The 
impact of the decline in port related activities and the manufacturing sector, 
particularly in the 1980s is evident from the economic circumstances of the local 
population ’ (Nevin, 2005, p.5).  
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Population loss and changes in the economic structure of the UK were inextricably 
linked.  Deindustrialisation can be cited as the primary cause for such extensive 
population loss.   The new global market for products and services gave rise to 
competition in certain sectors that UK businesses could not match.  As a response, 
the country began restructuring its economy away from manufacturing to knowledge 
based industries.  Such economic change has brought attitudinal changes.  The 
historic scenario of living and working in one community became steadily outdated as 
resident mobility has increased.  A concise expression of this is the gradual increase 
in travel to work times.  The number of people in England travelling over 30 
kilometres to work increased by 336,340 between 1981 and 1991(NOMIS, 2006).  
From the 1960’s onwards, more and more people were choosing to live further from 
their place of work, widening their horizons in terms of where they settled.  This in 
turn led to changes in the purchasing behaviour of house buyers, who increasingly 
aspired to rural/non-urban settings and lifestyles.  Such residents, who historically 
would have dwelled in the inner core of cities, were abandoning these areas and 
leaving an over-supply of housing. 
 
But such ‘counter urbanisation’ (Champion, 2001) cannot be seen as a late twentieth 
century phenomena.  Tony Champion argues that, generally speaking, the UK has 
been moving toward a counter urbanisation position since 1901 (allowing for short 
shifts to and from urbanisation in the 1920s).  In Champion’s terms, such a scenario 
is denoted by prevalent movement of people to intermediate (medium sized) towns 
and cities.  With the exception of the growth in large settlements in the 1920’s, the 
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UK has been in a steady shift toward counter urbanisation since this time (Champion, 
2001, p.17).  On a shorter time frame, migration patterns were revealing.  Net 
migration from the North of England in the period 1991 to 1996 stood at -56,600 
(Holmans and Simpson, 1999, p.12).  Prior to 1994 migration from the North of 
England to the South ran at relatively low levels, but this had significantly increased 
by the mid-1990s (Holmans and Simpson, 1999, p.71).  Such movement of peoples 
was posing a challenge for UK policy makers.  The New Labour government had set 
itself the task of ‘extending opportunities to every corner of the UK [and]…building 
strong and safe communities’ (Blair, 2005, p.5).  HMRPs can be seen as part of the 
response to the oversupply of housing, the depleting populations and the worsening 
economies of northern ‘corners’ of the UK.     
 
One of the catalysts for such changes in attitude and migration was public policy, 
which actively facilitated residential movement out of the ‘inner core’ of cities.  The 
New Towns Acts, the first in 1946, laid the foundations for a period of intense out-
migration from Northern cities.  These Acts, along with the Town Development Act 
promulgated the development of new settlements such as Runcorn, Skelmersdale 
and Knowsley whose expressed purpose was to receive the overspill from Liverpool 
(Farmer and Smith 1975, p.152).  Such policies sought the development of discrete 
settlements, halting the potential expansion of cities via their peripheries: 
 
‘…residential densities in the central areas of some of the greater cities needed 
to be drastically reduced without resorting to the expedient of uncontrolled 
peripheral expansion’ (Farmer and Smith, 1975, p. 165) 
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As suggested above, the decline of northern UK cities took a number of decades to 
unravel.  The HMRP programme can be seen as, in part, a response to this longer 
term legacy.  Responding to conditions in urban areas an Urban Taskforce (1999) 
was created.  This taskforce was created by the New Labour government to explore 
the reasons for urban decline and ‘establish a vision for our cities’ (Urban Task 
Force, 1999).  It identified specific urban challenges relating to the ‘decline of 
regional inner-city areas and communities [and]...suburban sprawl consuming 
greenfield sites at an alarming rate, causing social and economic decline within inner-
city areas’.  In response it made several recommendations related to building design, 
social wellbeing, environmental issues and the frameworks to deliver an ‘urban 
renaissance’.  
 
This focus on cities was being coupled with a drive toward neighbourhood renewal.  
In 2001 a National Strategy Action Plan for neighbourhood renewal was created and 
aimed to co-ordinate the renewal effort in the neighbourhoods showing the highest 
levels of deprivation.  Supporting this was a substantial pot of funding equating to 
over £800m. The strategy acknowledged the decline of certain urban 
neighbourhoods ‘over the past twenty years’ and that basic quality of life in such 
areas had become ‘increasingly detached from the rest of society’ (Social Exclusion 
Unit, 2001, p.7).  Two underpinning objectives were set; to tackle worklessness, 
crime, health, skills, housing and worsening physical environment; and to narrow the 
gap between the 88 poorest neighbourhoods and the rest of society on these 
measures (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001, p. 8).  The drive toward neighbourhood 
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renewal gave added prominence to the concept of neighbourhood. Power and Wilson 
(2000) argued that neighbourhoods are constructed of three interlocking aspects; the 
home and its immediate surroundings; services and facilities such as schools and 
shops; and the wider neighbourhood environment.  It is suggested that the 
government’s post-war urban policy had impacted on these ‘aspects’ unlocking them 
at the ultimate expense of their stability.  Indeed, by the mid-2000s the concept of 
neighbourhood renewal had become central to efforts to improve urban areas, and 
influenced (though did it not define) the development of the HMRP programme. 
 
The move toward neighbourhood renewal had at its heart a set of measures of 
deprivation.  The Indices of Deprivation (ONS, 2004) produced in the early 2000’s 
gave policy makers and regeneration practitioners a new lens through which they 
could target their intervention.  The areas identified by The Indices as the most 
deprived came as no surprise to practitioners, who had seen the manifestations of 
deprivation for a number of years. The Housing Corporation (2006) analysed 
indicators of deprivation in the 1981, 1991 and 2001 Censuses, and concluded that 
the level of deprivation in English cities has not changed across this period, but the 
‘footprint’ of deprivation had altered.  Some commentators would argue that in the 
poorest neighbourhoods the footprint of deprivation has been firmly fixed for several 
decades (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2002, p.152).  Indeed, it was the embedded nature of 
deprivation in certain areas that led the government to declare:  
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‘...over the last generation…the poorest neighbourhoods have tended to 
become more run down, more prone to crime and more cut off from the labour 
market’ (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p.9). 
 
The HMRP programme was not a direct response to deprivation, it was actually a 
response to specific abnormalities in housing markets and conditions.  Nonetheless, 
these broader conceptual trends influenced the HMRP programme, and created 
dichotomies for policy makers when planning the structure and focus of it.  
 
The abnormalities in the housing market in the late 1990’s were manifest in the 
booming of demand in some areas and market failure in others.  Some 
commentators were expressing concerns about housing affordability, particularly in 
the south of the UK.  In certain areas house price growth had outstripped the growth 
in household incomes, leaving the ratio of house price to income at some the highest 
levels witnessed in recent times (Cole and Nevin, 2004, p.6).   A step change was 
required in house building in the South East which, as a result of the land use 
planning system, had been significantly constrained.  In Greater London, housing 
completions in the private sector nearly halved between 1970 and 2003 (London 
Housing Board, 2005, p.32) leaving a shortfall in supply.  Yet at the same time certain 
areas of the North of England showed signs of housing market failure.  Policy makers 
in the North West, North East and Yorkshire and the Humber were beginning to 
recognise the urgency of the ‘low demand for housing’ situation. The shortage of 
homes and worsening affordability in the South, coupled with an apparent over-
supply of homes in the North, led some prominent thinkers to suggest that the market 
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was in an abnormal state (Barker, 2004).  The HMRP programme was a direct 
response to this housing situation in the north, and was being coupled with ambitious 
house building targets to speed up development in the south.  
 
In areas of Manchester, for example, the pace of change in the housing market was 
dramatic toward the end of the 1990’s. Over a five year period, vacant social housing 
in areas to the north of Manchester city centre increased by 25%.  At the same time, 
these same areas witnessed a 40% drop in house prices (Lee and Nevin, 2003, p66).  
In other areas, increasing levels of housing need and a lack of new build properties 
was ensuring that demand for housing did not completely stall (Bramley and Pawson, 
2002).  Such affordability issues were limiting abandonment and the complete 
collapse of demand.  However, in areas such as those in Manchester described 
above, affordability was not an issue as property prices were very low.  The house 
price to income ratio for the city of Manchester was only 2.17 in 2003 (Wilcox, 2003, 
p.19), in stark contrast to some southern cities such as Bristol which had a ratio of 
4.79.  Yet simply suggesting that affordability was a concern for the south of England 
failed to explain the diversity of housing markets in the north. For instance, some 
areas of Greater Manchester had stable and even increasing housing demand.  The 
picture was a patchwork of booming and failing markets. 
 
Hence the HMRP programme was conceived as a response to specific housing 
market abnormalities. In the late 1990’s many housing practitioners and 
commentators were becoming attuned to these abnormalities.  Social housing 
landlords had begun to report that their attempts to address the condition, size, type 
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and marketing of their stock were proving ineffective. Waiting lists for general needs 
housing had either markedly declined or become non-existent (Ferrari and Leather, 
2006).   As Ferrari and Leather state; 
 
‘The emergence of ‘low demand’ as a housing policy concern was first signalled 
by the detection of various processes that clearly challenged conventional 
housing management wisdom.’  
 
The tenure profile of housing in Northern cities did not aid the situation.  The 
disproportionate level of social housing in cities such as Liverpool (where it 
constituted approximately 40% of the stock in 1997) is said to have contributed to 
high void rates in this sector (Lee and Nevin, 2003, p. 68).   Another expression of 
low demand for housing was seen in the high turnover rate of housing.  Lee and 
Nevin (2003) revealed a number of ‘enumeration districts’ in Liverpool that were at 
risk of abandonment as a result of their high void levels and turnover rates.  Using an 
analytical framework, established through broad analysis of a number of urban areas 
that had suffered abandonment, it was acknowledged that 50 areas in Liverpool were 
‘acute’ in terms of vacancy rates and turnover.  Such areas were at risk of, or 
suffering from, low demand.  Perhaps the most worrying of all findings from this work 
however, was that only 42.6% of properties in these acute areas were subject to 
some form of public policy intervention. 
 
Whilst low demand was prevalent in the social sector in the late 1990s/early 2000s, 
the private sector also showed clear signs of this symptom. The cross-tenure nature 
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of the issue suggested a deep seated and pervasive cause, potentially beyond the 
narrow realm of housing.  The ineffectiveness of traditionally successful techniques 
for enhancing demand, in the social sector, only served to reaffirm that ‘abnormal’ 
forces were at work.  Perhaps the most challenging issue for practitioners and 
academics was that low demand for housing was not specific to a tenure type or a 
specific region.  This made responsive and targeted action difficult.  Holmans and 
Simpson (1999, p. 72) were some of the first to note the cross-tenure and inter-
regional nature of low demand.  Their analysis of the number of new dwellings being 
created in the North and South of England (in 1996, 1997 and1998) revealed 
comparable levels of development.  Low demand for housing was clearly not an 
issue for the whole housing market in the North of England, and patterns of low 
demand could not be expressed through simple North / South delineations. Holmans 
and Simpson argued that: 
 
‘Low demand for social rented housing in some places does not demonstrate, 
as yet, weakened demand for housing overall in the North of England…Older 
houses in less popular neighbourhoods do not compete with new houses, for 
which demand remains fairly strong’ (Holmans and Simpson, 1999, p. 72). 
 
It was such market abnormalities, across tenures and across regions, that led some 
commentators to cite ‘structural’ problems in the UK housing market (Ferrari and 
Leather, 2006, p.6), and the need for appropriately devised ‘investment frameworks’ 
to deliver market renewal (Lee and Nevin, 2003, p.81).  Citing a complex system of 
factors, Bramley and Pawson (2002) provided a number of explanations for the 
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increasing incidence of ‘difficult to let’ and low demand for housing in traditionally 
stable communities: 
 
1. Broad regional and sub-regional trends affecting the housing market 
(particularly migration) 
2. Changes in perceptions, and popularity of, social housing 
3. Micro-social process (including crime, nuisance, stigmatisation etc) 
 
It was argued that a more strategic approach was required at a broader spatial scale.  
Such an approach would go further than tinkering at a local level, with such things as 
local housing policies or housing management operations.  Local authorities would 
have to adopt partnerships at a sub-regional level.  This would help them act at a 
spatial scale that better reflected the boundaries of housing markets (Nevin et al, 
2003, p.117).  
 
Such an analysis drove the development of the HMRP programme, but it was not the 
only analysis of the problem at this time.  Some commentators suggested that the 
problem at hand was not low demand, but changing demand (Bramley and Pawson, 
2002).  Given the increasing movement of low income households into the private 
sector (as a result of the availability of housing benefit for this) Murie urged social 
housing providers to change their ‘product’ in order meet the changing demands of 
tenants and potential tenants (Murie et al, 1998). 
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3.2 How was HMR conceived? 
As a response to this context the HMRP programme was conceived.  Its earliest 
expression is found in a number of research reports published at the start of the 
2000s.  Studies such as Changing Housing Markets and Urban Regeneration in the 
M62 Corridor (Nevin et al, 2001) and Changing Demand for Housing: Restructuring 
Markets and the Public Policy Framework (Lee and Nevin, 2003) set out the case for 
HMRPs. The first of those reports (henceforth the M62 study) was aimed at 
identifying those areas along the M62 motorway most at risk of changing demand for 
housing.  Analysis of a number of factors helped establish, at the neighbourhood 
level, those areas with the biggest risk of changing demand, and therefore having the 
greatest potential to suffer low demand.  The six factors deemed to be important in 
assessing the risk of changing demand for housing were: 
 
 the prevalence of rented or low quality housing; 
 the existence of large scale, uniform housing (e.g. houses of the same tenure or 
2/3 bed houses); 
 the presence of outdated housing of a specific type (e.g. high rise flats); 
 demographic characteristics affecting demand; and 
 concentrations of economically inactive or unemployed people 
 
The M62 study suggested that approximately 280,000 households were contained in 
areas at risk of changing demand.  On the basis of the evidence the report called for 
the creation of a ‘Housing Market Renewal Fund’ (Nevin et al, 2001) which would 
‘finance long term strategies to renew the housing market’. The authors claimed that 
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without this strategic action the continued high turnover of properties would 
jeopardise other neighbourhood-based regeneration.  Indeed it was suggested that 
the Labour government’s broader aspirations in terms of addressing social exclusion 
could not be met without action on the housing market, which was exacerbating 
‘social polarisation’.  In addition to these recommendations made to government, the 
authors suggested that local authority powers be enhanced to compel private 
landlords to maintain properties, and enable social landlords to financially support 
home improvement.  The authors also called for a new system of valuation of 
properties in clearance areas, seemingly to enable local authorities to acquire 
properties at a lower purchase price: 
 
‘Open market value compensation should be reviewed and replaced by the 
concept of ‘recent actual market transaction cost’ in areas which have 
experienced market collapse’ (Nevin et al, 2001, p.121). 
 
The growing weight of evidence regarding ‘low demand’ led the Labour government 
to formally acknowledge the need for action.  In their plan Sustainable Communities: 
Building for the Future the ODPM noted the significance of ‘serious housing 
shortages in London and the South East and the impact of housing abandonment in 
places in the North and Midlands’ (ODPM, 2003, p. 3).  Adopting a number of the 
recommendations put forward by the ‘M62 study’ this plan established Housing 
Market Renewal Pathfinders (HMRPs) in nine of the urban areas showing the most 
severe signs of market failure.  Financing this initiative was a Housing Market 
Renewal Fund which was to provide up to £500m over the first three years:  
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‘Pathfinder strategic plans will entail radical and sustained action to replace 
obsolete housing with modern sustainable accommodation, through demolition 
and new building or refurbishment. This will mean a better mix of homes, and 
sometimes fewer homes. There will be no blueprint. The problems differ in the 
nine pathfinder areas; the solutions will too’ (ODPM, 2003, p.24). 
 
Acting at a broad housing market level and on the basis of strategic plans would 
ensure problems were ‘tackled permanently and not just displaced’ (ODPM, 2003, 
p.24). Certain features of the programme would mark it out from previous 
interventions.  Improvements to the compulsory acquisition system would provide 
powers for meaningful and efficient action, partnership with the private sector would 
be encouraged, and strong planning based on robust evidence would be at its core.  
Such was the difference in the housing markets of each of the nine pathfinders that a 
‘hands off’ approach would be adopted by government (Audit Commission, 2005, 
p.2).  Such devolved approaches, it was said, would allow for local innovation and 
tailored action. 
 
When the HMRP programme is juxtaposed against other regeneration initiatives, a 
better understanding of its rationale and defining features is appreciated.  Over the 
preceding 50 years interventions aimed at regenerating areas have fluctuated 
between ‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side’ approaches.  In this sense they have 
prioritised either people-based interventions (demand-side) or physical place-based 
interventions (supply-side).  Following the large scale demolitions in the 1960s, 
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regeneration policy began to focus on renewal and tackling the physical issues 
related to housing.  General Improvement Areas and Housing Action Areas targeted 
resources at improving owner-occupied properties.  In conjunction with this Estate 
Action invested resources in the refurbishment and management of social housing.  
Akin to such initiatives, the HMRP programme was conceived as addressing supply-
side issues; removing obsolete housing in poor condition, and where appropriate, 
replacing it with better designed and more desirable properties. 
 
The programme was conceived during a period that had largely focused on demand-
side regeneration.  Initiatives such as the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and 
City Challenge sought to focus effort in the education and skills development of 
communities.  HMRPs were, in part, a response to the deficit of such programmes. 
SRB had failed to take account of housing issues and had served to increase 
tenancy turnover as communities acquired new skills and sought greater 
opportunities elsewhere (Lee and Nevin, 2003, p.73).  In essence, critics argued that 
SRB enabled residents to increase their wealth and opportunities, which in turn gave 
them the capacity to migrate and vacate property in the area.  It was claimed that 
further economic regeneration would merely have ‘lead to the deterioration in 
popularity of the worst neighbourhoods’.  HMRPs were hence devised to address this 
legacy, and specifically the legacy of abandoned housing. 
 
As the HMRP programme was being designed, new and predominantly demand-side 
interventions were being conceived under the Labour government’s neighbourhood 
renewal programme. The establishment of New Deal for Communities (NDCs) in 39 
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areas represented aimed to transform neighbourhoods holistically, across issues of 
housing, crime, physical environment, as well as health, education and worklessness 
(CLG, 2010).  Despite the issue of housing being a theme, NDC’s were not intended 
to be the solution to all the symptoms of low demand.  The HMRP programme was 
conceived for the very fact that neighbourhood based regeneration failed to address 
housing market failure at a sufficiently broad spatial scale: 
  
‘…neighbourhood regeneration needs to be integrated within a strategic 
investment framework designed for a much larger spatial scale’ (Lee and Nevin, 
2003, p.81) 
 
In line with such thinking, and in awareness of some the failings of previous 
regeneration initiatives, the government proposed a programme of housing market 
renewal.  This signaled a change in philosophy and policy: 
 
‘The reliance on short-life, special initiatives and projects appears to have been 
replaced by a more ‘strategic’ approach that emphasises the role of mainstream 
government and public sector activity in determining the trajectory of 
neighbourhoods … the new policy advocates a ‘multilevel’ approach, in which 
the importance is recognised of governance arrangements operating at a range 
of spatial scales’ (Hastings, 2003, p. 85). 
 
HMRPs represented a move toward supply-side interventions which contrast 
markedly with many of the demand-side interventions that where running at the same 
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time.   Whilst communities would need to be engaged, skills programmes developed 
and jobs created, the imperative for HMRPs was to address poor physical 
environments and obsolete housing.   
 
As initially conceived, the HMRP programme was intended to be ‘strategic’ and 
operate at wide spatial scales.  But at a time when the concept of neighbourhood 
was ‘king’, questions were asked about whether the programme was being conceived 
as a locally or nationally focused programme (Ferrari and Leather, 2006).  Such a 
dichotomy presented problems for the programme.  Suggesting it would be a 
neighbourhood-based programme conflicted with HMRPs’ intended role as strategic 
market shapers. But operating at this wide spatial scale, in a strategic manner, would 
mean deciding which individual neighbourhoods were sustainable and which were 
not.  Such processes sat uncomfortably with advocates of neighbourhood-based 
regeneration.   
 
Justification for the HMRP programme was found in numerous places.  Theories 
around ‘area effects’ seemed to support the notion of more strategic action: 
 
‘…independent, separable effects on social and economic opportunities which 
arise from living in a particular neighbourhood’ (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2002, 
p.147). 
 
Atkinson and Kintrea (2002) asserted that a number of issues arising from area 
effects needed to be addressed through current interventions; segregation, the 
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residualisation of the social housing sector, the impermeable nature of 
neighbourhoods and community based approaches to regeneration.  The authors 
argued for the removal of the income inequalities that perpetuate societal 
segregation.  Linked to this there was also a need to diversify mono-tenure housing 
areas, further de-segregating populations and mitigating the poor image of social 
housing, as well as improving transport links to enable the in-flux and out-flux of 
people. Such outcomes would not be achieved through community-based 
regeneration and community development.  Such approaches, it was argued, could 
exacerbate an area’s effect, lending weight to the idea of co-ordinated action at a 
large spatial scale (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2002, p.161). 
 
Such a strategic role inevitably meant that HMRPs would increasingly be linked to 
economic development.  In the early 2000s commentators were stressing the 
importance of housing in economic development: 
 
‘Good quality aspirational housing is increasingly a driver of economic success 
rather than a consequence of it. Cities that want to be in a position to adjust 
most effectively to the knowledge economy are those cities which provide 
attractive places for middle and higher income households to live’ (Lee and 
Murie, 2004, 243). 
 
The issue of how the conception of the programme changed over time is explored 
later in the thesis, specifically with relation to economic development. 
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3.3 How have HMRPs intervened? 
The following sub-section is intended to give a summary of HMRP interventions in 
light of the discussion above.  It is not a complete picture of how HMRPs have 
intervened, but highlights key areas of activity over the course of the programme from 
2003 to 2010.   
 
3.3.1. The initial years of the programme 
As noted in the above sub-section, the HMRP programme was conceived as a 
mechanism for addressing obsolete housing, through demolition, rebuild and 
refurbishment (ODPM, 2003, p.24).  Early assessments of how the HMRPs were 
intervening suggested this is indeed what they were doing, combined with other more 
demand-side interventions (Audit Commission, 2005, p. 14-15): 
 
• Clearance of surplus housing and site assembly 
• Physical improvements to existing housing 
• Schemes intended to improve social cohesion and human capital 
 
In their first two years, HMRPs started to refurbish, acquire and demolish properties, 
albeit on a much smaller scale than would later be seen.  For instance the North 
Staffordshire HMRP, named RENEW, refurbished 139 properties, demolished 234 
and acquired 217 by the end of its first two years (RENEW, 2005).  Other HMRPs 
had intervened on a bigger scale during these years, and with more of a focus on 
house building and refurbishment.  MSP, Manchester and Salford’s HMRP, estimated 
that by 2006 it would have refurbished 7,120 properties, built over 3,107, whilst only 
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demolishing 1,726 (MSP, 2005).  Despite these differences in scale, it appears that a 
substantial amount of spending by HMRPs was being put into land acquisition during 
this time; Bridging Newcastle Gateshead being one example who spent £11.6m of its 
initial £28m grant (41%) on such costs (Audit Commission, 2006). In their early years, 
most HMRPs were investing significant effort in masterplanning, neighbourhood 
renewal assessments, heritage assessments and community consultation 
(Newheartlands, 2005; RENEW, 2005).   This period can be therefore be seen as the 
HMRPs finding their feet; building their housing market intelligence and governance 
structures, developing and securing consent for plans from the community and 
testing their proposed interventions.  
 
The Scheme Updates, submitted to government in 2005, show that HMRPs intended 
to focus much their HMR monies on clearance related activity.  RENEW’s Scheme 
Update shows that it intended to spend approximately 60% of its HMR funding for the 
period 2006-08 on acquisitions, demolition and resident relocation costs (RENEW, 
2005).  Similarly, New Heartlands (2005) and Oldham and Rochdale’s HMRP (2005) 
intended to spend 60% and 58% respectively of their HMR monies on clearance and 
site assembly.  The amounts of HMR money earmarked for refurbishment by these 
HMRPs in 2006-08 ranges from 18% to 1%.  It is clear, therefore, that for the period 
2006-2008 the pathfinders would concentrate their HMR funding on clearance.  
Despite this, by 2006 HMRPs were reducing estimates for the total number of 
demolitions by approximately 30% (Audit Commission, 2006).  It is somewhat of a 
paradox that funding was being targeted at demolition, but plans for such activity 
were being scaled back.  This paradox is returned to later in the sub-section.      
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It was at this time, following the Scheme Updates, that the Audit Commission 
released its first Annual Review (2006) which highlighted a number of concerns that 
the HMRPs were not implementing solutions that were markedly different from 
previous interventions.  In light of the theoretical basis on which the HMRP 
programme was founded and the focus on the structural issues in the housing 
market, the Audit Commission was critical of the implementation of ‘off the shelf’ 
interventions by pathfinders.  A number of planned activities seemingly lacked a 
bigger picture rationale (Audit Commission, 2005, p.2).  Despite positive strides being 
made, recommendations from the Audit Commission included the need for strong 
visions, improved project commissioning and a commitment to demonstrating value 
for money.   
 
Despite such criticisms, the Audit Commission was also pointing to effective methods 
HMRPs had developed for aligning their policies with partners, particularly at a sub-
regional level (Audit Commission, 2006).  The HMRPs were also receiving increased 
praise for their community engagement work.  In 2006, the HMRPs were deemed to 
be increasingly ‘working with communities’, and undertaking ‘more thoughtful 
engagement’.  HMRPs were also being applauded for the increasing depth and 
richness of their housing market intelligence and how this had been integrated into 
their planning, along with their governance arrangements to improve the 
transparency of decision-making (Audit Commission, 2006).   Such governance 
arrangements and market intelligence were enabling the HMRPs to respond quickly 
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and appropriately to changing contexts, specifically increasing demand and 
affordability (Audit Commission 2006).  
 
3.3.2. Changing context and focus 
Such responsiveness was a key strength as the boarder context for HMRPs began to 
shift in the mid-2000s.  Shifts in policy direction and housing market dynamics meant 
that the programme had to evolve to match these.  In contrast to the strong language 
used to prioritise action on ‘abandonment’ in 2003, the emphasis appears to shift in 
2005/06 to market revival and restructure, as affordability issues – as opposed to low 
demand – became more prevalent.  The national evaluators of the HMRP 
programme were pointing to the need for HMRPs to develop ‘new practical measures 
to support residents...in particular, to tackle the growing problems of affordability’ 
(CLG, 2007c).   Analysis showed that house price to earnings ratios had increased by 
41% for the HMRP areas between 2002-2006 (Nevin and Leather, 2007).  Some 
might have suggested that this was the direct result of HMRP interventions.  House 
prices had risen in HMRPs since the programme’s inception, and ‘the gaps between 
the pathfinder prices and the wider market were closing’ (CLG, 2007c).  Nonetheless 
for a programme established to tackle low demand, it was an oddity that the HMRPs 
were dealing with issues of affordability.  HMRPs were urged to respond to this 
changing context.  
 
In addition to this driver, HMRPs had to adapt to changes in policy direction.  When 
the HMRP programme was conceived there were no clear links made between the 
activities of HMRPs and economic development.  Indeed there is no mention of 
53 
 
economic development in the government’s launch of HMRPs in the Sustainable 
Communities Plan.  However, by the mid-2000s the ambition of creating sustainable 
communities was conjoined with a second aspiration; to develop a knowledge 
economy (Raco, 2008). This newer theme began to influence the direction of 
regeneration programmes, as the notion of ‘place-shaping’ (Lyons, 2007) found 
traction with policy makers.  By the mid-2000s the North of England had its own 
‘vision’, expressed and organised under the banner of The Northern Way, which was 
making explicit links between regeneration programmes (such as HMRP) and the 
economic vitality of northern cities: 
 
‘Overall, the quality of housing is simply not good enough to support the North’s 
economic potential, nor to achieve sustainable patterns of development in 
northern towns and cities’ (Northern Way 2004, p. 54). 
 
By 2008/2009, evidence was showing that the HMRPs were responding to these two 
contextual factors; affordability and place shaping.  Following on from its major 2006 
review of the programme, the Audit Commission delivered its next round of findings 
in 2009.  These highlighted how HMRPs had ‘increased [their] focus on affordable 
rented housing and other forms of low cost home ownership’ (Audit Commission, 
2009).  In addition it noted how HMRPs were becoming ‘forerunners of the place-
shaping’ agenda and doing the strategically important job of linking housing and the 
economy (Audit Commission, 2009).  Analysis of data relating to all the HMRP areas 
showed house prices narrowing the gap with comparator areas, fewer empty homes, 
and growing populations.  The Audit Commission were suggesting that there was 
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much to learn from HMRPs in how places could be ‘shaped’ (Audit Commission, 
2009).   
 
In 2009 there were also signs that the effort invested in community engagement had 
provided a platform on which to develop the programme.  The Audit Commission’s 
report highlights that community capacity building was being undertaken by HMRPs, 
though it seems that the focus of this was on building capacity for employment rather 
than active involvement in the programme (Audit Commission, 2009).  Nonetheless, 
this sense of better engagement of communities was echoed by Select Committee 
reports that suggest that HMRPs were ‘using innovative methods to develop 
schemes in collaboration with communities’ (ODPM, 2006b).  Deeper analysis of the 
Select Committee report shows praise for methods such as Enquiry by Design, a 
technique for opening up debate about design and planning of development.  
Summing up the progress made by HMRPs since inception, the Audit Commission 
stated: 
 
‘Impressive ground work has been laid – systems, governance arrangements, 
staff, plans and programmes are in place and sites have been cleared. New 
build is being delivered, confidence boosted, expectations heightened and 
community and other capacity built. Issues around heritage, the scale of 
demolition and community engagement are also being tackled’ (Audit 
Commission, 2009, p.4). 
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3.3.3. The impact of recession 
Despite such positive messages the Audit Commission noted how changing market 
conditions, relating to the global financial crisis, would ‘test the pathfinders’ (Audit 
Commission, 2009, p.7).  It would result in a slow-down in house building by the 
HMRPs and a widening in the gap between HMRP house prices and those in the 
wider market.  Indeed the recession was having such an effect on HMRPs that the 
indicators by which the programme was measured were to be renegotiated (New 
Start, 2009).  The recession, and subsequent slow down in the housing market, 
created another issue that HMRPs would need to respond to; the threat of cleared 
sites remaining undeveloped: 
 
‘New homes have already been built on some of these sites, and private 
developers and housing association partners were poised to make a start on 
many more. However, the downturn in house prices and the drop in the number 
of sales since mid 2007 have forced a retreat in these areas’ (Audit 
Commission, 2009, p.18) 
 
Media commentators were highlighting the threat of recession to the programme, 
noting that ‘HMR was losing momentum as money from private developers dries up 
and public funding cuts loom large’ (Guardian, 2010).  Crucially, articles such as 
these were making connections between the recession and the substantial 
demolition undertaken by HMRPs.  Questions were being asked about the prudence 
of clearance and site assembly as the housing market stalled.    
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3.3.4. Demolition: one element of the programme 
The literature review has revealed that, irrespective of how the context for HMRP 
changed, and however much the interventions of HMRPs moved away from 
demolition, the issue of demolition remained contested and a consistent area of 
debate.  Evaluators and supporters of the programme have firmly argued that 
demolition is only one element of the programme, which has not only been 
substantially scaled back during the life of the programme, but which is also 
comparably small in contrast to post-war demolition activity (Leather, 2010; Nevin, 
2007).  Recent evaluations of the HMRP programme echo this sentiment, and point 
to the political, inflammatory nature of the debate: 
 
‘Media comment focused almost exclusively on one element of the programme; 
the proposals for the demolition of a limited amount of privately owned terraced 
housing in a limited number of pathfinder areas’ (CLG, 2009d. p.6) 
 
Is demolition a major part of how HMRPs have intervened?  CLG’s national 
evaluation (2009) presents the programme outputs to 2007 and those proposed until 
2018.  As can be seen in Figure 2 below, the total number of properties planned to 
be demolished between 2003-2018 will be 55,947.  The total number of properties to 
be built is 66,310, whilst 98,286 will be refurbished.  
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Figure 2: HMR outputs 
  
 
In terms of the number of properties or land receiving an intervention, demolition is 
certainly only ‘one’ element of the programme.  Indeed, HMRPs will oversee a net 
increase in housing.  Nonetheless, it would be misleading to underplay the 
substantive role of demolition in the programme for two reasons; firstly, the 
demolition of nearly 56,000 dwellings is no small matter, equating to the total housing 
stock of a small unitary council; secondly, just looking at the number of properties 
receiving an intervention underplays the proportion of financial investment in 
demolition by HMRPs. Acquisition, compensation and relocation, demolition and site 
assembly entails considerable expense.  Analysis of a number of HMRP Scheme 
Updates has shown that up to 60% of HMR funds were being allocated to preparing 
and delivering demotion schemes. If an assessment of all HMRP spending was 
undertaken, it is likely that demolition would be seen as the major element of the 
programme in terms of spending.  Unfortunately such programme wide spending 
data is not available. 
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So demolition is a major part of how HMRPs have intervened, and a substantial 
proportion of their public money has been and will be spent on it.  It must also be 
questioned whether the proposed amount of new build housing can ever be achieved 
given the recession, particularly on land made available by demolition.  Questions 
can therefore be asked as to whether a net increase of properties is likely by 2018. 
Since 2003/4 a total of 16,062 properties have been demolished and 4,069 new 
builds completed, equating to a net reduction of 11,993 (CLG, 2009b).  Questions 
remain as to whether the programme can achieve the scale of house building 
required to meet the projected outputs, particularly in light of the slowdown in the 
housing market.    
 
3.3.5. Conclusion 
This literature review presents two key findings.  Firstly, that the HMRP programme 
has had to adapt to changing contexts and new challenges.  The housing affordability 
crisis in the mid-2000s and then the global recession of the late-2000s has meant a 
changing focus and challenges in delivering objectives.  These external factors have 
been coupled with new policy agendas (such as The Northern Way) that have shifted 
the requirements of the programme by appending new aspirations, such as economic 
development.  In addition, the need to work within neighbourhoods, whilst 
strategising across them, remains a persistent tension and challenge for HMRPs.  
Secondly, the literature review has revealed that demolition is indeed a fundamental 
part of the HMRP programme, though not its entirety.  In being a response to 
obsolete housing, in being given strengthened powers to acquire housing, and in light 
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of how HMR money has been spent, the significance of demolition to the programme 
cannot be underestimated.   
 
Hence, this literature review directs the focus of this study to HMRPs’ demolition 
activity.  As the aim of the study is to find ways in which HMRPs can more effectively 
intervene, this is an appropriate place to start. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS AND 
ALTERNATIVE INTERVENTIONS 
 
Having narrowed the study’s focus onto HMRP demolition, and having established 
the scale of opposition to this activity, it seems prudent to explore this further. It is 
hoped that an understanding of the objections to HMRP demolition, and the rebuttals 
of these objections, will provide a more detailed and rounded view of the subject.  
Indeed, understanding such opposition may reveal the limits of current policy; what is 
palatable to the public, politicians, campaigners and commentators, and alternatively 
what is not.  From such analysis better forms of intervention may emerge. 
 
It is with the above in mind that the following two research questions were set for this 
element of the research:  
 
1. What has been the opposition to demolition by HMRPs? 
2. What interventions would address such opposition?    
 
Sub-section 4.1 below aims to summarise the opposition to HMRP demolition, trying 
to juxtapose the differing arguments made by a variety of different sources against 
demolition.  Following this, sub-section 4.2 develops a set of theoretical propositions 
and alternative models of intervention. 
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4.1 The opposition to HMRP demolition 
 
As the HMRP programme began to take shape and get closer to delivery ‘on the 
ground’, commentators were highlighting the opposition to demolition: 
  
‘There is a growing recognition that clearance, demolition and relocation are 
emotive and politically sensitive processes that raise considerable and complex 
challenge to the Pathfinders’ (Cole, 2007, p.1). 
 
Such large scale plans for demolition had created opposition from a variety of 
sources; communities that were subject to demolition, elements of the national 
media, campaign groups and politicians.  Opposition from such a variety of sources 
created a complex mix of criticisms and objections.  On the basis of a wide ranging 
review of these, five broad types of objection have emerged: 
 
1. Refurbishment is a preferable intervention  
2. Demolition results in the loss of historic townscapes 
3. Demolition does not deliver value for money 
4. Demolition fails to capitalise existing residents 
5. Demolition neglects the empowerment of residents 
 
4.1.1. Refurbishment is a preferable intervention 
Prime time television programmes such as ‘Battle of the Bulldozer’ (ITV, 2006) made 
early connections between the HMRP programme and historic slum clearance 
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schemes.  Battle of the Bulldozer presented examples of demolition that were 
counter-intuitive, and insinuated that HMRPs had a default preference for demolition.  
Rather than being the financially prudent course of action in light of stock condition, 
such demolitions were actually more expensive than renovation.  Such investigations 
corroborated early suggestions made by the File on Four programme (BBC, 2005) 
that HMRPs were intent on demolition.  File on Four revealed potential malpractice in 
the surveying of local property conditions in East Lancashire.  In response to the 
HMRP’s claim that a number of houses in Blackburn and Darwen were ‘among the 
worst in the country’, residents commissioned a reputable structural engineer to re-
survey their properties.  Professor Clancy carried out such surveying and deemed 
such properties to be devoid of ‘any serious problems’.   
 
Such arguments were echoed by SAVE Britain’s Heritage. In their response to the 
House of Commons Committee on the issue of empty housing and low demand 
pathfinders (2005b, p.49), SAVE noted: 
 
‘...so much money has been put towards the demolition of buildings that are 
essentially sound, decent and lived in by communities rather than towards their 
renewal’. 
 
Many HMRPs objected to such suggestions and argued that they had conducted 
robust Neighbourhood Renewal Assessments, which included social, economic and 
environmental assessments of differing interventions.  These assessments ensured 
that the chosen intervention was the preferred one and economically justifiable 
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(RENEW, 2008a).  However, critics suggested that certain financial rules ensured a 
preference for clearance and rebuild programmes. Some suggested that Value 
Added Tax (VAT) rules made refurbishment less preferable.  New housing 
construction was ‘zero-rated’ in terms of VAT, whilst refurbishment costs were 
subject to 17.5% VAT. It was suggested that this encouraged demolition, and that a 
lower VAT rate should be applied to the renovation of properties where it is part of a 
funded social policy (HCCPA, 2008). 
 
The arguments in favour of refurbishment were boosted by successful refurbishment 
projects such as that undertaken by Urban Splash in Langworthy, Salford.  This 
‘cuckoo in the nest’ as one commentator described it (Jenkins, 2007) gave demolition 
opponents a real-life example that demonstrated the financial viability of 
refurbishment.  It is hard to determine the impact of this on total demolitions, but the 
scaling back of demolition plans, and scaling up of refurbishment, suggests it may 
have been an important factor. Indeed, as HMRP areas began to show signs of 
improved demand for housing, some were arguing for a presumption in favour of 
refurbishment: 
 
‘If there is strong evidence that the rise in housing demand is sustained and not 
just the result of an artificial boost to the market due to speculative activity, the 
Pathfinders should review their demolition programmes as a matter of urgency 
and concentrate on neighbourhood management and housing refurbishment’ 
(ODPM, 2005d, p.27) 
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In response, many HMRPs adopted a more measured and sensitive approach to 
demolition.  In planning its future demolition activity Manchester and Salford’s HMRP 
stated the following in its 2008-2011 Business Plan: 
 
‘[We are]...increasing our emphasis on activities that avoid the need for new 
expensive clearance programmes, although in some cases, remodelling will 
require selective clearance’ (MSP, 2008a, p.10). 
 
Such evidence suggests that not all HMRP demolition programmes have the same 
impacts.  Demolition is not always in direct conflict with refurbishment, and some 
HMRPs have sensitively combined the two.  
 
4.1.2. Demolition results in the loss of historic townscapes 
Linked to the issue of refurbishment, SAVE Britain’s Heritage were also arguing for 
the preservation of certain buildings in HMRP areas, as they formed important 
historic elements of the UK’s townscapes.  In their hard hitting report Pathfinder 
(2006), SAVE suggested the programme was the ‘largest single present threat to the 
historic environment...it blights rather than builds confidence’. 
 
Responding to the above issues, the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Empty Homes and Low-demand Pathfinders (2005) urged caution over the extent of 
demolition that HMRPs were planning to carry out.  The programme, it was 
suggested, should be wary of intervention that threatens the heritage of certain urban 
areas and fails to create neighbourhoods of ‘lasting value’.  This was supported by 
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the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (2008) when it stated its 
recommendation that government should ‘not approve demolition proposals that are 
not part of a wider study of landscape and townscape’ (HCCPA, 2008, p. 6).  In 
response to the above, HMRPs began to adopt more rigorous analysis of the 
heritage assets in their areas.  Many undertook discrete heritage assessments, and 
this level of rigour was praised by auditors (Audit Commission, 2009, p.28).  
Nonetheless, concerns about heritage remained, and organisations such as SAVE 
Britain’s Heritage continued to challenge HMRPs locally on their supposed 
destruction of heritage assets.  
 
4.1.3. Demolition does not deliver value for money 
The value for money delivered by HMRPs had long been a concern of auditors.  After 
four years, the Audit Commission (2006, p.3) was suggesting that HMRPs’ thinking 
on this issue was ‘the most underdeveloped’.  Some reports suggested that HMRPs 
were paying substantially over the market value for properties as they sought to take 
ownership of them for demolition (The Times, 2007).  These heavy costs were made 
more acute by speculators: 
 
‘The plan-led system of identifying houses for demolition risks giving 
speculators a free lunch.  They can buy up run down properties safe in the 
knowledge that the government will buy them out at very least for full market 
value’ (Leunig & Swaffield, 2007). 
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Indeed, commentators in the national press were noting how properties were being 
bought up by private landlords and ‘filled with people on housing benefit’ 
(Hetherington, 2007, p.1).  These speculators were then ‘receiving a tidy pile in 
taxpayer-funded rent’ and subsequent compensation when the houses were 
compulsorily acquired.  
 
But larger worries about value for money loomed, and these related to the long term 
legacy of the programme: 
 
‘However, more homes have been demolished than built and without longer 
term support, demolition sites, rather than refurbished and improved housing 
stock, may be the Programme’s legacy’ (HCCPA, 2008). 
 
As noted above, the financial crisis of 2008/09 meant that in a number of HMRP 
areas developers were stepping back from cleared sites.  This was not only stunting 
regeneration efforts, but was also raising questions about the value for money of 
certain types of intervention.  The financial crisis came at an unfortunate time, and 
exacerbated the issue of value for money even further.  As house prices fell 
nationally, developers for HMRP sites either opted out or saw development as too 
risky (Audit Commission, 2009).  Even before the crisis developers and lenders saw 
HMRP areas as high risk investments, so in volatile markets and in a context of 
falling house prices, there was even further reticence.  Cleared sites that were 
scheduled for development started to look as though they would remain undeveloped 
for some time.  As such they would provide no return on investment after the cost of 
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land assembly had been taken by the HMRP.  Broader economic conditions were 
also making negotiations with developers more challenging.  To cover the increased 
risk of investing in HMRP areas, developers were seeking to secure a greater profit 
margin, therefore squeezing value for money further.   Such concerns were seized 
upon by commentators, who suggested this further validated their argument for 
refurbishment over demolition (Hatherley, 2010). 
 
In response to such arguments, HMRPs may legitimately have suggested that the 
recession was helping them secure better value for money.  The recession was 
enabling them to renegotiate contracts with developers and acquire land at a cheap 
cost (Audit Commission, 2009, p.18).  Nonetheless, it seems that the auditor’s 
concerns about value for money in 2006 remained in 2009, as they suggested ‘a 
more comprehensive and sophisticated approach to value for money is still required’ 
(Audit Commission, 2009, p.10)   
 
4.1.4. Demolition fails to capitalise existing residents 
Leunig & Swaffield (2007) have argued that ‘spending significant sums of money on 
destroying assets’ is not an appropriate public intervention.  In criticising the 
demolition undertaken by HMRPs, the authors called for policies that would retain 
these assets and ensure they are transferred or sold in ways that recapitalise local 
people.  Such proposals raise important questions about who should benefit from 
interventions such as demolition. 
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Most owner-occupiers subject to demolition were financially worse off as a result.  
Subsequent to demolition, many did not have enough capital to find a comparable 
replacement home: 
 
‘Many owner-occupiers affected by demolition have encountered a substantial 
affordability gap between the compensation they receive and the cost of buying 
a new property...The average gap is estimated at between £20-30,000, but may 
be as much as £50-90,000 for new build developments’ (Cole, 2007). 
 
Even if the provision of financial support packages remedies some these affordability 
gaps, there remains a question as to whether this outcome is fair.  Numerous studies 
have highlighted the negative personal and social impacts of demolition (Qouta et al, 
1998; Friedman, 2010; Harker, 2006).  So it is legitimate to ask whether personal 
financial loss is an acceptable additional impact. Such issues have led some 
commentators to question who are the intended beneficiaries of HMRP interventions, 
if these are not existing residents.   Attracting new and more economically active 
populations seems an implicit part of the rationale for some HMRP interventions: 
 
‘These central area neighbourhoods will provide an attractive alternative to the 
suburbs and market towns for young professionals and their families’ (RENEW, 
2005, p.8). 
 
Households with existing wealth would spend their money in the local economy and 
catalyse broader economic development. Many of these households would be the 
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‘knowledge workers’ that were deemed crucial in developing a ‘knowledge economy’ 
(Northern Way; 2007, Amin et al., 2000; Raco, 2007).  Attracting such ‘aspirational 
and mobile occupiers’ was deemed important, and would entail replacing poor quality 
housing stock with more ‘executive’ properties (Northern Way 2004, p.54).  Allen and 
Crookes (2009) argue that these broader policy drivers for HMR, and the new ‘place 
shaping’ role of local and regional authorities, resulted in a lack of focus on existing 
populations.  Rather than striving to benefit existing residents in deprived urban 
areas, it is argued that planning and regeneration policies were being geared toward 
attracting ‘a narrowly defined class of creative/knowledge workers’ (p.458).  This 
drove a preference for demolition and the displacement of existing communities in 
favour of new, capitalised communities. 
 
Such suggestions of ‘revanchist gentrification’ should be tempered however 
(Rowlands and Murie, 2009).  To class all HMRP demolition schemes as purely a 
process of displacement and gentrification is misleading.  Looking at a number of 
demolition and redevelopment projects shows that in some instances very little 
displacement takes place.  For instance, following the demolition of Welsh Streets in 
Liverpool, New Heartlands HMRP enabled 105 displaced households to access the 
107 properties developed in the nearby Clevedon Park development (New 
Heartlands, 2010).  Demolition does not always equate to the breaking up 
communities and the gentrification of that area.  Rowlands and Murie, (2009) set a 
challenge for those looking at ‘who wins’ from regeneration: 
 
70 
 
‘...to capture the debate about urban renaissance and regeneration by 
articulating a process of regeneration that would secure real gains for working 
class and lower-income households, and make this the core issue rather than 
gentrification’ (Rowlands and Murie, 2009, p.258).  
     
So what classes as ‘real gains’ for such working class households? And how are they 
secured? Perhaps what is meant by real gains is an improvement in the capital 
wealth of low income households.  If this is the case, then interventions should seek 
to increase the capital of all households in the intervention area, most likely through 
home ownership.  Over time this would appreciate in value and deliver further 
benefits. Supporting this idea, research in the United States has shown that 
homeownership is the single most important route to wealth accumulation (HUD, 
1995), and that owned housing is the only real form of wealth that low income 
households have (Boehm and Schlottmann, 2004).  Whilst UK and US contexts do 
differ, the evidence is compelling; increasing homeownership, or increasing the 
equity of homeowners, is perhaps the most effective way of increasing the wealth of 
low income households.  Perhaps such outcomes would represent a ‘real gain’. But 
what if the term ‘real gain’ alludes to more subtle and holistic outcomes?  In addition 
to wealth accumulation, perhaps ‘real gains’ also means improvements in personal 
wellbeing or social outcomes. Whilst homeownership cannot be seen as a panacea, 
it may deliver some of these broader social outcomes.  It has been shown that 
homeownership has a positive knock-on effect on the social and psychological 
wellbeing of those households (Harkness and Newman, 2001; Aaronson, 1998; Rohe 
and Basolo, 1997; Hiscock et al, 2003). In light of such benefits, it is no surprise that 
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the Labour government committed itself to ‘helping those who aspire to own their own 
home to do so’ (CLG, 2010).  Hence the argument for increasing homeownership, or 
the equity of low income households, is hardly a radical proposition.  Recent political 
commentators have added weight to the argument with more general proposals for 
increasing the capital wealth of the poorest households.  Phillip Blond (2009, p.6) has 
recently asserted the need for: 
 
‘A new conservative agenda of ownership extension and security is therefore 
urgently required...a new popular philosophy of asset extension and stakeholder 
equity capitalism is required’.  
 
Blond highlights ownership of liquid wealth in the UK as an indicator of a 
decapitalised working class.  In 1976, the poorest 50% of the population owned 12% 
of liquid wealth.  In 2003 the 50% poorest owned just 1% of liquid wealth.  Such 
increased wealth, it is argued, leads to some key regeneration outcomes such as 
improved living conditions, greater mobility and economic opportunity.  In a more 
subtle sense, commentators have pointed to how ownership of such wealth and 
assets creates a ‘responsibilisation’ of individuals (Raco, 2009, p,440).  Citizens who 
aspire to such things as homeownership are taking responsibility for bettering 
themselves, and playing a part in broader improvements in welfare.  Whilst 
arguments can be persuasive, there is a case for coupling such responsibilisation 
with models for more local collectivisation and mutualism.  This issue is covered in 
the next sub-section.   
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There is an argument therefore that when HMRPs embark on interventions such as 
demolition, the prerogative should be to increase capital wealth.  In terms of owner 
occupiers in areas of demolition, rather than leave them with an affordability gap, 
perhaps HMRPs should actively try to increase their wealth.  One way to do this 
would be to offer a higher price for their home or greater compensation. Another way 
would be to retain their current home and invest in it to increase its value. 
 
Such a critique of demolition has rarely been articulated in the form above, but a 
number of organisations and individuals have argued the case that residents subject 
to demolition are unfairly treated.  Some campaigners have called for greater support 
to access homeownership. Other campaigners have argued that those affected by 
demolition should take a bigger cut of the financial gains resulting from any rebuild 
(SAVE Britain’s Heritage, 2006).  Whilst different in content, such arguments support 
the general thrust towards a better financial settlement for residents affected by 
demolition.  
 
4.1.5. Demolition neglects the empowerment of residents 
The development of sustainable communities was, for some time, the Labour 
government’s major aspiration (ODPM, 2003; CLG, 2007).  HMRPs were urged to 
ensure that whatever future interventions they undertake, ‘the format is sustainable in 
the long term’ (Audit Commission, 2009, p.16).  A review of the Labour government’s 
definition of a sustainable community, and its 8 core components (CLG, 2009a), 
suggests that a narrow focus on physical aspects of communities and economic 
issues will not realise sustainability.  Such action must be coupled with efforts to 
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ensure that those communities are also ‘active, safe and inclusive’ and ‘well run’.  
Sustainable communities will therefore have the following characteristics (CLG, 
2009a):  
 
• a sense of community identity and belonging;  
• tolerance, respect and engagement with people from different cultures, 
background and beliefs;  
• friendly, co-operative and helpful behaviour in neighbourhoods  
• opportunities for cultural, leisure, community, sport and other activities, 
including for children and young people;  
• low levels of crime, drugs and antisocial behaviour with visible, effective and 
community-friendly policing;  
• social inclusion and good life chances for all;  
• representative, accountable governance systems which both facilitate 
strategic, visionary leadership and enable inclusive, active and effective 
participation by individuals and organisations;  
• effective engagement with the community at neighbourhood level, including 
capacity building to develop the community's skills, knowledge and 
confidence;  
• strong, informed and effective partnerships that lead by example (e.g. 
government, business, community);  
• strong, inclusive, community and voluntary sector; and  
• sense of civic values, responsibility and pride. 
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Many of the criticisms levelled at HMRP demolition programmes focus on how they 
have undervalued the non-physical assets in communities such as civic pride, 
belonging or co-operative behaviours.  SAVE Britain’s Heritage highlighted this issue 
succinctly in their written submission to the Empty Homes and Low-Demand 
Pathfinder Select Committee: 
 
‘the approach to change and demolition appears to be based on crude top down 
statistical view of neighbourhoods – voids, turnover, ownership, value etc. This 
fails to see beyond the problems that may have little to do with the houses 
themselves. It also fails to obtain active community input until consultation 
exercises are carried out late in the day’ (in ODPM, 2006b, p.14).  
 
Such a focus on the physical has also been noted by auditors, who suggest that 
HMRPs have underplayed the importance of local people to the success of HMRP 
initiatives (National Audit Office, 2007): 
 
‘While the opportunity for change is welcomed by many residents, engaging 
local communities in the renewal plans for their neighbourhoods can be 
challenging for pathfinders since, by considering housing markets at the sub-
regional level, they are starting from a more top-down approach compared to 
other recent regeneration initiatives which put the local community more in the 
driving seat of developing and owning the improvements’ (National Audit Office, 
2007, p.6). 
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Such analysis suggests that HMRP initiatives may not be empowering communities 
to play a meaningful role in regeneration.  By being ‘top-down’ they do not afford 
communities the opportunity to drive change.  Yet perhaps this is too simplistic a 
conclusion to reach.  The HMRPs, as noted above, have been commended for their 
community engagement work by auditors and evaluators. But what do we mean by 
community engagement?  If it is taken to mean thorough consultation and information 
provision then, as Arnstein’s ladder of participation attests (1969), such activities are 
not creating ‘citizen control’.   
 
It is difficult to reconcile the essential nature and purpose of HMRPs as strategic 
place shapers, with the development of non-physical aspects of a sustainable 
community. Civic pride and responsibility, a strong identity, co-operative behaviours; 
these are unlikely to form when overtly ‘top-down’ processes are applied, and 
especially where interventions such as demolition displace residents and break down 
social networks.  Supporting such a perspective, local authority leaders in HMRP 
areas have asserted the importance of ‘community’.  As the Leader of Liverpool City 
Council stated, ‘you can’t rip the heart of the community and promise them something 
in 15 years time’ (Barlett, 2010). 
 
The Audit Commission has urged HMRPs to put the issue of sustainability at the 
forefront of their minds and to give ‘fuller consideration to sustainable development in 
decision-making’ (Audit Commission, 2009).  Pointedly this means thinking about the 
needs of present and future generations and so perhaps this can only be achieved by 
a fuller involvement of communities in the planning and ownership of interventions.  
76 
 
Good practice guidance for HMRPs, such as that developed by the Charted Institute 
of Housing (CIH) (2007) supports this idea.  The authors of this publication draw 
specific attention to community-led activity as a key element of good practice: 
 
‘Supporting independent community initiatives - helping residents to carry out 
their own plans or community initiatives – for example by grant-aiding or in other 
ways supporting them, while leaving them in charge of what happens’ (CIH, 
2007). 
 
So why should HMRPs be wary of undervaluing a community’s contribution?  There 
are several schools of thought that emphasise the value of community assets, but 
perhaps the most relevant is co-production.  Co-production was defined and 
developed by Edgar Cahn, in whose writing the concept of the ‘core economy’ is 
central (Cahn 2001;2004).  The core economy relates to an alternative system of 
value other than monetary.  It encompasses the assets and value in the home, 
family, neighbourhood, community and civil society.  By acknowledging the ‘limitation 
of government efforts to empower people’ because ‘neither markets nor centralised 
bureaucracies are effective models for delivering public services’ (NEF, 2008), co-
production privileges the position of the citizen.  The sense here is of the parameters 
of public interventions, applying models that miss ‘the crucial dimension that allows 
doctors to heal, teachers to teach and carers to care; the relationship with patient, 
pupil or client’ (NEF, 2008).   
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In parallel with such thinking, new methods of harnessing community assets have 
emerged in the U.S.  Asset Based Community Development (ABCD) places an 
emphasis on community-driven development: 
 
‘...the appeal of ABCD lies in its premise that communities can drive the 
development process themselves by identifying and mobilizing existing (but 
often unrecognized) assets’ (Mathie and Cunningham, 2002) 
 
Advocates of such approaches, and those who support co-productive processes, 
would suggest that interventions such as demolition break up assets within 
communities, assets such as relationships, kinship and associations. Top down, 
‘needs-based’ models mean residents ‘no longer act like citizens; instead they begin 
to act like “clients” or consumers of services’ (Mathie and Cunningham, 2002).    This 
thinking has a resonance with good practice guidance for HMRPs: 
 
‘...the present and future residents of an area are its biggest asset, and sharing 
some power with them may also be a way of achieving the HMR goals more 
readily. If residents themselves have a degree of power over the future... they 
are likely to be more committed to it and more likely to defend what has been 
achieved’ (CIH, 2007) 
 
However, this is not just a good practice imperative.  There is a broad governmental 
imperative for communities to be empowered and for all tiers of government to give 
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‘confidence, skills, and power to communities to shape and influence what public 
bodies do for or with them’ (CLG, 2007a). 
 
Perhaps advocates of demolition would argue that community empowerment is a 
necessary sacrifice, the removal of obsolete housing being our primary goal.  They 
may question how communities can drive a programme that will entail the demolition 
of their own homes, and suggest there is too strong a conflict of interest.  Such a line 
of argument would suggest suspending community involvement on grounds of 
expediency or in the public’s own interests.  Perhaps this is too simple a line of 
argument and justifies the undervaluing of community assets.  It poses an important 
question for researchers and those within HMRPs; can HMRPs intervene, addressing 
obsolete housing, whilst also empowering communities? 
 
4.2 Theory development 
 
4.2.1. Theoretical propositions 
Analysing the opposition to demolition has shown how simplistic and categorical 
condemnations of HMRP demolition are flawed.  It has been noted how some 
HMRPs have combined remodelling and refurbishment of properties with sensitive 
and selective demolition (MSP, 2008a, p.10).  It has also been seen that most 
HMRPs now adopt greater rigour in their assessment of heritage assets, and even in 
a tough economic climate are delivering some improvements in the value for money 
of demolition and rebuild schemes (Audit Commission, 2009).  Similarly, it can be 
suggested that not all HMRP demolition schemes will decapitalise and disempower 
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residents, though counter examples have been hard to find.   Caution must therefore 
be urged in treating all HMRP demolition as equally objectionable.  Despite this, there 
are examples of HMRP demolition schemes that justify some of the opposition 
posed.  These schemes should be our focus and where learning is most urgently 
required.  
 
Many of the objections to HMRP demolition are well rehearsed in the literature, 
particularly those relating to heritage, value for money and barriers to refurbishment.   
Less rehearsed are arguments that focus on the capitalisation and empowerment of 
residents. These latter two objections, as framed above, give structure to a disparate 
set of criticisms, and they perhaps provide the most coherent expression of the 
failings of many demolition schemes.  It seems likely that a number of HMRP 
demolition programmes will display these characteristics of decapitalisation and 
disempowerment of existing residents. If such HMRPs can account for these two 
basic objections, it may form the basis of better intervention.   
 
Hence, this research points to three basic theoretical propositions:   
 
I. HMRP demolition programmes can fail to capitalise existing residents 
II. HMRP demolition programmes can neglect the empowerment of residents 
III. Interventions that account for the above two propositions will be more effective 
 
In the course of reviewing the literature related to HMRPs, a note has been made of 
any potential interventions that may help counter issues of decapitalisation and 
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disempowerment. Such reading highlighted Community Land Trusts (CLTs) as 
potentially a more effective vehicle for intervention.  Such community-based models 
for ‘the stewardship and affordability of land, housing and other buildings’ strive to 
ensure that communities benefit from such assets in perpetuity (CFS, 2009, p.2).  
This model is explained and discussed later in the section.  The idea that CLTs could 
be applied in HMRP areas was first seen in a short paper by the Northern 
Consortium (2006, p.4):   
 
‘The uses of CLTs set out in the Birmingham study were also used to propose 
an alternative delivery vehicle for the Housing Market Renewal initiative in part 
of the Oldham pathfinder area. The CLT model was thought to provide an 
innovative way of investing in a low demand area and the model was thought to 
be able to deliver an alternative to traditional housing improvement grants and a 
framework for making decisions on clearance’ 
 
Such reading around CLTs suggested that they may have the potential to empower 
and capitalise residents.  This prompted further reading and deeper exploration of the 
CLT model.  
 
4.2.2. Community Land Trusts 
In the following sub-section the policy context for CLTs is set, as well as the broader 
move toward community ownership.  The basic CLT model is then outlined with 
examples of how they operate in practice.  Recent research into the development of 
CLTs in urban areas is explored, before assessing the potential application of these 
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models in HMRP areas.  A hypothetical CLT intervention is then compared to a 
typical HMRP demolition and rebuild project. 
 
The drive toward community ownership 
The growth in the number of CLTs  in the UK is part of a broader movement toward 
community ownership of assets.  In the preceding decade there has been an 
increasingly voluminous call to transfer assets from public ownership to communities, 
with the intention that the communities manage and/or own the asset.  In a 
succession of government reports in the mid-2000s (Lyons, 2004; CLG, 2006; Quirk, 
2007), the case for community ownership was made.  In 2007, the Secretary of State 
for Communities and Local Government, Ruth Kelly, set forth the Labour 
government’s view on the benefits of community ownership: 
 
‘Community ownership can bring people from different backgrounds together.  It 
can foster a sense of belonging.  It can play a role in enhancing the local 
environment, alleviating poverty and raising people’s aspirations’ (Quirk, 2007, 
p.1). 
 
Such language reveals the scale of ambition for asset transfer, though there is a 
danger that community ownership is presented as a panacea solution.  Other 
commentators have offered a more measured view.  Quirk points specifically at how 
community ownership can help address the ‘undercapitalisation’ of community 
groups, an issue which hinders their success in tackling local issues.  Quirk also 
suggests that far from being a silver bullet to alleviate poverty, asset transfer is 
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primarily a process of empowerment that gives communities the resources to meet 
specific local needs.  This may in turn lead to stronger economic development 
(Lyons, 2004), but it is a process undertaken to empower first and foremost: 
 
‘The starting point is the recognition that optimising the use of public assets is 
not the primary objective: the over-riding goal is community empowerment... 
The strongest assets of any community are its people; their character and their 
personal connections with the wider world’ (Quirk, 2007, p.3-4). 
 
The benefits of community ownership are several and include; wealth creation for 
local people and businesses, strengthening cohesion and the role of community 
anchors, retaining surpluses to reinvest in innovative local projects, and giving 
communities a psychological boost by retaining valued assets and their sense of 
identity (Quirk, 2007).  Such models of ownership are not without their challenges 
though.  Quirk highlights how difficult it is for public bodies to manage the risk of 
transferring an asset.  Quoting local authority staff, Quirk notes the perception that 
such assets may fall into the hands of ‘minority interest groups’, or that there may be 
a lack of technical expertise in communities to manage such assets effectively.  In 
addition to this, and in a time of tightening public finances, public bodies are being 
pressured to maximise their assets.  Public accounting rules preclude such transfers 
without higher government authority: 
 
‘...disposing of surplus assets at best price, to maximise capital receipts – there 
is no room for offering discounts to communities’ (Quirk, 2007, p.12) 
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A risk averse, short-term and predominantly economic view of community ownership 
leads to a more sceptical outlook on asset transfer.  Public servants adopting this 
outlook are more likely to look for the best price for the land, rather than the best 
outcome resulting from its disposal. When asset transfers are assessed for risk in a 
more balanced way, factoring in the social returns on investment, then community 
ownership looks more favourable.  Attempts to measure such social value are in their 
infancy.  Nonetheless, attempts have been made to put values on the social 
outcomes of asset transfer (Bieganski, 2008).  Adherents of the purely economic 
view may indeed over-value the financial return from such assets.  Surplus public 
assets do not always equal capital receipts for the public purse.  As seen in the 
previous chapter, there are significant areas of land assembled for new housing that 
developers now deem too risky to build on it.  So what value is this land?  Holding 
onto it in the hope that in five years time there will be more interest from developers 
is perhaps a questionable strategy, as derelict land further denigrates and devalues 
an area.  In such an instance, there is arguably little to lose (in the short-term) from 
transferring the asset. 
 
Quirk concludes that bodies such as local authorities have the necessary powers to 
transfer assets to the community, but there is insufficient knowledge and experience 
in how to use them.  So whilst the benefits of community management and ownership 
are ‘clearly evidenced’, a campaign is ‘urgently’ needed to raise awareness among 
public sector staff and to develop their expertise in assessing and undertaking 
transfers (Quirk, 2007). 
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The basics of the CLT model 
CLTs are one model of community ownership of assets.  They are not-for-profit 
organisations that hold and use land for the benefit of a community.  CLTs are often 
recipients of land or property through transfer of public assets, section 106 
agreements or from landowners through the exception site policy (BSHF & NHF, 
2007).  Local residents become members of the CLT, and from the membership base 
a management committee is often elected, in addition to the minority representation 
of partner organisations (CFS, 2006).  CLTs are often created as means of 
addressing affordability issues in area, building new housing or to tackle substandard 
housing.  It can help those on modest incomes to access adequate housing in which 
they have an equity stake. Alternatively, it has been proposed that CLT can support 
investment in stock that is in disrepair (URBED, 2004).   
 
In essence, CLTs separate the asset they hold (land and often property) from the 
market. This enables the CLT to subsidise buyers/owners so that they can purchase 
or repair their property.  As property prices increase, and when the owner wishes to 
sell, the CLT retains an equity stake and takes a share in the up-lift value.  This 
return is then reinvested by the CLT to support more homeownership.  Perhaps more 
importantly however, CLTs enable communities to play a much more meaningful and 
active role in the design and provision of housing, and ensuring their community is a 
sustainable one (ART Homes et al, 2002; CFS, 2006). 
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As discussed in the sub-section below entitled ‘Lessons from the development of 
CLTs’ there are very few fully functional urban CLTs in the UK.  Efforts have been 
made to support such CLTs, and 12 demonstration projects have been supported by 
the Carnegie Trust (CFS, 2008).  Despite this these CLTs are, generally speaking, 
still in the initial set-up phase.  Hence research in this field is embryonic and there is 
much to learn about the development of urban CLTs in a UK context.  
 
An example of a CLT in action   
In Burlington in the U.S, the Champlain Housing Trust2
 
 (CHT) applies a unique 
approach to enable those on modest incomes to access housing in an area where 
affordability is a problem.  Household incomes in the Burlington area are such that 
those served by CHT have earnings of only 69% of the area’s median income (New 
Start, 2010), making homeownership difficult in the open market. CHT has brought 
home ownership to 357 households since 1984, but perhaps more importantly, it has 
enabled a large number of households to take a share in the growth of property 
prices which has enabled them subsequently to buy on the open market (Davis and 
Stokes, 2009).  
CHT subsidises the purchase of a property, and takes a share of the increase in 
value when the households wish to sell the property.  In addition, it is written into the 
agreement that the property must be sold back to CHT, not sold on the open market; 
which is crucial to locking-in equity.   
 
                                            
2 Formerly Burlington Community Land Trust 
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For example, a CHT property is valued on the open market at $100,000.  CHT offers 
Household A, a low income family, a house for $75,000 (which means CHT has 
provided a 25% subsidy i.e. $25,000).  If after five years Household A wants to sell 
the property, and it is valued on the open market at $180,000, this would equate to 
an uplift in value of $80,000 from the original market value of $100,000.  Whilst the 
property cannot be sold on the open market (as it has to be sold back to CHT) the 
assessment of its market value helps calculate the share of the up-lift for both parties.  
As agreed, Household A takes a 25% share of the $80,000 uplift (i.e. $20,000).  This 
can be used as a deposit for a house on the open market (which 74% of CHT 
households chose to do).  In addition CHT repays the seller their original $75,000 
investment, which means that the property comes back into CHT ownership.  This 
leaves CHT with $60,000 worth of uplift to reinvest (i.e. the remaining 75% of uplift 
value).  To calculate the resale value, CHT takes its original sale price of $75,000 to 
Household A, and adds to it the amount paid to Household A from the up-lift, i.e. 
$20,000.  Hence, the property is resold at $95,000.  This would represent a highly 
affordable price, as the property’s market value is now $180,000 (BSHF & NHF 
2007).   See Figure 3 below for a more concise explanation: 
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Figure 3: CLT financial model 
Source: BSHF&NHF 
 
There are many variations on this model.  For instance, Paterson (CFS, 2006) 
suggests that on resale, the seller receives the same percentage of the sale price 
that they invested, in addition to 75% of the up-lift.  For example, imagine a property 
is valued at £100,000 and the seller buys 60% of equity and the CLT invests 40%.  If 
the resale value is £200,000 (an up-lift of £100,000), then the seller then gets his 
original investment back (£60,000), plus 75% of the up-lift (£75,000).  The CLT 
receives back its £40,000 investment in addition to £25,000 of up-lift.  Such a model 
is much more favourable to the homeowner than the CLT, but nonetheless the value 
created for the CLT is substantial and can be reinvested for the community’s benefit. 
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Lessons from the development of CLTs 
Research is increasingly being carried out into how CLTs develop and some of the 
barriers they face.  Such research has highlighted important issues around the 
necessary skills and capacities required within community groups to manage and 
own assets.  This is a key finding in the field of community ownership generally 
(LCST, 2006), as well as specific to CLTs (Crowe et al, 2010).  Crowe et al note that 
one of the major risks in developing a CLT is that volunteers are ‘overburdened and 
unable to maintain effort and interest’ (Crowe et al, 2010, p.66).  To remedy this, they 
recommend the following: 
 
‘What English CLTS would do differently...12-24 months capacity building prior 
to setting up organisation in the community [and]...a 5-year timeframe for 
establishing a community anchor organisation for asset transfer...[included in 
development costs should be] a paid organiser/officer time, circa £40,000 pa’. 
 
Such learning raises questions about the application of CLTs in urban areas. What 
assets can such CLTs take on?  What outcomes can they achieve?  And what do 
they need to help them work better?  Responding to such questions researchers at 
Salford University produced a toolkit for urban CLTs (CFS, 2008).The researchers 
supported and evaluated 12 demonstration projects, extracting significant learning 
about how urban CLTs develop. Summing up the value of urban CLTs the authors’ 
state: 
 
89 
 
‘CLTs have the potential to play a major role in managing urban change and 
connecting the process of physical change with the achievement of wellbeing 
outcomes in particular places, through the engagement of communities in the 
process, in individual and collective behaviour change, and retaining the 
intrinsic value of their assets for reinvestment in that place’ (CFS, 2008, p.2). 
 
The case studies produced by the authors reveal the diversity, in terms of scale and 
focus, of the projects.  Some of the proposed CLTs focus on demolition and 
redevelopment, whilst others will renovate existing properties.  The authors document 
the multiple barriers to development of urban CLTs; agreeing the complex legal and 
governance arrangements, securing the support of government and governmental 
bodies responsible for funding, finding willing partners to transfer assets and securing 
the requisite finances for development (CFS, 2008).   One of the case studies, of 
particular note for this study, is the The Seedley and Langworthy Trust which is 
based in the Manchester and Salford HMRP area.  The Trust has explored becoming 
a CLT so that it can ‘capture some of the wealth generated by the regeneration 
funding in perpetuity for the benefit of the community’ (CFS, 2008, p.80).  This would 
involve taking ownership of certain assets held by a local housing association.  It is 
unclear whether the Trust has been successful in obtaining such assets, but the 
authors note how the current ‘offer from the housing association has not matched 
[the Trust’s] aspirations’ (CFS, 2008). 
 
Despite the potential of such projects, the authors suggest that there is much that 
government, governmental bodies and other agencies can do to support the 
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development of urban CLTs.  These actions include; ensuring CLTs have a formal 
status and legal definition and are recognised by regulators, financial bodies, local 
authorities and local strategic partnerships.  In addition, the authors argue for 
guidance that will ensure decisions about asset transfer are taken in a well informed 
and balanced way: 
 
‘Develop guidance for policy and good practice to ensure that political choices 
between maximising capital receipts from the sale of public assets and 
achieving wellbeing outcomes from the use of public assets are taken with the 
benefit of balanced, transparent and explicit professional advice’ (CFS, 2008, 
p.5). 
 
Whilst there are significant barriers to the development of urban CLTs, there is 
momentum in the movement.  Some members of the UK’s current coalition 
government have been supportive of CLTs for some time, declaring ‘we are strongly 
in favour of Community Land Trusts’ (Conservatives, 2009, p.23).  In addition, there 
has been much talk of giving communities an increased responsibility for housing 
development by giving them freedoms within the planning system to authorise 
development (HM Government, 2010, p.7). 
 
Applications in HMRP areas 
The examples above show how CLTs can bring home ownership within the grasp of 
low income households.  However, such CLTs were not developed as a response to 
low demand for housing, indeed they were developed because of high house prices.  
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Many of the CLTs already in existence in the UK are in affluent rural areas, to ensure 
housing or facilities are accessible. 
 
So what is the application of the CLT model in HMRP areas, and how can it offer an 
alternative to demolition, or an alternative way of managing demolition?  More 
importantly, and in reference to the theoretical propositions developed, how could a 
CLT serve to better capitalise and empower existing residents in HMRP areas?  
Before answering such questions, it is first essential to understand the outcomes of a 
typical HMRP demolition and rebuild scheme.  This would provide something to 
compare the CLT model against.  Below an example HMRP intervention is 
presented, which has been constructed on the basis of a variety of evidence from 
existing HMRP schemes and house price data for 2007 (MSP, 2008b; RENEW, 
2008b; Oldham MBC, 2007; NewHeartlands, 2009, UpMyStreet, 2010).   The aim of 
presenting such a model is to approximate the financial inputs and outputs of such 
schemes and to show the flow of capital. In essence the model tries to show where 
financial gains are made for the public and private investment.  This reveals a 
number of important findings, and also enables us to juxtapose the potential CLT 
model against some existing HMRP practices.  
 
A typical demolition and rebuild model 
This hypothetical HMRP demolition and rebuild project is based on data for 
2007/2008 prices and values.  It is constructed on the following premises: 
 
• The demolition of 200 owner occupied and social rented terraced properties; 
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• the demolished properties will be replaced by 250 new build properties.  For 
ease of calculation the scheme comprises 70% private sale and 30% social 
housing; 
• demolition costs are on average £6,000 per property (RENEW, 2006d); 
• acquisition and compensation costs per property are £60,000 on average 
(Stoke City Council, 2007a).  Acquired properties were valued as though they 
were not in a demolition scheme (RENEW, 2008d); 
• equivalent properties in the local area for displaced households cost £77,000 
(UpMyStreet, 2010); 
• land value after demolition is priced at £7,000,000; 
• the cost to build each new property is on average £102,000, allowing for a mix 
of two and three bedroom properties (Newheartlands, 2009, p.5); 
• the sale price of each new property is on average £130,000 (including those to 
the RSL provider).  This is an approximation based on sale prices of new 
homes in HMRP schemes such as Walker Riverside and Dorrington Gardens 
(Upmystreet.com, 2010); 
• as a result of the development and regeneration activity, after two years there 
is a 10% up-lift in value of properties which equates to £13,000 on per 
property (10% of £130,000); and 
• the HMRP receives no share of profits from the sale of new housing (Oldham 
MBC, 2007) 
 
Using the above information and indicative figures for similar programmes, the flow of 
capital and outputs of such schemes can be depicted as follows:
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Figure 4: Flow of investment and capital in a typical HMRP demolition and rebuild scheme 
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Whilst the diagram above is a simplification of the flow of capital and the outputs 
achieved, it prompts the question about whether the right people benefit financially 
from such interventions.  If implemented, the above example would arguably address 
issues of poor quality housing and the social knock-on effects of having a large 
amount of unwanted, void stock.  If existing residents were rehoused, and/or some 
renters were helped into home ownership, then their wealth will increase as 
demonstrated earlier in this thesis (HUD, 1995).  This may support wider economic 
development.  If new residents are housed in the new properties they may also 
contribute to the economic development of the area, spending their income with local 
businesses.  These benefits are welcome, but under the model presented above the 
biggest beneficiary financially is the developer.  We also know, as the case study 
later in the thesis shows, that such schemes often fail to rehouse existing residents in 
the new properties. As we’ve demonstrated, displaced residents may lose out 
financially as they seek to find a replacement home.  In addition, how has the 
scheme empowered residents?  How have existing residents been put ‘in charge of 
what happens?’ (CIH, 2007).  Under a typical HMRP scheme such as that modelled 
above, residents may have been consulted on the new development but far from put 
‘in charge of it’.  
 
Arguably CLTs offer a solution to increasing the financial benefits for existing 
residents, whilst also empowering them.  One model that has been posited is the use 
of CLTs to refurbish properties, rather than demolish them.  Such a CLT may ensure 
that members are put in charge of the intervention, that owners increase their capital 
wealth and that local people benefit from the scheme in perpetuity.  The development 
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of this model is credited to Charlie Baker (URBED, 2007).  Using proposals 
developed by Baker for the town of Werneth in Oldham it is possible to model and 
approximate the likely the flow of capital and outputs.  A specific focus has been 
placed on HMRP investment and the financial benefits for residents. 
 
CLT refurbishment scheme 
This hypothetical example of a CLT refurbishment scheme is constructed on the 
following premises: 
 
• the comprehensive refurbishment of 200 poor quality terraced houses; 
• average open market values of properties before improvement is £50,000.  
This is lower than valuations for properties earmarked for demolition, which 
are valued differently (RENEW, 2008d). For ease of showing the flow of 
capital it has been assumed that each property is owned outright; 
• an average subsidy of £30,000 per property is required to bring each property 
up to a decent standard (Plimmer et al, 2008, p.6); 
• Refurbishment contractors make 15% profit on the work completed (MSP, 
2008b, p.6); 
• as a result of the refurbishment each property is worth a minimum of £96,000 
(CLG, 2009, p.36).  There is a net up-lift of £16k per property after 
refurbishment, allowing for the existing value of the property (£50,000) and the 
investment made (£30,000); 
• the CLT takes a 10% share of this up-lift, and the resident takes a 90% share 
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Figure 5: Flow of investment and capital in a CLT model of refurbishment 
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The model above is merely indicative and critics may argue that £30,000 per property 
is not enough to repair poor housing stock.  In the course of this research examples 
of both very high and very low refurbishment costs have been found (Audit 
Commission, 2010; BCIS, 2006), and £30,000 seems like a fair estimate for  those 
properties that are in poor but not derelict condition. Critics may also argue that there 
would be difficulties in signing up all residents to the scheme, which would be crucial 
to delivering economies of scale.  This model then does not account for such 
logistical challenges and is presented not as a definitive example, but merely to 
demonstrate where the value created (or more precisely the capital) arising from the 
investment could go. 
   
Comparing the typical HMRP demolition and rebuild project, with the CLT model 
above, it seems that there is only slight difference in the investment required.  
Nonetheless, looking at benefits accrued and the flow of capital, it can be seen that 
existing residents and the CLT receive much of the financial benefits. Under the CLT 
scheme, owners would grow their capital from £50,000 to £64,400 on the sale of the 
property after refurbishment.  Given a number of years and house price increases it 
likely that the value of the house will grow further.  This will enable the resident, if 
they sold their property, to realise greater capital.  Perhaps just as importantly, local 
housing conditions will have improved, without the need for displacement, and in the 
process building up the community’s ownership of local problems and empowering 
them to act.   By placing the investment in a CLT, and enabling the CLT to take a 
share in the uplift of properties, it can reinvest in the local area and keep local 
housing affordable. 
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The benefit of the CLT refurbishment model is therefore twofold; firstly, it secures 
significant financial benefit for existing residents and future aspirant home owners; 
and secondly and perhaps most importantly, because the CLT manages the scheme 
the local community owns the process of improvement.  The reality of the CLT 
refurbishment scheme is that it may also have to be combined with selective 
demolition, where property conditions are so poor that refurbishment costs outweigh 
the end value.  Nonetheless, the empowerment benefits alone suggest that such 
interventions may be preferable to some of the demolition schemes that HMRPs 
have undertaken.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CASE OF SLATER STREET 
 
The following chapter presents a case study of demolition by a HMRP, and one in 
which a CLT was proposed.  It was hoped that by looking at such a case, the 
theoretical propositions developed in the previous section may be tested against a 
real world example.  To guide this testing process a set of research questions were 
developed: 
 
1. How did the HMRP intervene? 
2. How much did the intervention capitalise residents?  
3. How much did the intervention empower residents? 
 
The first research question ensures the case study is grounded in a full 
understanding of how the HMRP intervened.  Only after understanding and detailing 
the full chronology of the intervention, can an assessment be made as to whether it 
capitalised and empowered existing residents.  To separate evidence and 
interpretation, as advised by Green et al (2006), the case study is therefore divided 
into three sections: 
 
i. Contextualising the case 
ii. The chronology of the intervention 
iii. Analysis of the intervention 
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The first sub-section, Contextualising the case, enables the reader to understand the 
case’s location, and some of the social, environmental and economic factors affecting 
it.  The sub-second section, The chronology of the intervention, tries to present a 
well-evidenced view of how the intervention unfolded over time, free from 
interpretation and analysis. Only after this can the case be subjected to analysis and 
a decision made as to whether it validates or invalidates the theoretical propositions.  
  
5.1 Contextualising the case 
The case study area is a small number of streets in Middleport, part of the urban area 
of Stoke-on-Trent, a city in North Staffordshire in the West Midlands of the U.K.  The 
research uses the geographical boundaries of the case as set by the HMRP and the 
local authority (Stoke-on-Trent City Council, 2005).  Such agencies named the case 
study area the Slater Street Clearance Area (henceforth, Slater Street).     
 
Figure 6: The location of Slater Street in the wider geography 
 
 
Source: Open OS (adapted).  Open OS (adapted).  Contains ordnance survey data © Crown copyright 
and database right [2011] 
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Slater Street is approximately one and half miles north-west of Stoke-on-Trent city 
centre, and two miles north east of the centre of Newcastle-under-Lyme.  Slater 
Street is part of Middleport, a neighbourhood at the southern margins of the town of 
Burslem.  The case study area lies between two main arterial road routes to the north 
of Stoke City centre (the A500 and A50).  
 
Figure 7: The physical boundaries of the case study area 
 
Source: Open OS (adapted).  Contains ordnance survey data © Crown copyright and database right 
[2011] 
 
The case study area comprises seven streets; Bennett Street, Slater Street, 
Dimsdale Street, East View, Clew Street, Luke Street and housing on the east side of 
Newport Lane.   It is bordered to the north by Furlong Street, and access from the 
south is via Newport Lane.  Figure 7 shows the size, basic road layout and 
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orientation of Slater Street. Large industrial sites border the case study area to the 
east and south. 
 
As a small area, situated within a variety of geographies, it is important to explain 
how these geographies relate to one another.  The diagram below, which is not to 
scale, shows the containment of geographies within one another.  
 
Figure 8: Slater Street and geographic context 
   
 
Later in this section, in exploring the social, economic and enviromental data for 
Slater Street, low level geographies are used (ONS, 2010).  Such data is presented 
for Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) and Output Areas (OAs) which represent 
small geographical units of similar sized populations. Slater Street is part of one 
LSOA and is comprised of two OAs.  When combined the OAs cover a slightly larger 
geography than Slater Street, but nearly match the case study boundary3
 
.   
                                            
3 The Output Areas (OAs) that cover Slater street contain 285 dwellings, as opposed to the 237 contained in the 
clearance area.  With this in mind data at this level provides a close approximation, but not perfect, picture 
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To simplify the job of setting the case study area in a wider context, conditions within 
the local authority and within the HMRP are used to contextualise the case. 
 
Employment and industry in the wider geography 
Slater Street was originally built in the Victorian period to house employees in the 
local pottery industry (Stoke City Council, 2006).  This industry was a major source of 
employment for local people, peaking in the post-WWII period when 79,000 people 
were employed in the industry.  Such employment has however shrunk markedly, 
with recent estimates suggesting only 7,000 people are now employed in the pottery 
industry (Stoke City Council, 2010).  The loss of this major industry, and the failure to 
develop a thriving alternative industry, has resulted in high unemployment which is a 
significant factor affecting the housing market and broader regeneration.  
Unemployment in Stoke-on-Trent is some 2.5% higher than the UK average (NOMIS, 
2010), and has been worsening since 2007.  Average incomes for Stoke-on-Trent 
were deemed to be the third lowest in England in 2004 (RENEW, 2004), and gross 
weekly pay is some £89 per week less than the national average, and £55 less the 
regional average (NOMIS, 2010).   
 
Deprivation in the wider geography 
On assessments of deprivation Stoke scores highly.  In 2004 it was declared the 18th 
most deprived local authority area in the country (ONS, 2004), and was deemed to 
have become more deprived in 2007, being ranked 16th (ONS, 2007).  Such 
deprivation is matched with population decline. Based on population estimates, 
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Stoke-on-Trent will lose 26,000 residents between the period of 1991 to 2021, a drop 
of 12% (Centre for Census and Survey Research, 2005) 
 
Land use in the wider geography  
As the previous two maps demonstrate, the case study is located in an area with a 
high housing density, and hence high population density.  The Stoke-on-Trent area 
has 25.75 persons per hectare compared to the national average of 3.45 (ONS, 
2001).  As suggested above, Slater Street and the surrounding area contains a large 
amount of industrial land.  Much of this land is disused.  As of March 2008 Stoke-on-
Trent had 210 hectares of derelict land and buildings, constituting 2.26% of the total 
land in the local authority boundary.  This compares to only 0.13% of land regionally.  
Such statistics highlight some of the environmental issues in the local area and the 
potential land for reuse as housing. 
 
The wider housing market 
The housing market in Stoke-on-Trent fluctuated in line with national trends until 
2008.  Nationally, house prices declined between 2007-2008, but began to rise again 
in 2009-2010 (Land Registry, 2010).  In Stoke-on-Trent however, prices have 
continued to decline since 2008 and the average sale price in 2010 was lower than it 
was in October 2008.  The trend in house sales mirrors this decline, with sales nearly 
halving between 2007 and 2009 (Land Registry, 2010): 
 
  
105 
 
Figure 9: Volume of house sales in Stoke-on-Trent between 1996 and 2009 
 
 
Empty properties are, and have been, one of the results of this housing market 
decline.  In 2001/02, the number of vacant dwelling in Stoke-on-Trent stood at 6368, 
5.9% of the total stock in the authority (DTLR, 2002).  Whilst improvements have 
been made (in 2009 vacancy rates were at 5.2% of the total stock) the percentage of 
empty stock is still significantly higher than the national average of 3.4% (CLG, 
2009). 
 
Renewing the housing market in North Staffordshire 
Such housing market issues are not confined to Stoke-on-Trent, being prevalent in 
neighbouring conurbations and across North Staffordshire.  It is therefore no surprise 
that this sub-region was designated a HMRP area.  RENEW, as the HMRP is called, 
covers a large area of North Staffordshire, comprising Stoke-on-Trent, Newcastle-
under-Lyme and surrounding areas.  The RENEW area was chosen as one of the 
HMRP’s as it met the stated criteria: 
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‘when measured against vacancies, house prices and stock condition, it has the 
weakest housing market in the West Midlands by a considerable margin...the 
housing stock is largely the product of a low wage and poorly performing 
economy’ (RENEW, 2004, p.27). 
 
In their prospectus RENEW (2004) highlight three priority housing issues that it would 
seek to address; 
 
• obsolescent housing - the product of poor stock conditions and unstable 
ground.  High improvement costs mean refurbishment was deemed too costly; 
• surplus housing - estimated at approximately 3000 units in the RENEW area; 
and 
• unpopular neighbourhoods – suffering from concentrated deprivation, poor 
urban design and other associated social issues.   
 
Responding to these issues, RENEW’s Prospectus gave a clear statement of its 
future ‘goals’ (RENEW, 2004, p.7).  These goals are returned to in the case study 
analysis: 
 
1.  Balance the supply and demand for housing by removing surplus properties and 
providing a better choice of homes in appropriate locations. 
2.  Provide sustainable neighbourhoods through better management and increasing 
population by building at higher densities. 
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3.  Reduce outward migration from Stoke-on-Trent and retain and attract new 
populations to the pathfinder area. 
4.  Improve the environment radically by removing housing from heavily polluted 
roads, from areas of polluting industry and from areas with no long-term 
residential future. Quality open space will be provided on former housing land 
which is no longer needed. 
5.  Promote social cohesion by ensuring ethnic minorities can access new build 
housing and by reducing overcrowding. 
6.  Link to wealth creation by supporting the new commercial core, town centres and 
by providing construction training to local people. 
7.  Reduce crime and the fear of crime in order to promote safe neighbourhoods. 
 
In its Scheme Update (RENEW, 2005, p.7) this list of aims was reasserted, with slight 
changes in focus.  The Scheme Update asserted RENEW’s aim to: balance the 
supply and demand for housing; provide a quality housing stock; retain and attract 
new populations; transform the urban form and local environment; promote social 
cohesion and meet housing needs; and, achieve sustainable neighbourhoods.  
Whilst these later aims are much less specific than the aims stated in 2004, they do 
overlap.  When compared, key issues relating to the quality of stock, tackling crime, 
housing in industrial areas and wealth creation have no specific mention by 2005.   
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5.2 The chronology of intervention 
Having set the context for the case study, the following section details the process of 
intervention by the HMRP in Slater Street.  As discussed in Chapter 2, there are 
advantages to presenting this in chronological order (Yin, 2003), providing a picture 
of how the intervention developed linearly over time.  Each two year period is taken in 
turn, from the year 2001 to 2010. 
 
2001-2002 
 
The baseline position 
The 2001 census data provides an invaluable baseline picture for the Slater Street 
area prior to any HMRP intervention.  Looking at this data for the Slater Street OAs, 
shows that 13% of the total number of dwellings were unoccupied in 2001, 
significantly higher than the average for England (3.8%) and the West Midlands 
(3.3%).  The data also shows the tenure split in the area at this time; 49% of 
households were in some form of owner occupation, 28% in social renting and 16% 
in private renting.  The Census data also states that 88% of dwellings in the area 
where terraced.  Compared against regional averages, Slater Street has a 
disproportionately high percentage of terraced housing, one of the factors of being ‘at 
risk’ of low demand as identified in the M62 study (Nevin et al, 2002, p.vi).  Looking at 
individual property sales in the case study area confirms this. Between January 2002 
and December 2002, house prices ranged from £8000 to £22,000, with the average 
being £15,932 (Land Registry, 2010).  This was significantly below the Stoke-on-
Trent average for this priod of £52,329, with the regional average being £111,429.  
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Even comparing Slater Street against averages for terraced properties shows 
comparatively low prices.  In 2002 the average price for a terraced house nationally 
was £105,739, and £73,761 regionally.  It is clear then that at the turn of the 
millennium Slater Street was suffering very low house prices and significant 
abandonment. 
 
The census data also provides important details about the population of the area 
prior to intervention.  Nearly half of the working age population (42%) were classed 
as economically inactive; neither employed nor registered as unemployed (i.e. 
registered as retired, a student, looking after the home/family, permanently 
sick/disabled or ‘other’).   In addition, nearly half the working age population was in 
employment, meaning very few people deemed themselves to be registered as 
unemployed.  Data on the social grade of the population shows only 25% of residents 
were classed in social grade E (‘On state benefit, unemployed, lowest grade 
workers’).  It appears that a high level of skilled workers occupied the area, with 43% 
of residents over 16 years of age being classed in social grades A to C; Higher and 
intermediate managerial / administrative / professional, supervisory,  clerical,  junior 
managerial / administrative / professional or skilled manual workers’.  A high 
percentage of skilled workers, many of whom were economically inactive, points to a 
potential mix of issues related to ageing populations, familial dependencies and 
health related conditions.  
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The 2002 Neighbourhood Renewal Assessment 
In December 2002, a Neighbourhood Renewal Assessment (NRA) for Middleport 
was completed. The NRA had been commissioned by a working group which 
comprised a variety of local agencies involved in Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) 
projects.  The rationale for the NRA was based on significant worries about local 
housing including ‘a number of concerns about housing conditions, demand, tenure 
shift and house values’ (RENEW, 2008b). 
 
The NRA covered 1,318 dwellings in Middleport, a much bigger area than just Slater 
Street.   Figure 10 below shows the boundaries of the NRA, Slater Street is shown in 
red as ‘Area C’: 
 
Figure 10: Middleport 2002 NRA area 
 
Source: RHS Consultants 
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As part of the NRA a stock condition survey was completed on the externals of 1,318 
dwellings in Middleport.  In practice, this meant external surveys of all privately 
owned and privately rented properties in Middleport, plus all social housing built 
before 1919.  To supplement this, 20% of privately owned properties were subject to 
internal inspection.  From this survey it was revealed that 16% of dwellings were unfit 
for human habitation.  The NRA concluded that in the next 10 years, 40% of roofs 
and 30% of windows would need replacing and 25% would need damp courses: 
 
‘The immediate cost of dealing with urgent disrepair and doing all external 
works to merely make premises fit is £1.5 million...Overall the total cost of the 
repair work will be £20 million in the next ten years’ (RHS, 2002, p.7). 
 
The NRA provides comment on specific areas within Middleport that presented either 
regeneration opportunities or future challenges.  Some of these specific areas are 
within the case study area, and hence the NRA offers the earliest insight into the 
different issues and potential solutions for the area.  Reviewing the extensive detail 
provided in the NRA provides two interesting findings.  The first relates to the impact 
of adjacent land on Slater Street, the second that the Slater Street area itself was 
deemed highly problematic.  The NRA points to two problematic sites bordering the 
Slater Street area: 
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• Brown’s Yard, which was deemed to be ‘the most environmentally damaging 
location in the neighbourhood’ with blown refuse and proliferate refuse 
dumping a problem; and 
• the old Co-op with its ‘largely redundant buildings’ and ‘poor site management 
[and] dumping’ was also deemed problematic.   
 
In both instance the NRA points to the important role of the Burslem Port project, an 
attempt to reopen an old canal arm, to the regenerate the area. 
 
Figure 11: Brown's Yard, the Co-op and Burslem Port project 
   
Source: Open OS (adapted).  Contains ordnance survey data © Crown copyright and database right 
[2011] 
 
In addition to the problematic areas identified above, the NRA pointed to issues in a 
number of streets in the case study area (RHS, 2002, p.55-62).  It provides details on 
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Luke Street, at the southern edge of the case study area. There is evidence of 
boarded up, fire damaged houses and ‘demoralised’ residents wanting to ‘sell their 
homes and abandon the neighbourhood’.  East View, at the eastern most edge of the 
case study area, was being ‘very badly affected by environmental degradation’.  
Slater Street itself, which runs down the heart of the case study area, was 
experiencing a ‘huge fall in market values’ and issues related to private landlords.  In 
all these instances, the NRA points to the importance of developing adjacent, key 
strategic sites.  Development on the Co-op land, in conjunction with the Burslem Port 
development, was considered crucial if the area was to improve.  Whilst the NRA 
introduces the idea of demolition, the recommendation is actually to hold back on 
demolition until these adjacent sites are developed:   
 
‘Though demolition appears to be the most socially and financially appropriate 
option at this time, its implementation could be held to see if the package of new 
build  and conservation proposals for the key strategic sites has a beneficial 
effect on this part of the neighbourhood’ (RHS, 2002, p.62). 
 
There are clear issues of empty housing and poor environmental conditions, and in 
terms of stock condition Slater Street was deemed as having ‘the highest proportion 
of unfit properties’ and ‘selective demolition and redevelopment’ may be necessary 
(RHS, 2002, p.19).  It appears, however, that at this stage investment in adjacent 
derelict land was being prioritised.   
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The NRA for Middleport provides an economic assessment of potential interventions 
on selected areas.  Area C aligns with the eventual Slater Street boundaries, and 
hence provides useful information about which course of action which was deemed 
appropriate in 2002.  The assessment looked at the Net Present Value (NPV) of four 
interventions for Slater Street: 
 
1. Group repair – Continuous repair and maintenance of all properties 
2. Make fit and maintain - Undertake urgent repairs, then replace housing in year 30 
3. Clear and rebuild (year 2) - Clearance and redevelopment all within 2 years  
4. Clear and rebuild (year 10) - Clearance of properties and maintain land for 10 
years, then redevelop  
 
In this instance, the total NPV shows the cost of an intervention with any benefits 
(such as increased property values as a result of the intervention) subtracted from 
these costs.  Costs include those for both public bodies and private owners. Crucially, 
the assessment is based purely on the net expenditure (such as acquisition, repair 
costs, compensation packages) and financial returns on this expenditure (e.g. 
increased property prices and land value).  In looking purely at financial expenditure 
and financial returns, it does not factor in any social returns on investment (NEF, 
2009a), such as the wellbeing of residents.  The NPVs for the four interventions are 
provided in Figure 12, along with changes in values if conditions alter over time. 
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Figure 12: NPV and projected values for four interventions 
 
Source: RHS, 2002 
 
As can be seen from the table, the most cost-effective solution for Slater Street (in 
terms of NPV) is seen to be clearance and rebuild within two years (£350,298), 
closely followed by group repair (£376, 275).  The option of making fit for 30 years 
and then replacing housing is deemed the least cost effective solution.  As shown 
later in this section, the intervention that most closely resembles the one undertaken 
is ‘clear and rebuild (year 10)’, with an NPV of £1,060,788, the third most costly 
option.    
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Later in this thesis the decision making around demolition is explored further, and 
why selective demolition combined with refurbishment was never considered (neither 
in the 2002 NRA or 2006 NRA).  As a final point about the 2002 NRA, in its 
concluding recommendations for Middleport, it makes a key point about the model of 
intervention in the Slater Street area.  The NRA suggests the development of a 
surprisingly local vehicle for regeneration, showing some of the characteristics of a 
community-based approach: 
 
‘We recommend that the potential for setting up a local housing and 
regeneration company be explored.  A major part of the brief of such a project 
would be to obtain funds to purchase and improve empty or neglected 
properties and market them for owner occupation’ (RHS, 2002, p.19) 
 
2003-2004 
 
Emerging plans for Middleport 
In July 2003 an Interim Housing Market Assessment was completed which enabled 
the newly formed RENEW to declare four areas in North Staffordshire as Areas of 
Major Intervention (AMIs).  Middleport was one of these AMIs and hence plans for 
Middleport were put into RENEW’s prospectus and submitted to government in 
March 2004.  When presenting the vision for Middleport, the Prospectus makes 
consistent reference to how Middleport must be better connected to Burslem in order 
to be sustainable.   The vision out for Middleport was: 
117 
 
 
‘To become a ‘heritage’ suburb to Burslem Town. Its canal, listed buildings and 
former industrial character will endow it with a unique sense of place. It can 
capitalise on its connections to a revitalised historic centre whilst offering 
access to the strategic road network and economic areas that will be at the 
heart of a more dynamic Stoke-on-Trent. It will be characterised by the rich 
resource of integrated green spaces within and around the 
neighbourhood.’(RENEW, 2004, p.87). 
 
The key strategic objectives for Middleport were declared to be: clearing poor quality 
terraced housing and enhancing the environment; relocating industrial premises; 
providing homes in line with residents aspirations and financial situations; and, to 
create a high quality urban environment (RENEW, 2004).  Specific references to the 
Slater Street area point to addressing industrial land between Furlong Road and 
Navigation Road (which would include the Co-op and Brown’s Yard).  This would be 
redeveloped as housing, in part as ‘homes for those displaced by renewal activities’ 
(RENEW, 2004, p.87).  The Prospectus set out spending plans for Middleport 
totalling £173m.  This comprised approximately £41m for new build housing, £13m 
for demolition and land costs, £42m in displacement packages and £3m for 
refurbishment costs.  Clearly, the intention at this stage was to invest heavily in new 
build development.  The large amount of money allocated to displacement packages 
suggested that existing housing that was occupied (as opposed to commercial land) 
would be the focus of the development.    
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During this period a Neighbourhood Action Plan (NAP) was developed for Middleport, 
which divided the area up.  In the NAP an area named Middleport East is identified 
and this is co-terminus with what would become the Slater Street clearance area.  
Whilst pointing to high vacancy rates in the area, the NAP also provides some 
qualitative evidence from residents, suggesting ‘loyalty to the area is not strong; 
around two thirds would be willing to leave’ (RENEW, 2008a, p.27).   The NAP shows 
that whilst residents supported the idea of improving and maintaining housing, they 
also acknowledged the need for some clearance in Slater Street which was 
‘crumbling away’.   
 
2005-2006 
 
The government response to plans and further intelligence gathering 
In March 2005, the ODPM contacted RENEW to tell them they would be holding back 
funds in relation to their plans for Middleport.  In a letter to the Director of RENEW, 
the ODPM stated: 
 
‘...one issue that we did feel was overlooked was the effect that house building 
in Burslem will have on the size of Middleport.  We want you to consider this 
further as your plans develop...Middleport should be then reconsidered in the 
context of the pathfinder’s scheme update which is due to be submitted to 
ODPM in September 2005’ (ODPM, 2005, p.1-3). 
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It is not clear from the evidence available how this issue was resolved, but it appears 
that funds were eventually released by the ODPM. 
 
Shortly after this correspondence, RENEW commissioned an Urban Core Study for 
Middleport, which would become the AMI Plan.  Running alongside this, RENEW 
commissioned a heritage characterisation study (Booth et al, 2005), and crucially a 
number of localised NRAs.  One of these NRAs would begin in 2006 and would be 
for Middleport East, i.e. the Slater Street case study area.   
 
AMI community engagement 
This period of developing the AMI Plan and Slater Street NRA, perhaps represents 
the most intensive period of community engagement by RENEW and its partners.  In 
July 2005 several consultation events where held in the Middleport where the AMI 
Masterplan was introduced, along with details about the forthcoming NRAs and 
findings from a ground condition survey.  Following these events the AMI Masterplan 
was approved by the RENEW Board in November 2005 (RENEW 2008a).  Shortly 
after this every household in the AMI received a newsletter, which included a map 
detailing the broad proposals for their neighbourhood (PS Consultants, 2006). This 
merely categorised areas into; Housing Priority Areas, Areas for Further Study, 
Environmental Improvement Areas, Declared Clearance Areas, Development 
opportunities and Largely Sustainable Areas.  Slater Street was declared a Housing 
Priority area, bordered to the east and south by land with ‘development 
opportunities’.   
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Along with this newsletter, a short survey was included to gauge the views of 
residents on core issues (PS Consultants, 2006).   In total, 3447 surveys were sent 
out across the Middleport AMI area, with a return of 580.  RENEW received 58 
responses from the Slater Street area, a sample of 23% of households.   The results 
from this survey show a number of interesting findings, the most significant being that 
50% of respondents ‘would agree to their home being acquired and demolished 
subject to compensation’ (PS Consultants, 2006, p.48). The results also showed that 
28% of respondents were dissatisfied with the state of repair of their property, and 
significantly more (57%), were dissatisfied with their street and surrounding area.  
Only 34% of respondents thought they would still be living in the Slater Street area in 
two years time.  When asked about the most serious problems in their area, the most 
pressing problems were deeded to be fly-tipping and litter (55%) and criminal 
damage/vandalism (55%), then derelict properties or homes in poor state of repair 
(53%).  The survey corroborates other evidence that residents were dissatisfied with 
their area, and perhaps receptive to some form of demolition. 
 
Following this survey, four consultation events were held in February 2006, one of 
which took place at the Cathedral in Slater Street.  The events presented the 
proposals for the AMI, and conducted a number of qualitative feedback exercises.  
The first entailed marking a map of the area with different labels, denoting 
participants’ preferred land use for certain sites, and any eyesores.  The second 
exercise related to how money should be spent in the area (a ‘Real Money 
Exercise’).  Taking the issue of land use first, a number of residents pinpointed the 
old Co-op site and Brown’s yard as opportunities for redevelopment.  Indeed 
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residents declared these as one of seven ‘strategically important’ sites in the whole of 
Middleport (PS Consultants).  The results from the Real Money Exercise do not show 
findings specifically for Slater Street.  However, taking Middleport Housing Priority 
Areas, in general, residents suggested spending the most money on the ‘repair of 
older homes’. The final AMI plan was published in April 2006. 
 
It is hard to say, in retrospect and with only partial evidence, whether this consultation 
was used meaningfully by RENEW and the local authority.  It certainly appears that 
consultation activities were geared toward residents expressing their aspirations and 
requirements, and that there was some support for demolition.  Yet it is evident that 
some residents questioned the impact of such consultations on RENEW’s decision 
making processes: 
 
‘They said there’ll be a full public consultation...Generally, the consultation was 
a box ticking exercise... We had questionnaires, there were a number of 
instances where council officers came round.  Then you had the surveyors 
coming round.  I engaged, not that that made any difference’ (Resident, 2010) 
 
The impact and quality of engagement is an issue addressed in the case study 
analysis section below.   
 
The 2006 NRA 
As mentioned above, during this period in 2006 an NRA assessment was being 
carried out specifically for the Slater Street area.  Whilst there are references to, and 
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excerpts from, this document in the Proofs of Evidence given by officers, the full 
document is not publicly available.  It has not been possible to trace the authors of 
the document and hence when referenced it is cited as RENEW, 2006d.  It appears 
that a substantial part of this NRA focused on stock condition, and as part of this 
process, all 240 properties in the Slater Street area were inspected against the 
Housing Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS).  The HHSRS is a risk based 
approach, aimed at identifying the ‘potential risks to health and safety from any 
deficiencies identified in dwellings’ (ODPM, 2006c, p.7).  The rating system uses 29 
types of hazards, which are grouped into four sets.  These are hazards to existing or 
potential occupiers of a property, rather than specifically related to building defects.  
For each hazard, the risk is measured and is adjudged to be a category 1 or category 
2.  Without going into the nuances of the process, category 1 hazards are those that 
a local authority has a ‘duty to remedy’.  The Housing Act 2004 (HM Government, 
2004, chp.34, p.5&31) declares that: 
 
‘...if a local housing authority consider that a category 1 hazard exists on any 
residential premises, they must take appropriate enforcement action...if the local 
housing authority is satisfied...that each of residential buildings in the area 
contains a category 1...declaring the area to be a clearance area is a course of 
action’.      
 
Inspections of all 240 properties in the Slater Street area showed 128 (53%) 
contained category 1 hazards (RENEW, 2008c).  The decision therefore to class 
Slater Street as a clearance area was not made on the basis of ‘each residential 
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building’ containing such a hazard, but just over half of them. That said, submissions 
to the public inquiry paint a picture of significant disrepair; ineffective drainage, 
rotten/unstable woodwork/flooring, structural issues and poor electrical and gas 
installations.   Taken as a whole, the majority of category 1 hazards were ‘associated 
with damp and mould growth and excessive cold’ (RENEW, 2008c).  The breakdown 
of category 1 hazards was as follows: 
 
Figure 13: Category 1 hazards in Slater Street 
Category 1 hazards 
 Excess cold 47 
Damp and mould 67 
Falls associated with steps and stairs 2 
Structural collapse 5 
Food safety 2 
Personal hygiene, sanitation, drainage 2 
Domestic hygiene, pests, refuse 2 
Entry by intruders 1 
Total 128 
Source: Calculated from data in Appendix III of NRA 2006 (RENEW, 2006d) 
 
As part of the 2006 NRA for Slater Street a socio-economic survey was undertaken, 
this gathered demographic information and data on housing choices/preferences 
(RENEW, 2006d).  Of the 240 properties in the area receiving a postal questionnaire, 
139 returned the survey. It is not clear whether each survey was unique to each 
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property, or whether different occupiers completed surveys from the same properties.  
In addition, the data gathered has been used as a representative sample of 
households in the area, and used to extrapolate conclusions for the total 240 
properties.  The sample does not produce high confidence intervals and hence this 
leads to inaccuracies.  Unless significant changes in owner occupation took place 
(i.e. a reduction from 49%, as stated in the 2001 Census, to 31% in this survey) then 
the sample is skewed toward those in social rented properties.  Taking this into 
account, the survey reveals that the majority of those in owner occupation wished to 
continue in this tenure, and that the majority of residents in social housing wished 
also to continue in their current tenure.  Owner occupiers were asked how willing they 
were to sell, and over what period.  48% gave no response and 23% requested 
further information.  21% said they would move immediately and 4% within 6 months.  
The survey also asked where residents would move to, giving a number of local 
locations or the option to move out of the city.  20% percent voted in favour of the 
latter, with 80% choosing locations within a four mile radius of Stoke on Trent.  In 
terms of property type, the majority of respondents desired semi-detached properties 
(41%) or terraced housing (37%).   Such results show the desire to stay and live 
locally and to be housed in a property/ tenure similar to their existing accommodation. 
 
In line with Neighbourhood Renewal Guidance (ODPM, 2004), the 2006 NRA for 
Slater Street developed and appraised a number of options for the area.  The 10 step 
process of an NRA (see Appendix 3) requires the development and assessment of 
options for intervention, built from an understanding of the wider context (step 1) and 
information gathering (step 5).  For the Slater Street NRA, four options were 
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developed to tackle the manifest problems, and because these ‘mainly related to run 
down housing’ (RENEW, 2008b, p.15) these interventions were housing orientated.  
The four options, akin to those in the 2002 NRA for Middleport were (RENEW, 
2006d, p.15-16): 
 
1. Do nothing – no financial investment or enforcement.  All 
improvement/renovation work funded by owners and self-initiated.  
Demolition at year 30. 
2. Repair to minimum standard – Remove all category 1 hazards.  Largely 
funded by owners but targeted support through Home Repairs Assistance 
Grants (max £5,000). Demolition at year 30.  
3. Comprehensive renovation – Environmental improvements, along with a 
scheme of refurbishment and maintenance to bring properties up to modern 
day standards.  Mixture of grants and loans, plus owner investment.  Review 
at year 30. 
4. Clear prior to redevelopment – Clearance of all properties and prepare 
land for housing redevelopment, primarily to meet housing needs of local 
people.  
 
The 2006 NRA performed two assessments; an economic assessment and a socio-
environmental assessment of each of the options.  These two were then combined to 
decide on the most satisfactory or best course of action (OPDM, 2004). 
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The economic assessment merely estimates the cost of each option, subtracting any 
financial benefits from the overall cost.  As with the 2002 NRA, net present values 
(NPVs) were used to demonstrate costs, with discount factors to allow for inflation 
and the increased value of present expenditure and income.  In looking at option 1 
(‘do nothing’), the costs of routine maintenance and renovation by owners was 
calculated, along with the cost of acquisition and demolition in year 30.  In looking at 
the ‘repair to a minimum standard’ option, the cost of making fit all category 1 hazard 
properties was estimated, along with some renovation and maintenance by owners 
and acquisition and demolition at year 30.  The option of ‘comprehensive renovation’ 
included the costs of environmental improvements, comprehensive improvements to 
all dwellings and maintenance of all properties to year 30.  Finally, in looking at 
clearance prior to redevelopment, the cost of acquisition and demolition of all 
properties within four years was estimated.  Crucially for the latter option, the costs 
and benefits related to redevelopment were not included.  Figure 14 shows the 
results of the assessment for each, with the values being a net cost for each: 
 
Figure 14: Costs of each option 
 
Source: RENEW, 2006d, Appendix V of NRA 2006 
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As can be seen, the two lowest cost options are to do nothing or to repair properties 
to a minimal standard.  Clearance can be seen as the second most costly and 
comprehensive renovation the most costly.   Having reviewed the calculations it 
seems that a significant error was made in the calculations of option 3.  The increase 
in property values was counted as a negative NPV as opposed to a positive.  This 
means that the net cost of comprehensive renovation was significantly 
overestimated, because it failed to offset any costs against the benefits of property 
value appreciation. This issue is explored further in the case study analysis section. 
 
The second part of the assessment looked at which options would best address the 
non-economic problems in Slater Street.  The first step was to identify a range of 
non-economic criteria that each option would be assessed against.  To do this, the 
consultants responsible for developing the NRA spoke to RENEW staff, and also sent 
out a socio-environmental survey to residents.  In submissions to the public inquiry, it 
was suggested that:  
 
‘criteria were selected based on common themes and the strongest views 
emerging from responses to the socio-environmental questionnaire...In addition 
to this, factors relating to the objectives of RENEW were included such as 
improving house conditions, the overall regeneration context and issues of 
historical significance.   The two factors relating to regeneration and housing 
conditions were considered to be the most significant in terms of RENEW’s 
ambitions...therefore were given a higher weighting’ (RENEW, 2008b, p.20-21). 
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In the next section the efficacy of this process is analysed, and whether it was right to 
apply higher weightings to issues important to RENEW and not to those identified by 
the local community.  The final seven criterions for the socio-environmental 
assessment were therefore: 
 
• maintaining the existing community; 
• security and safety; 
• environmental conditions; 
• heritage; 
• resident’s views; 
• housing conditions; and 
• contribution to the overall regeneration of the city. 
 
The scoring of each option against each criterion is detailed in Figure 15. The score 
given to the option is provided first, then multiplied by the weight of that criterion: 
 
Figure 15: Scores of each option on the socio-environmental assessment 
 
Source: RENEW, 2006d 
129 
 
 
As can be seen in the bottom row of the table, option 4 relating to housing clearance 
scores the highest.   This is followed by comprehensive renovation, then minimal 
repair, and finally the option to do nothing.   
 
The socio-economic survey of residents revealed that a majority of residents 
supported clearance (64%), with only 33% supporting repair or renovation.  It is worth 
noting however that because only 93 surveys were completed, this is a mandate for 
demolition from only 25% of residents.  This issue is revisited in the following section.  
Suffice to say some residents have questioned whether 64% of residents supported 
demolition: 
 
‘I think that’s basically rubbish.  The majority of people would’ve liked everything 
to remain as it was...Some people were supportive of development but they 
were in a minority.  Most people had extended family in the area.’ (Resident, 
2010) 
 
The fact that 333 such questionnaires were sent out, when there were only 237 
households in the study area is also an issue of concern.  One of the interviewees in 
our study suggested that in private rented properties, both landlord and tenant 
received a survey.  As no HMRP officer was made available for interview this issue 
could not be explored further. 
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Demolition: The preferred course of action 
In an internal Stoke City Council report, the results of the economic and socio-
environmental assessments were presented, in addition to a statement of the most 
satisfactory course of action (Stoke City Council, 2006a).  Combined scores for the 
two assessments meant that clearance scored highest followed by doing nothing, 
then repair to a minimum standard, with comprehensive renovation being the least 
satisfactory course of action.  In summing up, the report states: 
 
‘Whilst renovation has been considered as a tangible alternative, the ability to 
achieve it is to an extent in the hands of local residents  and 
landlords...Clearance would allow the residents to be more suitably housed 
away from an area with environmental pollution and rising anti-social 
behaviour...Taking all factors in to account; appraisal of the alternative courses 
of action indicates the declaration of Clearance Areas to be the most 
satisfactory method of dealing with conditions in the area’ (Stoke City Council, 
2006a).  
 
Part of the financial efficacy of the clearance option was based on the fact that it must 
be wholesale, i.e. entail demolition of all properties.  Given that only 53% of 
properties in the Slater Street area exhibited category 1 hazards, a justification had to 
be made for why the other 47% should be cleared.  As stated in evidence to the 
public inquiry, ‘these buildings and land were included as added lands in the 
Compulsory Purchase Order’ (RENEW, 2008b, p.26). 
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Overview and Scrutiny 
Based on the above report, authorisation to serve a Notice of Intention (NoI) to 
declare clearance areas was sought by council staff.  In May 2006 the Director of 
Community and Adult Services approved this recommendation, in the presence of 
two local councillors.  Decisions made by Chief Officers in Stoke City Council are 
disseminated to all local councillors, who can then ‘call-in’ the decision if six or more 
deem this appropriate (or by the Leader of a political group alone).  In June 2006 the 
above decision was called in by the then Labour Group Leader (Roger Ibbs) 
supported by the Labour ward councillor for Slater Street (Ted Owen).  By calling-in 
the decision, it was passed to the Overview and Scrutiny Commission which could 
then, if appropriate, pass the issue back to the Chief Officer for reconsideration.  In 
calling-in the decision, it was specifically asked that the issue of renovation be looked 
at in more detail.  In addition, it was suggested that more consultation should be 
conducted, and that the lack of investment by landlords be explored further (RENEW, 
2008b).  The minutes of the Overview and Scrutiny Commission (Stoke City Council, 
2006b) reveal a number of concerns expressed by local councillors.  In his address, 
Councillor Owen stated how Slater Street residents had held their own meeting, and 
posted out a separate questionnaire.  It was suggested that this questionnaire (the 
results of which are not available) expressed a majority view of wishing to stay in the 
area, and that greater investment should be made in it.  Councillor Owen 
acknowledged the need for some properties to be demolished, but stressed that the 
issue of renovation be revisited, casting doubt on the £24m figure for comprehensive 
renovation put forward by the 2006 NRA.  Supporting this, Roger Ibbs expressed 
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concern that residents had been told about demolition before the Overview and 
Scrutiny Commission could look at the decision.  Summing up, Councillor Ibbs stated: 
 
‘it was not fair if the residents did not benefit from the demolition...it was an 
insult that their futures were being discussed and they had not seen the report 
concerned’ (Stoke City Council, 2006b, p.11). 
  
In response, the Director of Community and Adult Services stated that there were a 
number of issues with comprehensive renovation, especially in getting the sign-up of 
residents to a scheme that entailed them also investing money in it.  This was 
supported by the Director of RENEW, who stated ‘he could only agree with the Chief 
Officer’s recommendations to move to the intention to declare a clearance area’ 
(Stoke City Council, 2006b, p10). 
 
The Overview and Scrutiny Commission raised a number of related concerns.  Two 
Committee members put forward a motion that ‘implementation of the decision be 
deferred for four weeks in order to negotiate an equitable settlement with residents’ 
(Stoke City Council, 2006b, p12).  In response, the Chief Officer for Community and 
Adult Services suggested that this was not possible as this could not start until after 
the NoI had been declared.  Hence, the Commission raised ‘no objection’ to serving 
the NoI. Letters were sent to all residents on 15th June 2006 to notify them of this 
decision, and their ‘intention to declare a clearance area’ (Stoke City Council, 2006c).  
An event was held on the 19th June for residents to receive more information.  
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Residents were advised that if they wished to voluntarily sell their property to Council, 
then they should appoint an agent.   
 
The community’s response 
At around this time there was significant community activity, as residents came to 
terms with the impending demolition: 
 
‘We would have large residents only meetings, probably 100 people there, 
perhaps 200.  You’d have another meeting 4 to 6 months later on, fewer people 
would attend.  You could see slowly community activity died.  You don’t fight 
city hall.  People just felt there wasn’t any point...the place was going to go.’ 
(Resident, 2010) 
 
It appears that residents faced the decision to ‘stay and fight’ or ‘get out while you 
can’ at different stages. Reflecting on this, it seems that owner-occupiers were the 
ones that faced the most substantial dilemma.  RSL and private tenants were likely to 
be rehoused in places such as Sadler’s Park (a new development in the vicinity of 
Slater Street) and that such relocation was probably favourable to them.  However, 
owner occupiers faced a more difficult choice: 
 
‘But what the council did as they were buying up, and a clearance area was 
declared all of sudden people started to panic, ‘what’s gonna happen round 
here’ [knock, knock] ‘hello i’m from the council, would you like to sell your 
property to the Council?’  The minute that started...the rot set in, they put 
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shutters on your windows.  As soon as that happened them people across the 
street would say ‘eh up, it’s started we’ll be next and the fear set in’... Another 
fear was that people would lose money, it didn’t work out that way, but people 
were thinking if we don’t go now you know’ (Former local councillor, 2010). 
 
As alluded to above, it seems that over time the balance of fight or flight was tipped 
among owner occupiers, and large numbers sold their properties to the local authority 
voluntarily. 
 
2007-2008 
 
The serving of Notices of Intention and resident objections 
In March 2007 NoIs were served to all properties with a category 1 hazard, which 
started a 28 day consultation period.  In the same month consultation started on the 
Stoke North Area Regeneration Framework (ARF).  This spatial plan sought to 
develop a vision for north Stoke, and was intended to inform RENEW’s forthcoming 
funding bids, along with the local authority’s Local Development Framework 
(RENEW, 2008a).  Consultation with the local community started in March 2007, 
leading to the development of options in June 2007.  Preferred options were 
presented in May 2008, and consultants were sought to develop a Masterplan for 
Middleport by January 2009 (see following section). 
 
Following the serving of NoIs in March 2007, letters of objection were received from 
11 residents; 9 owner occupiers, 1 landlord and 1 resident outside of the Slater 
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Street area.  The evidence submitted to the public inquiry presents a number of these 
objections.  Unfortunately it is difficult to date these, and hence it is difficult to know 
which were made in 2007 or later in the process.  Nonetheless, having reviewed all 
the objections made to RENEW and the council, the list below summarises their main 
points (RENEW, 2008a; RENEW, 2008b): 
 
• inadequate compensation; 
• the area is no longer being kept clean and tidy; 
• condition surveys were not carried out by Environmental Officers; 
• the initial report on the decision for Slater Street not was not public and was a 
closed agenda; 
• condition survey included houses that were never inspected; 
• social housing was left vacant for many months; 
• CPO badly handled and without a masterplan in place; 
• a lack of information about the future development of the area including; size 
of project, level of future population, how things will look, how the community 
will benefit and which developers are involved; 
• lack of clarity over the reopening the canal arm, and no explanation of why 
they are not building on the Shelton Bar Steel works; 
• no masterplan existed prior to clearance, and the Audit Commission criticised  
RENEW for this; 
• initially, residents were told they would benefit from improvements to the area, 
these included reopening the canal arm; 
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• the new housing and flats that planned for development are ugly and 
characterless; 
• all 240 properties are currently occupied; 
• the houses are being build on unsuitable land; 
• it is not clear where the green space be located; and  
• it is not clear how transport improvements and access will be made. 
 
Following the consultation period, a meeting was held between city council officers 
and RENEW to discuss these objections.  Letters of response were sent out to 
objectors on 24th July 2007.  A number of council responses are of significance. To 
the issue of inadequate compensation, the council stated that all compensation 
entitlements have been agreed in line with the ‘compensation code’ and that property 
valuations had been conducted as if the properties were not affected by clearance 
proposals.  It was accepted that there would, in some cases, be ‘funding gaps for 
owners wishing to purchase another property’ so packages such as hardship grants 
and relocation loans were being put in place (RENEW, 2008b).   
 
Two objectors posed the question about how the proposed interventions would 
benefit residents and the local community.  In response to these objections, the 
Council focused on the broader neighbourhood, detailing how service providers had 
increased their presence in Middleport (such as the Primary Care Trust).  It was also 
stated that residents in the wider area would benefit as the redevelopement of Slater 
Street would support the regeneration of Burslem.  None of these responses detail 
how the scheme would benefit existing Slater Street residents. 
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The issue of the Burslem port canal arm, see Figure 11 above, was also questioned 
by a number of objectors and why this had been abandoned.  In response the 
Council detailed the findings of a feasibility study into reopening the canal arm, which 
concluded significant public subsidy would be required.  This was being considered 
as part of the masterplan for the area, but was not deemed a fundamental ‘driver for 
the Slater Street CPO’ (RENEW, 2008a, p.29).  Five of the residents who made 
objections went on to make representations to the Secretary of State regarding the 
making of compulsory purchase orders, seeking a public inquiry.   
 
Local policies for supporting affected residents 
It was at this time that RENEW and council republished their policies around financial 
support for those affected by clearance.  RENEW had already made a strong 
commitment to supporting those affected by clearance in its 2004 Prospectus: 
 
‘The Board are committed to minimising the social costs associated with market 
restructuring and have therefore been working with the local authorities to 
develop mechanisms to allow people to transfer from their current property to 
an appropriate tenure in a sustainable neighbourhood’ (RENEW, 2004, p.99) 
 
In their submission to the public inquiry RENEW submitted two documents, their 
‘Renewal and Relocation Loans Policy’ (2007a) and ‘Housing Renewal Assistance 
Policy’ (2007b).  These documents enable estimates to be made of the financial 
entitlements of those displaced by clearance.  The types of financial support are 
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varied and complex, hence a focus is on those most likely to have been used in 
Slater Street; disturbance allowances, Home Loss payments, relocation grants, 
relocation loans, hardship grants and discretionary assistance for private sector 
tenants.  The table below outlines these entitlements and the likely amounts paid per 
household if the compulsory purchase took place in 2007: 
 
Figure 16: Financial entitlements resulting from displacement 
Entitlement What is it for? Conditions  Likely amounts paid 
Disturbance 
allowance 
To cover 
expenses 
such as 
removal 
costs, 
telephone 
reconnection, 
professional 
fees 
For those being displaced 
or under compulsory 
purchase orders 
This is difficult to 
establish, but estimates 
in the 2002 NRA 
suggested this would be 
£300 per property (RHS, 
2002).  With inflation this 
equates to approximately 
£360. 
Home loss 
payment 
A statutory 
requirement 
to pay 
persons 
when they 
are displaced 
as a result of 
Residents must have 
been in occupation for 
one year, and must not 
have given up occupation 
prior to authority was 
authorised to acquire 
(VOA, 2010) 
10% of the market value 
of the property, and no 
less than £4,000 if 
purchased between Jan-
Aug 2007, and no less 
than £4,400 if purchased 
between Aug-Dec 2007 
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compulsory 
acquisition 
(VOA, 2010).  Taking the 
average sale price for 
2007 in Slater Street, this 
is likely to amount to 
approximately £6000 per 
property. 
   
Relocation 
loans 
(Property 
Appreciation 
Loans for 
Relocation) 
To enable 
those 
displaced to 
purchase a 
new home. 
Owner occupiers must 
have been in their current 
home for 1 year, or 
tenants held their tenancy 
for 1 year.  The 
replacement home must 
be within areas defined 
by the council.  The loan 
is repayable on either the 
sale of new property, 
death of borrower or 
other transfer. 
Loans can be made on 
up to 50% of the free 
equity in a property.  For 
instance, if the property 
to be cleared (plus home 
loss payment) is valued 
at £55k, and the 
outstanding mortgage is 
£20k, then there is £35k 
of free equity.  50% of 
this amount can be 
loaned, i.e. £17,500. 
Relocation 
grants 
To ‘bridge the 
gap’ where 
an owner 
occupier’s  
equity and 
Used when a resident is 
affected by clearance and 
loans are not sufficient (at 
discretion of council and 
means tested). The 
There is no data about 
the amount of relocation 
grants given.  The only 
information available is 
that the maximum 
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their 
relocation 
loan are not 
sufficient to 
secure an 
equivalent 
property  
replacement property 
must be equivalent and 
within specified locations.  
The replacement property 
must meet decency 
standards and the 
resident must live there 
for 5 years or pay the 
grant back. 
awarded is £25,000. 
Hardship 
grants 
Where grants 
and loans still 
leave a gap 
in finances to 
purchase a 
equivalent 
home 
Where there are high 
levels of indebtedness, 
i.e. where the maximum 
50% of free equity is 
loaned and this is still 
insufficient.  This grant 
may also be used when a 
larger home needs to be 
secured or a property 
must be adapted 
because of a disability. 
There is no evidence 
available about the 
amount of grants paid or 
maximum amounts 
Discretionary 
assistance 
for private 
sector 
To support 
private sector 
tenants in 
non-secure 
Those eligible must be 
subject to displacement 
as a result of clearance, 
and have occupied the 
An interest free loan of 
two month’s rent, capped 
at £500.  Also includes 
payment for credit 
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tenants tenancies. property for 1 year.  It is 
provided to tenants 
wishing to stay in the 
private rented sector. 
reference checks 
 
In addition to these financial entitlements RENEW and partners had developed a 
Homeswap scheme that, where possible, would enable residents to secure a 
replacement property from a housing association or developer.  This property would 
be in the same area as their current property.  This was deemed a ‘key-for-key’ 
solution (RENEW, 2008b, p.42) and was ‘being used’ at the time of the public inquiry.  
It is estimated that only eight properties were acquired and refurbished by Midland 
Heart RSL for those affected by clearance to rent (RENEW, 2008a).  There is no 
evidence to suggest the HMRP or local authority considered decamping residents 
and then rehousing them in the new development. This eventually led to the wide 
displacement of residents, as suggested by a former local councillor who stated: 
 
‘Get a packet of seeds, chuck ‘em up in the air and let the wind blow, that’s 
where they’ve gone.  People were never given the opportunity to stay as a 
community.  They’ve gone everywhere and nowhere’ (Former local councillor)  
 
Acquisition and its consequences 
Following the NoI, a number of properties affected by clearance were acquired by the 
Council through voluntary acquisition, 83 in the first year of the scheme and 73 in the 
second.  By the end of 2007, as more residents moved out and the acquired 
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properties became vacant, there were increasing incidences of theft, vandalism and 
arson.  A multi-agency task and finish group was set up to address this with £30,000 
of investment from RENEW (RENEW, 2008b).  The group attempted to address poor 
environmental conditions and established a dedicated police presence in the area.  
Nonetheless, ‘high levels of anti-social behaviour and criminal activity continued’ 
(RENEW, 2008b, p.43).  It was in this context that other public service providers 
began to support the speedy clearance of Slater Street, including Staffordshire Police 
who stated that they ‘actively support the demolition of these vacant terraces’ 
(Clarke, 2008). 
 
Despite this seemingly proactive action by local agencies, residents and local 
councillors were critical of the level and timeliness of such interventions: 
 
‘The police did very little, they stepped back.  People were coming in the night, 
pinching bricks from the wall, or taking tiles off the roof, slowly the thing 
deteriorated...can we have gates at the end of entries...oh no we can’t that’s 
going to cost too much’ (Former Local Councillor, 2010). 
 
The spectre of demolition was serving to exacerbate such criminal activity.  As the 
prospect of demolition grew and more properties were acquired and boarded up, it 
fuelled the sense that the area and people’s properties were obsolete.  This is likely 
to have affected valuation prices for properties, although such valuations were 
conducted as though demolition proposals were not in place. 
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Updated information on stock condition  
In November 2007, the results of a stock condition update were published.  This 
provided specific details on stock condition in Slater Street’s broader AMI (called 
MBEV), and its ward (Burslem South).  The results confirm earlier findings on stock 
condition.  Firstly, the number of category 1 hazards in MBEV was by far the highest 
for the AMI areas, some 40% higher than the next worst AMI.  This was corroborated 
by the fact that Burslem South had the highest percentage of category 1 risks present 
among any ward in the city.   There is little doubt therefore that stock condition in the 
area was deemed a pressing issue. 
 
Compulsory purchases and the start of demolition 
In January 2008 a meeting of the Executive and Members Board (EMB) took place to 
discuss the next stage in the clearance process.  A report was submitted by Council 
staff seeking approval to declare a clearance area and start making compulsory 
purchases.  The EMB approved the recommendation, and this decision was not 
called-in by local councillors.   In March 2008 compulsory purchase orders were 
made to remaining residents, requesting that any objections be made to the 
Secretary of State.  Figure 17 below shows Slater Street in March of 2008: 
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Figure 17: Slater Street in March 2008  
 
Source: Pits n Pots, 2008 
 
Up to this point, whilst a large number of properties had been acquired, few had been 
demolished.  In June 2008, citing worsening conditions in Slater Street, the Council 
proposed to begin demolition work on 111 of the properties that they had already 
acquired (see Figure 18 below).  The justification for this was based on the high 
incidences of criminal activity, poor environmental conditions and two instances of 
arson.  A letter was sent to remaining residents to seek their views, and in response 
six residents objected.  These objection letters are not available. 
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Figure 18: Proposal to demolish 111 properties 
 
Source: RENEW, 2008 
 
Despite these objections, in July 2008 it was decided that 72 of 111 properties would 
be demolished ‘in key terrace blocks which will remove the target for crime’ (RENEW, 
2008b, p.45).  This represented a scaled down proposal and ‘consideration was 
made of where properties were still occupied’.  In a letter to residents, it was 
suggested that demolition work would start in August 2008, and that the council 
would work with residents on ‘landscaping schemes or art projects to further enhance 
the appearance of the sites’ (RENEW, 2008d, p.2).   
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This act of agreeing to start the demolition is a decisive one. Reflecting on this fact, 
and the impending public inquiry, an interviewee noted: 
 
‘They started demolition before the public inquiry.  I rest my case on what the 
council thought of the public inquiry.  They’d decided that they were going 
ahead.’ (Resident, 2010) 
 
RENEW’s funding and allocations for Middleport 
It was around this time that RENEW’s 2008-2011 Business Plan submission was 
supported by CLG, and RENEW secured £114m in HMR funding.  This translated to 
£40m of investment of HMR money in the Middleport/Burslem AMI, matched with 
£8.5m from the Housing Corporation, £3m from Stoke City Council and £20m of 
private finance.  This investment would be shaped by the Middleport and Burslem 
masterplan commissioned in July 2008, and due to be delivered in 2009.  
 
A CLT for Slater Street 
To support the development of this masterplan, the Middleport, Burslem and Etruria 
Valley (MBEV) Forum was established. It included representation from residents, 
RENEW, the local Neighbourhood Renewal Team, RSLs, local councillors and a 
consultant.  At one such meeting during this period, a representative from the local 
RSL presented a number of housing options for the masterplan area.  One of the 
options entailed the development of shared ownership properties valued at ‘£150-
160,000’ (Resident, 2010).  In response to such high prices, the consultant working 
with MBEV asked whether residents had considered a Community Land Trust (CLT) 
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model.  One resident began to research the model in more depth, with RENEW 
providing funding for them to attend a CLT conference in London.  Following this and 
subsequent research, this resident approached a RENEW member of staff: 
 
‘...I had a long chat with the guy from RENEW...if RENEW were willing to do 
some deal over a piece of land...you could use the existing housing stock to 
refurbish...just ideas...one of the possibilities’ (Resident, 2010). 
 
Following this initial discussion, which was inconclusive, the resident spoke to 
someone from a national funding body that had received a shortage of applicants to 
their CLT grant programme.  This seemed at the time like a prime opportunity to lever 
in some funding to look at CLTs in more depth.  It appears that no application was 
made and this points to some interesting issues in terms of communities initiating a 
CLT through voluntary action: 
 
‘I was working away at the time.  There were lots of reasons...you really need 
staff, it can’t be done alone, it’s a real struggle (Resident, 2010). 
 
Nonetheless, around this time, a presentation was made to the MBEV forum by the 
consultant and the above mentioned resident.   It appears that the general concept of 
a CLT was presented, and the suggestion that it may be applied to Slater Street pre-
demolition.  The idea, as it was broadly conceived, was to undertake selective 
demolition so that ‘every sixth property would go and create parks’ (Resident, 2010) 
with the rest being fully refurbished.  It seems the presentation to MBEV did not have 
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the desired outcome of mobilising residents, and whilst the local MP became 
supportive as a result, the idea was seemingly too complicated for residents to buy-in 
to: 
 
‘It went over the head of residents...It was a good idea, but we didn’t put it 
across in the right way at the right time to right people’ (Resident, 2010). 
 
Much of this is inconsequential however, as RENEW seemingly could not support the 
idea.  The CLT would need to take ownership of the land and assets at a much 
reduced price (for instance £1).  This would enable the finance to be raised against 
this asset to fund the selective demolition and refurbishment.  However, it seems that 
this financial decision was not one RENEW would even explore: 
 
‘I don’t think it was ever really an option from RENEW’s point of view...I think 
because they couldn’t get their head round it.  If you have a million pound 
property they’d have to sell it over a period of years...cash flow...Their model 
was that they’d own the land...they’d deal with the funding as a less risky option’ 
(Resident, 2010). 
 
To compound this, the loss of a community activist had a negative impact on 
developing the CLT, as well as community spirit more broadly.  Her death seems to 
have had a powerful affect on the remaining residents, and her loss highlights the 
importance of active community members in mobilising community support.  The 
local residents association were not active in presenting alternatives to demolition, 
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nor outwardly supportive of the idea of a CLT.  Advocates of a CLT in Slater Street 
suggest that they needed a ‘nucleus of people’ that could drive it forward.  The loss 
of a community activist appears to have been central to developing this nucleus.   
 
An interviewee suggested that if RENEW had been more supportive of the idea it 
would have perhaps made it off the ground; ‘they can facilitate things, if it’s 
something they’re not happy with it becomes a struggle’ (Resident, 2010).  But this 
was not the sole reason a CLT failed to evolve.  It appears that the development of 
certain infrastructure was crucial.  Having a formalised group that could secure 
funding would have enabled this group to employ someone to do the detailed 
technical work of designing the CLT.  Reflecting on the issue of a CLT for Slater 
Street, an interviewee suggested that its development never got beyond an 
embryonic idea (Resident, 2010). 
 
The public inquiry 
In September 2008 a public inquiry was heard into the clearance of Slater Street and 
whether CPOs could be issued.  Despite the availability of significant amounts of 
evidence submitted to the inquiry, very little is known about the process in question.  
Press articles at the time suggest that much of the evidence detailed in this case 
study was presented to the inspector to support the case for demolition.  It is also 
clear that a number of residents’ queried whether demolition had the support of local 
people (The Sentinel, 2008).  This process concluded in October 2008 with the 
Secretary of State due to declare their decision in February 2009. 
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2009-2010 
 
The government’s decision on compulsory purchase 
In March 2009 the then Secretary of State for the Department of Communities and 
Local Government approved the making of CPOs in Slater Street. Delivering the 
verdict of the inquiry, the lead inspector stated that there was a ‘compelling case in 
the public interest to confirm the compulsory purchase order’ (Pits n pots, 2009).  By 
March 2009 much of Slater Street had been demolished anyway, with 198 of the 237 
properties having been cleared and six properties yet to be acquired.  In response to 
the verdict from the Secretary of State, remaining residents voiced their concerns: 
 
‘We will have lived here 29 years in July. We don't want to go from owning our 
own home to living in council accommodation. All the houses they have shown 
us are out of our price range, so we are stuck’ (The Sentinel, 2009a). 
 
The sense that the battle had been lost by objectors is summed up by the testimony 
of one resident who, after the verdict, stated they ‘wouldn't want to stay in Middleport 
now because it is turning into a waste ground’ (The Sentinel, 2009a).  From the 
evidence available it appears that CPOs were issued to remaining residents in the 
spring of 2009.   
 
The Middleport masterplan 
In the spring and summer of 2009, consultants appointed by RENEW were 
developing a masterplan for Middleport.  Consultation was undertaken with residents 
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from across Middleport on the options for the area. Option 1 entailed new housing 
development in Slater Street and areas to the north and east.  Option 2 included 
these developments, but also included new house building on the old Co-op site 
bordering the southern end of Slater Street.  Option 3 focused on refurbishment of 
areas other than Slater Street and the creation of a nature reserve around the 
Burslem port area. 
 
In August 2009, the final masterplan (BDP, 2009) was developed which seems to 
have incorporated elements of all three options (see Figure 19 below).  As can be 
seen, housing development is not restricted to Slater Street, with the co-op site 
planned for development.   Along with this, the plan commits to reopen the Burslem 
Port canal arm with the said nature reserve.  The 15 year plan was said to entail 
£16m of investment from different sources (The Sentinel, 2009b). 
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Figure 19: Middleport masterplan 2009 
 
Source: BDP, 2009
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As the masterplan developed, the disputes with resident objectors continued.  As the 
council and RENEW sought to agree valuations with remaining residents, progress 
on the scheme began to stall.  A newspaper article in 2009 presented the story of 
one resident who had disputed the valuation of his property (The Sentinel, 2009c).    
This resident was told his property had been valued at £75,000.  This was in contrast 
to the valuation he had received from his own valuer, who suggested the property 
was worth £93,000.  Reflecting on this fact the resident stated ‘I think if the city 
council accepted the value given by your own valuer, then 95 per cent of people 
would agree to move out’ (Sentinel, 2009c). 
 
Conditions and community sentiment in 2009 
By 2009 Slater Street had been largely cleared, and the land prepared for 
development.  Figure 20 and Figure 21 show the physical condition of Slater Street in 
October 2009 (Junction 15, 2009). 
 
Figure 20: Clews Street 2009 
 
Source: Junction 15, 2009 
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Figure 21: Dimsdale Street in 2009 
 
Source: Junction 15, 2009 
 
Newspaper articles at this time suggest local views about RENEW’s interventions 
were mixed. Such a diversity of views was something one of the interviewees alluded 
to: 
 
‘Once the idea had sunk in, some people were happy because they were 
getting large sums of money in relative terms.  Someone who paid £1-2k for 
their house and RENEW was offering them thirty to forty thousand.  Other 
people were very unhappy, their home was their past.  They’d spent a lot of 
money on it, and wouldn’t enable them to get a similar property elsewhere’ 
(Resident, 2010). 
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Some local business owners were critical of RENEW’s interventions, which had 
resulted in falling profits for their businesses (The Sentinel, 2010a).  However 
residents in streets adjacent to Slater Street, who were not subject to demolition and 
had received funding to improve their properties, felt positive about RENEW’s 
activity.  Such residents were calling for the speedy demolition of Slater Street, 
suggesting ‘it will be even better when the houses marked for demolition are knocked 
down’ (The Sentinel, 2010c).  
 
The impact of the recession and general election  
In 2010 local councillors were also calling for the speedy demolition of the remaining 
properties, stating that ‘putting demolition on hold is just prolonging people's pain’ 
(The Sentinel, 2010b).  The chair of the local residents association, echoed this 
sentiment but added that if the properties were not to be demolished soon ‘then the 
council and RENEW should bring them back into a habitable condition (The Sentinel, 
2010b).  But it seems RENEW had little choice in their actions, as the recession had 
created reticence among developers: 
 
‘Plummeting land values during the recession wiped out any profit margin for 
the housebuilding firms which had been lining up to fill the clearance sites with 
high-quality homes... Now Renew cannot continue to demolish because it can 
no longer afford to entice reluctant builders onto the cleared sites’ (The 
Sentinel, 2010b) 
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This air of uncertainty was being made more acute by the impending general 
election, and the impact of different political leaderships on housing policy.  As the 
UK’s coalition government was forming in the summer of 2010, there were 
suggestions that £50m of cuts would be made to the HMRP programme budget 
(Regeneration and Renewal, 2010).   
 
Slater Street development plan 
Despite the above, a Development Brief (BDP, 2010) was published in August 2010 
for Slater Street which incorporated the co-op site to the south, setting the vision for 
the development as follows: 
 
‘A critical mass of new residential development on these sites, carefully 
integrated with the retained properties on the Slater Street site will help to retain 
existing and attract new residents to the area, helping to diversify Middleport’s 
housing offer so that it meets the needs of families and achieves a balanced 
population structure’ (BDP, 2010). 
 
In the development outputs the density, size and tenure of dwellings is detailed, as 
well as the split of development across the Slater Street area and the co-op site.  
Across the two site densities of between 45-55 dwellings per hectare were to be 
achieved.  This would including 2, 3 and 4 bedroom ‘houses’ that will deliver a tenure 
split of 75% private and 25% affordable/social rented properties.  The co-op site 
would provide purely private homes for sale, meaning the Slater Street area would 
have a high percentage of affordable/social renting to meet the desired tenure split 
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across the site as a whole.  The Development Brief suggests that Slater Street would 
deliver a minimum of 79 dwellings, with space allocated for B2 employment, and the 
co-op site 84 dwellings.  The design concept is presented in Figure 22 below: 
 
Figure 22: Design concept for Slater Street and co-op site 
 
Source: BDP, 2010 
 
Prospects for development 
At the time of writing (summer 2010) it is not clear at what stage this development is 
at, or whether developers have been identified. Some residents still remain in Slater 
Street, in properties earmarked for demolition.   
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5.3 Analysis of the intervention 
The following section scrutinises the evidence presented above.  The aim is to judge 
whether the theoretical propositions developed in Chapter 4 are valid for the case of 
Slater Street.  To remind ourselves of these propositions they are as follows: 
 
I. HMRP demolition programmes can fail to capitalise existing residents 
II. HMRP demolition programmes can neglect the empowerment of residents 
III. Interventions that account for the above two propositions will be more effective 
 
The analysis is broken down into three sections corresponding to the propositions 
above; assessing levels of capitalisation and empowerment, before offering some 
concluding thoughts on interventions that may capitalise and empower.   
 
5.3.1. Capitalisation 
 
In the course of developing the case study, a detailed review of Stoke City Council’s 
policies has been undertaken.  Specifically, policies on financial assistance for those 
displaced by clearance have been reviewed. Throughout it is striking how the 
overarching sentiment is on ‘bridging gaps’ in finances for those displaced, or 
minimising ‘social costs’.  The act of providing assistance is presented as a 
regulatory requirement, rather than an opportunity to provide recompense for certain 
actions or to capitalise residents so they may increase their own wealth and assets.   
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This is clearly evident in the council’s stated desire to move from ‘a grants only policy’ 
to a system of ‘using grants only in exceptional circumstances and utilising a system 
of loans and equity release products’ (Stoke City Council, 2007b, p.5).  Such a 
decision is a local one, as the national regulatory requirements for housing 
assistance allows significant room for local discretion.  The Regulatory Reform Order 
(Housing Assistance) England and Wales (HM Government, 2002, p.5), allows 
assistance to be provided, by a housing authority, to any person in order to acquire, 
adapt, repair, demolish or construct a property.  Crucially it states that assistance can 
be provided in ‘any form’ and may be ‘unconditional or subject to conditions’. Hence 
the decision to be conservative in providing financial assistance is a definitively local 
one. 
 
In the last chapter the arguments for the capitalisation of low income households 
were made.  Hence it is important to tackle the question of whether such 
conservatism in financial support is appropriate.  First, however, it is essential to 
address whether these policies and their implementation actually resulted in the 
capitalisation or de-capitalisation of residents in Slater Street. Such an issue is not 
easy to resolve given limited access to those residents that were displaced.  However 
estimates can be made.  In the case of social and private rented tenants in Slater 
Street, some small capitalisation will have taken place after displacement.  It appears 
that most social housing tenants were relocated to nearby RSL properties rather than 
being supported into owner occupation. Hence, very little capital wealth will have 
been created by enabling renters into owner occupation.  Nonetheless they may 
have received home loss payments and disturbance allowances equating to £4500. 
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Private tenants will have also have received such payments if they met the stated 
criteria, plus the discretionary assistance that amounted to the payment of two 
months’ rent.  
 
In the case of owner occupiers, it is perhaps more difficult to assess whether their 
capital wealth increased as a result of the intervention.  Making such assessments 
has entailed looking at the average financial settlement for owner-occupiers in Slater 
Street, and comparing this with the average price of a terraced property in Stoke in 
2007.  This approach has helped judge whether the intervention provided sufficient 
capital for such residents to afford an average priced terraced house.  This would 
mark a step up from the lowest priced housing in the City (which Slater Street 
represented).   In this sense it is a conservative measure of capitalisation in the form 
of housing.  Taking the year 2007, sales of properties in Slater Street (the majority of 
which are likely to be voluntary acquisitions by the Council) were sold at an average 
price of £60,382.  Such prices were achieved because valuations were made as 
though no demolition programme was in place.  The average price of a terraced 
house in Stoke in 2007 was £77,000, making a shortfall for Slater Street residents of 
approximately £16,600. The average Slater Street owner occupier, in addition to their 
£60,382, would have received approximately £360 in disturbance allowances and 
£6,000 in home loss payments, therefore receiving a total of £66,742 after 
compensation.  This makes a shortfall of approximately £10,000 against the price of 
an average terraced property for Stoke, so it is likely that property appreciation loans 
(and potentially grants) were used to bridge the gap.  Private landlords, as with other 
owners, will have received a price higher than the normal market value for their 
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property (i.e. the valuation was done without allowing for demolition plans).  However 
they will not have received the statutory home loss payment. 
 
Clearly this calculation is based on averages and estimations, so it does not 
represent each household’s circumstances.  Some owners may have bought their 
replacement property at a price lower than the city average, and therefore generating 
some cash surplus or decreasing their mortgage.  Nonetheless, it is a reasonable 
conclusion to make that residents did not receive compensation and property 
valuations that markedly increased their capital wealth. The process of displacement 
did not, in any significant way, increase their net wealth.   
 
If those displaced have just as much capital after displacement as before, can such 
an intervention be said to have worked?  Have the right people benefited?  If the 
opportunity to capitalise displaced residents is missed, is poverty merely moved from 
one location to another?  A retort to such questions would be that regeneration is 
about much more than capitalisation, and if those that were living in sub-standard 
accommodation were eventually moved into ‘decent homes’, then some regeneration 
objectives have been achieved.  Indeed there is much research that demonstrates 
the breadth of social impacts stemming from poor housing (Friedman, 2010; Harker, 
2006), and how addressing these improves people’s lives.  Reflecting on the case 
study it is likely that a number of residents were rehoused in better quality 
accommodation, with fewer category 1 hazards, and will have felt the benefit of this. 
Many of the financial support packages offered to residents could only be redeemed 
if their replacement properties were ‘decent’ or at least mortgageable.  It must be 
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acknowledged however that only half the properties in Slater Street had category 1 
hazards, so improvements in housing condition may have only been felt by a 
percentage of residents.  Irrespective of improvements in housing condition however, 
it likely that a number of residents will have lost the social ties that they had formed in 
Slater Street. No evidence was found to suggest that displaced residents were to be 
rehoused, or given priority for housing in the new development.  Hence existing 
social ties are likely to have been lost.  Having ‘supportive relationships’ as well as a 
sense of ‘trust and belonging’ are central components of wellbeing, as defined in the 
National Accounts of Wellbeing (NEF, 2009b).  The intervention may also have 
affected the ‘personal wellbeing’ of some residents, impacting on their mental health 
as demonstrated by Qouta et al (1998).  An assessment of such wellbeing has not 
been undertaken in this case study, but it is important to acknowledge that the 
benefits accrued from rehousing are perhaps offset by impacts on wellbeing.          
 
But even if Slater Street residents have generally speaking been relocated to better 
housing, and even if their wellbeing has been preserved, this does not resolve the 
issue of capitalisation.  As noted in the previous chapter, increasing the wealth of low 
income households, and enabling greater homeownership, is a catalyst for wider 
social outcomes. In conclusion, whilst the intervention in Slater Street did not 
significantly decapitalise residents, it did not increase their capital wealth and this 
was an opportunity missed.  
 
There is another angle to the issue of capitalisation that has only become clear in the 
course of the case study; the ethics of the decision.  In ‘calling in’ the decision to 
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declare a clearance area, local councillors pointed to the moral imperative to 
recompense those displaced, because it was what they deserved.  As noted in the 
case study, the then Leader of the Labour Party in Stoke stated; 
 
‘It was not fair if residents did not benefit from the demolition’ (Stoke City 
Council, 2006b) 
 
It seems right that the act of acquiring and demolishing someone’s property should 
result in significant recompense for that individual.  The moral case for this seems 
intuitive; such an intervention is an impingement on the rights of an individual.  In the 
Public Inquiry, the then Housing Standards Manager at Stoke City Council cited the 
following from the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of 
Europe, 1952): 
 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest... The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest’ 
 
Whilst the protection of possessions is important, such rights can be forsaken in the 
‘public interest’.  This is a truly utilitarian caveat which has its foundation in the idea 
that ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people that is the measure 
of right and wrong’ (Bentham, 1776, p.3).  The application of such utilitarian ethics 
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means the decision to demolish can often be made if it is in the broader public 
interest.  But these codes of ethics contrast with those of libertarians, who would 
argue that:  
 
‘a minimal state limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, 
fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive 
state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things’ (Nozick, 
1974, p.ix). 
 
This thesis is not concerned with the validity of certain moral theories. Such ideas are 
presented to demonstrate that support for demolition, and conversely the opposition 
to it, have their basis in different moral codes.  Looking at the evidence of the case 
study, there are persuasive libertarian objections to demolition that should not be 
overlooked; that forcing individuals to do certain things, such as forsake their 
property, goes beyond an acceptable role for the state.  Such a moral objection, 
expressed by local councillors in Slater Street, adds weight to the imperative of 
capitalising residents as a successful regeneration strategy. 
 
Perhaps then demolition was judged to be the most satisfactory course of action 
because the alternatives were so undesirable.  Perhaps the decision to demolish was 
made because other alternatives would not capitalise residents, or were not 
financially viable.   As detailed above, when the 2006 NRA reported on the options 
for Slater Street, the combined scores for the economic assessment and socio-
environmental assessment suggested demolition was the best course of action.  
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Whilst it scored low on cost, it scored high on meeting the socio-environmental 
criteria, and hence had the highest combined assessment score.  But what of 
comprehensive renovation, was this a financially viable option?  As seen in some of 
the testimonies of our interviewees and the NRA survey responses, there was 
support for some form of refurbishment combined with selective demolition.  In the 
2006 NRA, comprehensive renovation scored lowest on the combined assessment 
and was the least preferred option.  Whilst it scored second highest on the socio-
environment assessment, it was deemed the most expensive and therefore had the 
lowest combined score (as a result of the economic assessment carrying more 
weight in the combined score).  In addition to the scoring it appears that pragmatic 
concerns were being raised that not all residents would sign-up to a renovation 
scheme as they would all need to make a personal investment.  Nonetheless, in 
hypothetical terms comprehensive renovation seems to have been the best option for 
capitalising existing residents, particularly owner occupiers.  The 2006 NRA suggests 
that such a scheme would have increased total property values by £13.7m, 
significantly increasing the capital of existing owners/landlords.  In addition, such a 
scheme would have addressed a number of the other criterions in the assessment 
such as maintaining the existing community, preserving heritage and improving 
house conditions.  If such an intervention included schemes to enable those renting 
to access ownership, then further capitalisation would take place.   
 
It is with some regret then that a simple mathematical error in the economic 
assessment of comprehensive renovation meant that it was deemed the most 
expensive, when actually it was the most cost efficient option.  In Figure 23 below, in 
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the column entitled NPV, the amount for increased market value is £13,754,586.  
This is crucially expressed as a positive amount, which is correct as the up-lift in 
value from renovation is a benefit that should be subtracted from the costs.  
However, in the ‘Total’ at the bottom of the NPV column, the increase in market value 
has been counted as a negative.  Hence the total NPV for comprehensive renovation 
is stated to be –£24,648,972, when actually it should have been a positive 
£2,860,182.  In essence, comprehensive renovation was the only option that 
delivered a net economic benefit, and would have been deemed the most 
satisfactory course of action if the scores were recalculated. 
 
Figure 23: NPV calculations for comprehensive renovation 
 
 
Whether demolition had factual and practical grounds for support is an issue for 
discussion.  It is clear however that errors were made in the calculations of 
cost/benefit for comprehensive renovation, and therefore the evidence did not 
support demolition as the best course of action. 
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So what is the relevance of this to the issue capitalisation?  It is an unfortunate irony 
that the error in the calculations relates to the increase in market value of renovated 
properties. It is this very increase in values that would achieve the outcome this 
thesis has argued for; the capitalisation of residents.  As renovations were 
completed, property values would increase, and it would be existing owners who 
would realise this up-lift and increase in capital.  Hence the error leads to an 
underestimation of the benefits of renovation, and specifically, underestimates the 
benefits of capitalisation.  
 
Knowing now that house prices were to stall in 2008 and 2009, the estimate of 
£13,754,586 up-lift from renovation was too high.  From 2007 to 2010 the average 
price of terraced house in Stoke-on-Trent actually fell from £77,000 to £74,000.  
Nonetheless, even if the up-lift in values from renovation was calculated at a minimal 
amount, comprehensive renovation would still have been the most cost efficient 
option.      
 
Putting such errors aside, perhaps RENEW would suggest that comprehensive 
renovation was impractical.  Securing the sign-up of all residents would be impossible 
because of the need for residents’ own contributions.  Such was the view of the 
Director of Community and Adult Services at the council at this time (Stoke City 
Council, 2006b, p.10): 
 
‘If there was major refurbishment, money would also have to be found by 
residents themselves, in which case, questions would need to be asked, such 
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as if owners could afford refurbishment costs and how long the property would 
stay in good repair’. 
 
Reflecting on this and other evidence presented against refurbishment, it is clear that 
the presumption was that only small investments could be made in residents’ 
properties by RENEW.  Why was this so?  If £18.7m NPV could be spent on 
acquisition and compensation under a demolition scheme, why could this not be 
spent on the 240 properties in Slater Street to bring them up to modern standards?  
Acquisition and compensation equated to a cost of £77,000 per property, much more 
than the £30,000 per property predicted in the calculations for comprehensive 
renovation.  Perhaps the retort would relate to cash flow, i.e. that the expenditure of 
£18.7m could be made by RENEW as it would realise a return on this when the land 
when sold to developers.  However, because the demolition option was not assessed 
for future benefits (neither economic, social nor environmental) this will never be 
known.    
 
To conclude, it is clear that the intervention chosen for Slater Street as the most 
satisfactory was not the one that best capitalised residents.  Errors were made that 
underestimated the benefits of capitalisation.  Practical issues and considerations 
about cashflow may be raised in response.  However, if the ‘social costs’ of 
demolition (RENEW, 2004) are to be prioritised, then comprehensive renovation 
would seem the preferred chosen option.   If however, in the utilitarian spirit, the 
losses of displaced residents were to be offset by benefits to surrounding and new 
residents, then this should have been made explicit.  It is argued that this could not 
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be explicit because of the libertarian objections such as those given by local 
councillors.  
 
5.3.2. Empowerment 
 
In reviewing the case study evidence there are numerous instances of consultation 
by RENEW and partners.  Looking purely at the quantity and structure of those 
consultations, it is clear that steps were taken to find out the views of Slater Street 
residents’, most notably their preferred intervention.  Such consultation activity 
included locally held events to gather residents’ views, interactive exercises around 
land use, consultations on spending plans and strategic development sites, and 
surveys to gather a variety of data; including demographic information, housing 
preferences/choices and views on preferred interventions for the area.  In addition, 
local forums were set up comprising both professionals and resident representatives 
to discuss issues and interventions.    There is then no doubt that consultation was 
undertaken, and that at key points when a decision about the preferred intervention 
was needed residents’ views were sought.    
 
But were residents empowered?  Using the government’s definition of empowerment, 
developed around the time of the public inquiry, it is legitimate to ask whether 
residents were given the ‘power to shape and influence’ the eventual interventions of 
the HMRP (CLG, 2007, p.12).  Those answering in the affirmative would point to the 
socio-environmental survey (as part of the NRA 2006) that asked residents for their 
preferred intervention.   In this survey nearly two thirds of respondents deemed 
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clearance their preferred option, which gave RENEW and partners the community 
mandate to proceed with this option.  If the decision had been made to do something 
other than demolition, RENEW and partners may have received criticism for not 
listening to residents’ views.   
 
So, in some respects, the community did have a decisive influence over the chosen 
intervention. But it is a valid question to ask what sort of mandate the above survey 
provided.  Detailed above are the anomalies in the number of surveys that were sent 
out (which is likely to have skewed results in favour of tenant and landlord 
preferences).  Also detailed above is the issue of having only 25% of households 
form a mandate for intervention.  Objectors to demolition suggest that greater 
investment should have been made in conducting face to face interviews, and 
ensuring every household was contacted through a variety of methods (Former local 
councillor, 2010).  Such mixed methods have been used in other HMRPs to achieve 
appropriate sampling (Hull Gateway, 2006).  So how confident can we be in the 
statistics from the socio-environmental survey?  Calculating the confidence interval 
for the surveying reveals that we can be 95% confident that results wouldn’t have 
varied by +/-7.65% if every household completed the survey.  Therefore at worst, 
support for demolition would have been 53% and at best 72%4
 
. Even with the lowest 
possible level of support demolition would still have been the preferred option. 
Perhaps then, concerns around mandate relate more to ensuring everybody can 
have their say, rather than stressing representative value. 
                                            
4 A note of caution is needed here that such statistical tests rely on random sampling, and in this case 
it is likely that the sample was skewed toward tenants and landlords. 
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Despite this, some of the processes and decision-making by RENEW and its partners 
did not serve to empower residents.  A seemingly small and subtle decision made in 
the 2006 NRA reveals a genuine level of disempowerment of Slater Street residents.  
This is perhaps symbolic of a broader mentality.  In developing the criteria for the 
socio-environmental assessment, residents’ views directly led to the formation of a 
number of criterions.  These were supplemented with a set of criteria from RENEW.  
In a crucial decision about how to score the options against the criteria, it was 
decided that RENEW’s criterions should receive a higher weighting than those from 
the community (RENEW, 2008b, p.21): 
 
‘The two factors relating to regeneration and house condition were considered 
to be the most significant in terms of RENEW’s ambitions for the AMI and 
therefore given a higher weighting’ 
 
It is difficult to translate the impact of this on the decision to demolish. What it does 
demonstrate however is that in the crucial process of deciding how to assess the 
options for intervention, the objectives of RENEW were given a higher priority than 
those of existing residents.  Viewed cynically, this act could be seen as an attempt to 
drive through RENEW’s ambitions irrespective of the wishes of existing residents.  
Even in a sympathetic light, it appears to be somewhat heavy-handed.   
 
Similarly the decision to demolish all properties in Slater Street, by classing non-
category 1 hazard properties as ‘added lands’, seems heavy-handed.  Only half the 
properties in Slater Street contained such hazards, and this raises questions about 
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whether it is legitimate for ‘added lands’ to constitute nearly half of a demolition 
programme.  It is argued that in order for demolition and rebuild to have ‘stacked-up’ 
financially the whole site needed to be cleared.  Some residents and local ward 
councillors were in favour of selective demolition, which would have seen those 
properties with the most severe hazards demolished, and those in a decent state of 
repair retained and refurbished.  It is not known why, in neither the 2002 NRA nor the 
2006 NRA, the option of selective demolition was not assessed.   
 
Empowerment is about more than just influencing decisions.  In the CIH’s good 
practice guidance on community engagement, it expresses the need for HMRPs to 
‘support independent community initiatives’ (CIH, 2007, p19).  The emphasis 
throughout the case study shows that RENEW’s emphasis was on consulting 
residents, rather than handing over control or engaging them in the co-production of 
any intervention.  The failure to explore the option of a CLT is an example of this, 
which represented an opportunity for RENEW and partners to look at more 
community-led interventions.  As shown, there was some support for a CLT from 
individual residents, the local MP, community activists, and supporting consultants.  
But as Chapter 4 shows, developing a CLT is highly complex and the case study 
confirms this.  Specifically, it shows how difficult it can be to convey the value and 
operation of a CLT to residents. One of our interviewees highlighted the difficulties in 
initiating a CLT purely through voluntary action, and this concurs with the broader 
evidence base regarding the creation of urban CLTs in the UK.  Specifically the case 
study corroborates the suggestion that an over-reliance on a small number of 
volunteers is a risk to development (Crowe et al, 2010).  This provides an important 
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piece of learning on the empowering role of HMRPs and local authorities.  
Empowerment is not a passive task that is simply about letting go.  It entails active 
support, providing the resources and support required for communities to take control 
or co-design solutions.  As suggested by Crowe et al (2010, p.70), a period of ‘12-24 
months of capacity building’ was probably needed for a number of residents and 
activists in Slater Street.  In addition, it required the appointment of a ‘paid organiser’ 
(Crowe et al, 2010, p.72) who could handle the technical issues of setting up a 
community anchor organisation and planning the finances of the CLT.  An 
interviewee from the case study corroborated this recommendation, highlighting the 
fact that ‘you really need staff, it can’t be done alone’ (Resident, 2010).  This then 
was the key opportunity for RENEW and the local authority to play its empowerment 
role, providing the resources and support to enable residents to develop the model 
further.  Such a ‘sympathetic local authority [and]...supportive partners’ (Crowe et al, 
2010, p.49) are seemingly crucial to the development of CLT, and this case study 
supports that.   
  
It appears that this missed opportunity for empowerment, was probably the result of 
financial prudence on behalf of RENEW.  In order for the model to have been 
created, the assets or investment for the CLT would need to have been provided at a 
very low cost.  But this seems improbable, as it was too big an investment and too 
big a risk for RENEW.  The Quirk Review notes how one barrier to asset transfer is 
the over-riding mentality of ‘disposing of surplus assets at best price’ (Quirk, 2007, 
p.12).  It is likely that the case study validates this argument.  
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Perhaps a window of opportunity had been missed much earlier than 2007.  In 2002 
the NRA recommended that partners look into developing a ‘local housing and 
regeneration company’ for Middleport.  Whilst this was not a direct recommendation 
for a community-based model, it could have been a catalyst to explore a CLT for the 
area.  
 
Whilst RENEW and partners did not seize the opportunity to support the development 
of a CLT, or even to thoroughly explore it, they are not wholly to blame for it false 
starting.  By the time the CLT was actually being considered, the decision to 
demolish was already being made.  As noted by commentators, a five year lead-in 
time is required to establish a suitable organisation to take on the responsibilities of a 
CLT (Crowe et al, 2010).  Hence, the idea was developed too late in the process to 
be viable.  Perhaps also by this time the high levels of social capital, an essential 
ingredient of developing a CLT, were not in place.    
 
To conclude on the issue of empowerment, the research shows that RENEW did not 
meet stated best practice in this area.  But reflecting on the structure and nature of 
the HMRP programme, as described in Chapter 3, it is easy to see why RENEW 
failed to empower its residents.  As noted earlier in the thesis, the rationale for 
HMRPs was to take: 
 
‘a more ‘strategic’ approach that emphasises the role of mainstream 
government and public sector activity in determining the trajectory of 
neighbourhoods … the new policy advocates a ‘multilevel’ approach, in which 
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the importance is recognised of governance arrangements operating at a range 
of spatial scales. (Hastings, 2003, p. 85) 
 
RENEW was therefore tasked with ‘determining’ how neighbourhoods improved, and 
operating at large geographical scale to achieve this.  This would require forceful and 
directive action.  The onus would be on RENEW to create change, with input from 
local communities.  Operating at the sub-region, HMRPs like RENEW would have to 
look at neighbourhoods in terms of the function of their housing market.  If a 
neighbourhood had a dysfunctional housing market where demand could not support 
supply, an intervention in that neighbourhood should be made for the greater good of 
the sub-regional housing market.   
 
Making such utilitarian decisions at this spatial scale was not conducive to 
empowerment for a number of reasons. Firstly, HMRPs like RENEW were explicit in 
being led by public sector professional staff, who were given the job of ‘determining 
the trajectory of neighbourhoods’.  This meant that the conceived experience of 
professionals took precedence over the lived experience of residents (Allen and 
Crookes, 2009).  Perhaps this was a necessity given the sheer scale of housing 
abandonment, but it did mean that professionals (with some resident input) were 
choosing which neighbourhoods should be retained and improved, and which should 
be cleared and given a new ‘vision’.  In this context, there seems to have been little 
scope for communities to own and co-produce interventions.  Critics would argue that 
this would have led to an unpredictable and unstrategic patchwork of initiatives 
across neighbourhoods.  In addition, whilst the programme was given a 20 year time 
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frame, the demand for results probably meant that long term investment in 
community-led vehicles was unviable as HMRPs like RENEW needed to 
demonstrate quick tangible outputs.        
 
5.3.3. Interventions that empower and capitalise 
 
The case study gives rise to an important question; would a CLT refurbishment 
model have been a preferable option for Slater Street compared to the actual 
intervention?  The key test is whether, with hindsight, the same intervention would be 
made again in Slater Street.  In balancing the outcomes achieved (or likely to be 
achieved) from demolition in Slater Street against the projected benefits of a CLT 
refurbishment model would the same action be taken?   
 
There is no definitive answer to these questions, but the choice in part rests on the 
emphasis placed on existing residents.  If the wealth and empowerment of such 
residents is prioritised, it seems rational to support the model outlined in this 
research.  If attracting new capital is the priority in order to support wider economic 
development, then demolition, displacement and rebuild seems the rational choice.  
The current outcome for Slater Street is a cleared site with limited prospects for 
development in the near future.  With hindsight, the CLT model was at the very least 
worth exploring in full.   
 
The case study has shown how difficult CLTs are to develop, the barriers to creation, 
the complexity of the model and the difficulties in securing the assets needed.  These 
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challenges should not be underestimated.  To create a CLT in Slater Street, there 
was a need for greater professional support on issues of governance and financial 
planning.  As this thesis has shown, a CLT would have needed a bold local authority 
and HMRP, willing to adopt new investment strategies aimed at growing the capital 
wealth of existing residents, as well as increasing their empowerment.  Greater lead-
in time was needed so that planning for a CLT could have started in 2002, not 2007.  
By 2007 the Slater Street community was gradually shrinking, along with the social 
capital deemed crucial to the development of a CLT. Hence, by 2007 the conditions 
were not right for a CLT in Slater Street, and the planned demolition a formality. 
 
The case study presents one validation of our theoretical propositions.  It shows that 
in one instance, HMRP demolition failed to capitalise and empower existing 
residents. In addition, the research validates the proposition that, for Slater Street, a 
more effective intervention would have accounted for the capitalisation and 
empowerment of such residents.  But the case study does not validate the CLT 
model per se.  The case study is an example of a CLT ‘false-starting’, rather than a 
successful CLT intervention.  The case provides practical learning about how to 
tackle the barriers to CLT creation and has helped identify the potential value of CLTs 
in tackling issues of housing disrepair and low demand.  Despite this, further 
research is needed to provide conclusive evidence that CLTs are an effective model 
of intervention in HMRP areas. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The thesis has tried to build an understanding of HMRPs and their interventions.  It 
has explored the context from which they emerged, how they were conceived and 
how they acted once established.  It has focused on the significance of housing 
demolition to the programme and the opposition to it.  This has revealed a set of 
theoretical propositions; that HMRP demolition can fail to capitalise existing 
residents, that it can also fail to empower residents, and that interventions that 
account for these issues can be more effective.  It is suggested that CLTs may be 
one such model of intervention.  Such propositions were tested against a case of 
HMRP demolition, where the development of a CLT was a possibility. Such research 
has shed light on the nature of HMRP interventions, alternative models to demolition 
and challenges in applying such alternatives.  
 
To conclude the thesis this learning is drawn together.  The section presents a short 
summary of the key findings of this research.  It then assesses the extent to which 
the initial aims of the study have been achieved and its contribution to knowledge.  
Finally the section presents the limitations of the research before offering a view on 
the future relevance of this work. 
 
6.1. Findings   
This study spans from the early development of the HMRPs through to their closing 
stages (Jordan, 2010).  Studying the programme over such a long period of time has 
helped trace its evolutions, and the contextual drivers that have led to these 
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evolutions. The affordability crisis, the emergence of the Northern Way and the 
economic recession are to name but a few of these drivers.  A constant feature 
throughout the programme has been the tension between working within and across 
communities.  It seems that operating strategically at large spatial scales is more 
difficult than was first anticipated.  This is not because of failures of partnership or co-
ordination, more simply, it is because making strategic decision-making is difficult 
when residents have an attachment to their area. When residents’ views are loaded 
with ‘shared experiences and interpretations at a profound level’ (Liggett, 1995, 
p.251), it makes hard-nosed rational decisions difficult.  Few policymakers seem to 
have foreseen the neighbourhood-level challenges in trying to maximise utility within 
a wider housing market. 
 
Demolition is indeed a major element of the HMRP programme, if not in terms of 
housing units, then in terms of finances.  It is an issue that has been almost 
constantly contested in the sector press and national media, with some vociferous 
opposition.  Some opponents have treated such interventions as a homogenous 
whole.  This is misleading, not all HMRP demolition schemes lead to displacement, 
not all are revanchist and a number have been sensitive and selective.  But some 
HMRP demolitions do displace residents, are aimed at repopulation and are not 
sensitively handled.  The case study illustrates a number of issues with one such 
intervention in Slater Street, in Stoke-on-Trent.  Existing residents in Slater Street did 
not benefit financially from the intervention, nor does it appear they were empowered 
in a meaningful sense. 
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CLTs appear to offer a potential solution.  They are primarily a model for empowering 
communities to take charge.  They can enable community-level control of how 
housing is developed, managed and have the potential to provide other local services 
and facilities.  A number of residents and activists in Slater Street would have 
supported the words of the current Housing Minister, when he asserted the potential 
of CLTs to give communities control:   
 
‘People have waited long enough for a model that is on their side rather than 
on the side of the bureaucrat’ (Shapps, 2010, p.2). 
 
CLTs also have the potential to help low income households either access 
homeownership, or undertake renovations that will ultimately increase their capital 
wealth.  In refurbishment schemes this means increasing property values.  Such up-
lifts in value are shared between the resident and the CLT.  This builds the CLTs 
assets and enables them to undertake further interventions.  But the model, as 
demonstrated, is not without problems.  This thesis serves to confirm other research 
on the developmental challenges of CLTs.  To confirm whether or not CLTs have the 
potential suggested requires further research into existing CLTs in HMRP areas, and 
to support the creation of new ones. 
 
6.2. Achievement of aims and contribution of knowledge 
As stated in Chapter 1 the aim of this study was, ‘to provide intelligence that will 
enable HMRPs to develop more effective interventions’.  This thesis urges HMRP 
practitioners to think carefully about how demolition schemes benefit existing 
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residents.  It is hoped that the arguments in favour of capitalisation and 
empowerment of such residents are convincing, but also help practitioners articulate 
a case for more community-led interventions.  The case study demonstrates that 
such approaches may constitute a more effective intervention in certain contexts.   
Whilst the exploration of CLTs is far from conclusive, it presents sound reasons why 
such models may be valuable in HMRP areas.  It is hoped that this can raise the 
profile of, and introduce HMRPs to, an unusual CLT model based on renovation 
rather than redevelopment.   
 
The thesis has adopted a staged approach starting with board exploration, leading to 
theory development and primary research and analysis. A clear statement of the 
research questions has been made at the start of each stage of the study and thesis 
chapter.    Of specific note is the role of the research questions in the development 
and testing of the theoretical propositions.  The early research questions guided the 
focus of the study and the theoretical propositions were developed as a direct 
response to these.  Later in the study research questions were used to guide the 
testing of these theoretical propositions.  As such, the research questions have 
performed a key purpose and have been directly answered in each stage of the 
research. 
 
It is therefore suggested that the aims of the research have been met, and its 
research questions answered, but what of its contribution to knowledge?  It is argued 
that this contribution falls into two categories.  Firstly, in looking at a HMRP 
intervention in one case study area, new insights and learning have been produced 
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that is of practical local value.  Secondly, the thesis contributes to a wider body of 
knowledge related to HMRPs and urban CLTs. 
 
In reviewing the significant documentary evidence for the case study, this research 
has uncovered errors in the calculation of economic assessments.  Such knowledge 
comes too late to inform the intervention in Slater Street.  However such learning 
does provide RENEW and Stoke City Council with the opportunity to improve their 
processes in forming and appraising interventions.  This knowledge is unique, and it 
is likely it would never have been uncovered without this study. This detailed account 
of the intervention in Slater Street provides practitioners in the HMRP and local 
authority with a uniquely triangulated view of their intervention.  The hope is that this 
can inform future HMRP and other housing interventions. 
 
So what contribution does this thesis make beyond the case study?  This case study 
research is not intended to enumerate the number of areas where a CLT would be 
effective.  The case is not a representative sample, and therefore does not provide 
results that can be applied to a population with a predictable level of confidence.  
Rather, the case is an experiment ‘in which a previously developed theory is used as 
a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study’ (Yin, 2003a, 
p.33).  What is more the case study relates to a ‘critical case’, with a definite set of 
characteristics that allowed the research’s theoretical propositions to be tested.   
 
This means that the contribution of this work beyond the case study area is 
theoretical.  The thesis has developed a set of propositions that may be valid in other 
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areas.  It is for other practitioners and researchers to contextualise this learning in 
other areas, in order to apply it.  In addition, the research contributes to the growing 
body of work related to urban CLTs, particularly how they develop and the barriers to 
development.  The contribution in this area has been confirmatory rather than 
revelatory, validating a number of findings from existing work about urban CLTs 
(Crowe et al, 2010; CFS, 2008). 
  
6.3. Limitations of the research 
The research has a number of limitations. It does not provide conclusive proof that 
CLTs are an effective model of intervention in HMRP areas.  Its findings cannot be 
generalised to all HMRP areas and interventions.  There are also limitations 
associated with the methods adopted.  The small number of interviews with objectors 
in the case study perhaps places too much weight on their testimony.  Nonetheless, 
efforts to triangulate evidence have provided a rounded view of events in the case 
study.  
 
6.4. A view of the future 
As this research concludes, the UK’s coalition government is publishing its 
Decentralisation and Localism Bill (HM Government, 2010).  This will imbue 
communities with a number of new rights, including a community right to buy: 
 
‘The Bill will give communities powers to save local assets threatened with 
closure, by allowing them to bid for the ownership and management of 
community assets’. (HM Government, 2010, p.7) 
184 
 
 
Coupled with planning reforms that will give communities greater control over local 
development, the Bill is arguably laying the foundations for greater management and 
ownership of assets by communities.   In this context, the idea of Local Housing 
Trusts (LHT) has been mooted (Conservatives, 2009, p.23).  The LHT model will 
adopt many of the features of a CLT, such as holding assets in perpetuity for the 
benefit of a community.  It will be enable local areas to proceed with the development 
of housing without ‘specific planning applications’ (Schapps, 2010, p.2). 
 
In this context the learning developed in this thesis, particularly about CLTs and the 
barriers they face, is ever more relevant.  More importantly, if the current government 
is to extend such community-led models beyond rural settings, and into deprived 
urban areas with multiple housing issues, then the learning presented here is of real 
significance.   The end of the HMRP programme creates an imperative to seek new 
and creative solutions in areas of housing abandonment and dereliction.  If such 
solutions are not found, numerous sites will remain either wholly or partly cleared with 
no likelihood of development (Inside Housing, 2011).   In such circumstances the 
case for CLT models becomes more pressing and ever more persuasive. 
 
To move beyond the theories outlined in this thesis, applied research is now required.  
Such research would be aimed at understanding how CLTs can be formed and 
operate successfully in HMRP areas.  Through a process of action research, 
observing and supporting groups as they form and run an urban CLT, this applied 
knowledge can be obtained.  There remains only one major piece of research into 
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urban CLTs in the UK (CFS, 2009).  Whilst a useful toolkit this report leaves a 
number of operational questions unanswered.  Any further research in this field must 
seek to answer the following: 
 
1. What barriers and opportunities exist to creating CLTs in areas of urban 
renewal? 
2. How can CLTs in such areas access the assets and finances to undertake 
their activities? 
3. What types of partnerships can be formed with social landlords, 
developers, landowners and other infrastructure organisations? 
4. What legal models and structures should such CLTs adopt? 
5. Does the current legal framework for CLTs support or hinder their 
development in urban renewal areas? 
6. How can the development of CLTs in urban renewal areas best be 
supported? 
7. Should CLTs in urban renewal areas be geared toward housing 
refurbishment or new development? 
 
Such work would make an important contribution to the fields of socio-legal 
geography (Blomley, Delaney and Ford, 2001) and community property 
(Alexander and Penalver, 2011).  Equally, it has the potential to help policy 
makers and communities develop practical and workable solutions in the absence 
of central government funding. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Case Study Protocol 
1. Overview of the case study 
Case study objective:  
To test the validity of our theoretical propositions in the case of Slater Street 
Theoretical propositions: 
a) HMRP demolition programmes can fail to capitalise existing residents 
b) HMRP demolition programmes can neglect the empowerment of residents 
c) Interventions that account for the above two propositions will be more 
effective 
Key case study challenges: 
a) Engaging the HMRP in research 
b) Obtaining HMRP officer interviews 
c) Interviewing with sensitivity 
d) Accessing/interviewing displaced residents 
e) Using non-recorded data (e.g. conversations outside of recorded 
interviews) 
f) Filling the gap in evidence after public enquiry 
g) Cross referencing public enquiry evidence with interview data and media 
coverage 
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2. Field procedures 
Target interviewees: 
a) Existing residents 
b) Activists 
c) Displaced residents 
d) HMRP officer 
Data collection, analysis and write-up timeline:
 
Key sources of data: 
a) RENEW’s online resource 
b) Public enquiry evidence 
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c) Other documents submitted to the enquiry; NRA 2002, Stock condition 
surveys, consultation reports, AMI plans, BDP development plans, Council 
relocation/compensation policies, central government correspondence, 
miscellaneous appendices 
d) This is Staffordshire / The Stoke Sentinel 
e) Audit Commission performance monitoring reports 
 
3. Case study questions 
Research questions: 
a) How did the HMRP intervene? 
b) How much did the intervention capitalise residents?  
c) How much did the intervention empower residents? 
Areas for specific/further exploration: 
a) The proposed CLT 
b) Levels of displacement and financial gains of those displaced 
c) Financing of the Slater Street development scheme by HMRP 
d) Role of MBEV forum in decision making 
e) Opportunities for residents to take control 
f) The development timetable and details of the scheme (including tenure mix, 
sale prices, developer profits) 
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4. Case study report 
Structure: 
a) Context for Slater Street, using regional, HMRP and local authority context 
b) Chronology of intervention, broken down into manageable periods 
c) Analysis of intervention, assessing extent to which it empowered and 
capitalised 
d) Examine potential role of CLTs as an alternative intervention 
Summary of case study chronology: 
a) 2001-2002 – NRA (including Slater Street issues, option assessment and 
recommendations) 
b) 2003-2004 – AMI Plan and NAP 
c) 2005-2006 – Consultation and engagement, the 2006 NRA (including stock 
condition, socio-economic survey, option assessment and overview and 
scrutiny) 
d) 2007-2008 – NoIs, resident objections, Council policies for 
support/compensation, acquisition and the initiation of demolition, the 
proposed CLT, the public enquiry 
e) 2009-10 – public enquiry decision, Middleport masterplan, the impact of 
recession, BDP development brief, the future. 
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Mapping and other scanned evidence to be used: 
a) OpenOS – Broader Stoke/Newcastle-under-Lyme geography, Slater Street 
Road layout (amended) and Canal arm and key sites (amended) 
b) Middleport 2002 NRA boundaries 
c) 2002 NRA - NPVs for options 
d) 2006 NRA - NPVs for options 
e) 2006 NRA - socio-environnemental assessment scores 
f) 2006 NRA - detailed NPVs for renovation option 
g) RENEW demolition plan 
h) BDP masterplan for Middleport 
i) BDP design concept for Slater Street 
  
191 
 
Appendix 2: Example interview topic guide (resident interviews) 
Introduction 
 
• Explain the purpose of our work and purpose of interview: 
- Looking at demolition in the case study area to assess whether a set of 
ideas I have developed are valid in this case 
- The interview today is to talk about Slater Street, the process of demolition, 
outcomes for you and the community and the proposed CLT. 
• It is a semi-structured interview (i.e. not tick box).  I have a small number of 
question, but you have some direction over what we talk about 
• Time required – 13 questions, 1 hour 
• You will remain anonymous but can we record interview? 
• Quoting – You will not be named in person, but comments attributed to 
‘resident interviewee. 
• You can stop the interview at any time. 
• Is this ok?  Do you have any questions before we start?  
 
Questions 
1. How did the process start? 
2. What reasons were given for demolition?   
3. Talk me though process/timeline, from initially hearing about plans for Slater 
Street to the current day 
4. Where you given opportunity to influence decisions? 
5. At what points where you consulted/engaged? 
192 
 
6. Do you feel you will be adequately recompensed? 
7. What’s happened to people who used to live here? 
8. How did the idea of setting up a CLT come about? 
9. Why did you think it was an effective solution? 
10. What did you think you most needed to create a CLT? 
11. What stopped it developing? 
12. What did you need from the council/pathfinder to make it happen? 
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Appendix 3:  Neighbourhood Renewal Assessment steps 
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